I The Constitutional Court, 2 The Constitutional Court: Rules and Model

Author(s):  
Barsotti Vittoria ◽  
Carozza Paolo G ◽  
Cartabia Marta ◽  
Simoncini Andrea

This chapter succinctly introduces the reader to the composition, jurisdictional scope, and methods of judicial review in Italy. Using both direct and incidental methods of judicial review, the Italian system combines certain elements of centralized systems (like the Austrian paradigm of Hans Kelsen) with elements of diffuse systems of review like that of the United States. The chapter highlights the highly collegial structure and process of the Court. Overall, the cooperative and multilevel character of Italian constitutional adjudication emerges as its most distinctive contribution to our understanding of the range of the varieties of constitutional models and experiences in the world.

Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter examines the two models of judicial review that exist in the common law countries: the Diffuse Model and the Second Look Model. The Diffuse Model of judicial review originated in the United States and has spread to India, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, most of the countries of Latin America, the Scandinavian countries (except for the Netherlands), and Japan. It is premised on the idea that a country’s written constitution is its supreme law and that courts, when deciding cases or controversies that are properly before them, are thus duty-bound to follow the constitution, which is supreme law, and not a contrary statute whenever those two items conflict. Meanwhile, the essence of the Second Look Model of judicial review is that a Supreme or Constitutional Court ought to have the power of judicial review, subject to some kind of legislative power of override. This, it is said, best harmonizes the advantages of a written constitution and a bill of rights enforced by courts with the imperatives of democratic self-government. The underlying goal is to obtain the advantages of both constitutional government and also of democratic government.


Author(s):  
Barsotti Vittoria ◽  
Carozza Paolo G ◽  
Cartabia Marta ◽  
Simoncini Andrea

Forms and methods of constitutional interpretation are less divisive in Italy than in the United States. In this chapter the interpretive style of the ItCC is described as “syncretistic” or “integrated” because the Court uses a combination of many different approaches to constitutional interpretation. The ItCC interprets the Constitution as a whole, as an integrated system, avoiding the fragmented interpretation of a single provision detached from the context and relationship with other principles, rules, and rights inscribed in the Constitution. This chapter also focuses on the concepts of reasonableness and proportionality, which are used synonymously in a way that is ancillary to many other constitutional principles, making them pervasive in constitutional adjudication. This chapter also studies the types of decisions of the constitutional court and their overall effects.


2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 148-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lino A. Graglia

Constitutional law in the United States is, for most practical purposes, the product of ‘judicial review’, the power of judges to disallow policy choices made by other officials or institutions of government, ostensibly because those choices are prohibited by the Constitution. This extraordinary and unprecedented power, America's dubious contribution to the science of government, has made American judges the most powerful in the world, not only legislators but super-legislators, legislators with virtually the last word. Because lawmaking power divorced from popular will is tyranny, most states have attempted to reconcile the lawmaking power of judges with representative self-government by subjecting all or some judges to some form of popular election. In all but four such states, judges, encouraged and supported by their fellow lawyers in the organized bar—would-be judges and beneficiaries of judicial power—have responded by adopting codes of judicial ethics that limit what candidates for election to judicial office are permitted to say. The effect is to undermine elections as a control on judicial power by limiting criticism of judicial activism, the misuse of judicial power.


This article attempts to critically assess the gathering and examination of evidence in Russian and American constitutional litigation. With references to case law of the Russian Constitutional Court and the United States Supreme Court, the author demonstrates that the properties of judicial review of legislation have significantly shaped the basic elements of constitutional fact-finding. The general idea of the article is that owing to the practice of «in-house» re-search conducted by the Russian Constitutional Court, constitutional justice in Russia tends to be inquisitorial, whereas judicial review of legislative actions exercised by American trial courts basically complies with the adversarial principle. At the same time when it comes to constitutional litigation in federal appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court, one can observe a clear deviation from the adversarial principle and notice investigative traits that appear to be at odds with the American concept of justice. Also in both countries there exists a similar negative trend associated with constitutional reasoning based on evidence that was not tested by parties in the course of constitutional proceedings.


2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Patrono

"Man", said Benjamin Franklin, "is a tool-making animal". A major contribution of 20th century Western legal thought to tool-making was possibly the publication in 1914 of Reichgesetz und Landesgesetz nach der österreichen Verfassung1 by Hans Kelsen, a Czech lawyer, but Austrian by adoption. Kelsen is noted for his "pure theory of law". By conferring upon a special constitutional court the exclusive power to rule on the constitutionality of legislation and to refuse to enforce legislation that in its judgment violated the constitution, Kelsen found a way for the United States pattern of constitutional adjudication (as established in 1803 by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v Madison) to work in countries which have (as in the United States) a written and "rigid" Basic Law, and even where the doctrine of precedent does not operate.This is a very short history of the development of that Kelsen "tool" and an evaluation of it.


1976 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fritz Nova

The Watergate controversies and especially the recent decision in Richard M. Nixon versus the United States on July 24, 1974 have again raised in the United States the problem of the political limits to judicial policy making and the need to strike a new balance among the three branches of government for preserving and maintaining a democratic policy. In this paper, which is based on largely primary judicial, political, and academic German sources up to the year 1972, the development of jurisprudence of the West German Federal Constitutional Court is analyzed and discussed, particularly the Court's experience with judicial review. The article is geared toward the student of comparative constitutionalism and comparative government, offering possible lessons to the United States and other Common Law constitutional courts. Less concerned with the practical work of the Court, except for brief comments on actual performance, the paper focuses on such problems as past and present German approval and disapproval of the notion of judicial review, the often erudite disputation on the merits of constitutional—especially “creative”—jurisprudence; the discussion on the political limits of judicial review; and trends in particular philosophical positions of the Court in contemporary West Germany.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Lubbers

The US system of administrative adjudication in which our federal agencies decide disputes with private parties themselves with administrative hearings, with an internal appeal, followed by judicial review based on the administrative record in the federal courts is familiar to American lawyers. But that is not the system that is followed by most countries around the world—where agency decisions are typically made in a very informal manner, with any requested hearings taking place in administrative courts or tribunals and sometimes with further review in the ‘regular’ courts. This dichotomy between the US system of internal administrative adjudication and external administrative adjudication around the world reveals that the United States is the outlier. This chapter describes this dichotomy in more detail and examines its implication in terms of administrative justice and other qualitative measures of the different models.


2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 186-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malini Ratnasingam ◽  
Lee Ellis

Background. Nearly all of the research on sex differences in mass media utilization has been based on samples from the United States and a few other Western countries. Aim. The present study examines sex differences in mass media utilization in four Asian countries (Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Singapore). Methods. College students self-reported the frequency with which they accessed the following five mass media outlets: television dramas, televised news and documentaries, music, newspapers and magazines, and the Internet. Results. Two significant sex differences were found when participants from the four countries were considered as a whole: Women watched television dramas more than did men; and in Japan, female students listened to music more than did their male counterparts. Limitations. A wider array of mass media outlets could have been explored. Conclusions. Findings were largely consistent with results from studies conducted elsewhere in the world, particularly regarding sex differences in television drama viewing. A neurohormonal evolutionary explanation is offered for the basic findings.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 32-54
Author(s):  
Silvia Spitta

Sandra Ramos (b. 1969) is one of the few artists to reflect critically on both sides of the Cuban di-lemma, fully embodying the etymological origins of the word in ancient Greek: di-, meaning twice, and lemma, denoting a form of argument involving a choice between equally unfavorable alternatives. Throughout her works she shines a light on the dilemmas faced by Cubans whether in Cuba or the United States, underlining the bad personal and political choices people face in both countries. During the hard 1990s, while still in Havana, the artist focused on the traumatic one-way journey into exile by thousands, as well as the experience of profound abandonment experienced by those who were left behind on the island. Today she lives in Miami and operates a studio there as well as one in Havana. Her initial disorientation in the USA has morphed into an acerbic representation and critique of the current administration and a deep concern with the environmental collapse we face. A buffoonlike Trumpito has joined el Bobo de Abela and Liborio in her gallery of comic characters derived from the rich Cuban graphic arts tradition where she was formed. While Cuba is now represented as a rotten cake with menacing flies hovering over it ready to pounce, a bombastic Trumpito marches across the world stage, trampling everything underfoot, a dollar sign for a face.


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