Immanuel Kant and Jurisdiction in International Law

Author(s):  
Stephan Wittich

This chapter discusses Immanuel Kant’s notion of jurisdiction. Kant’s work contains several thoughts and ideas on the scope of regulatory state activities that may well be read as pertaining to the exercise of imperium in the sense of jurisdiction how it is commonly used today. In his philosophical sketch on Perpetual Peace, Kant proceeded from a traditional understanding of jurisdiction as coexistence between states as a cornerstone of international law. In this traditional view, jurisdiction is nothing more than a reasonable mutual delimitation of jurisdictional spheres based on territoriality or personality. Yet, at the same time, he also developed a visionary idea of cosmopolitan law which would significantly affect the traditional rules of jurisdiction, especially the personality principle through the emergence of individual rights. Kant’s approach thus foreshadowed a development towards an anthropocentric international legal order epitomized by the concepts of human rights and universal jurisdiction.

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Tomuschat

The international legal order today constitutes a truly universal legal system. It has received guiding principles through the United Nations Charter: ever since this ‘Constitution for the world’ began operating, sovereign equality of states, self‑determination of peoples, and human rights have been key components of this architecture, which has reached a state of ‘conceptual unity’ belying the talk of ‘fragmentation’ of international law that so fascinated scholars in their debates only a short while ago. The great peace treaties of 1648, 1815, and 1919, as Euro‑centric instruments influenced by the interests of the dominant powers, could not bring about a peaceful world order. After World War II, it was, in particular, the inclusion of the newly independent states in the legislative processes that has conferred an unchallenged degree of legitimacy on international law. Regrettably, its effectiveness has not kept pace with its normative growth. Some islands of stability can be identified. On the positive side, one can note a growing trend to entrust the settlement of disputes to formal procedures. Yet the integration of human rights in international law – a step of moral advancement that proceeds from the simple recognition that, precisely in the interest of world peace, domains of domestic and international matters cannot be separated one from the other as neatly as postulated by the classic doctrine of international law – has placed enormous obstacles before international law. It must be expected that the demand for more justice on the part of developing nations will subject the international legal order to even greater strain in the near future. Currently, chances are low that the issue of migration from the poorer South to the ‘rich’ North can be resolved.


2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-104
Author(s):  
Shruti Rana

Abstract The Covid-19 pandemic and related shutdowns created seismic shifts in the boundaries between public and private life, with lasting implications for human rights and international law. Arriving just as the international legal order was wobbling in the wake of a populist backlash and other great challenges, the pandemic intensified fault lines of marginalisation and state action, amplifying the forces that had already left the liberal international order in crisis and retreat. This article examines the pandemic’s impacts on the international legal order through a gendered lens. It argues that in the short-term, the pandemic has reinforced public-private divides in international law, reinvigorating previous debates over the role of the state in protecting its people from harm. It argues that in the long-term, these developments threaten to unravel the most recent gains in international law and global governance that have supported and expanded the recognition of human rights to marginalised groups. Left unaddressed, this unraveling will further entrench such divides and contribute to the further retreat of the liberal international order. Examining these fault lines and their implications can help us re-imagine a post-pandemic international legal order that offers more protection for human rights, even as multilateral institutions and cooperation sputter or fail.


2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (10) ◽  
pp. 1072-1094 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjartan Koch Mikalsen

This article takes issue with the common view that cosmopolitan normative commitments are incompatible with recognition of state sovereignty as a basic principle of international law. Against influential cosmopolitans, who at best ascribe a derivative significance to the sovereignty of states, the article argues that state sovereignty is not only compatible with, but also essential to the recognition of individuals as units of ultimate concern. The argument challenges a problematic distributive conception of justice underlying many cosmopolitans’ support for reforms of the international legal order towards a system where respect for basic human rights is the only criterion for political legitimacy. An alternative relational conception of justice makes it possible to see why there is an internal connection between the rights of individuals and the rights of states. The argument adds up to a novel defence of the so-called domestic analogy, which regards the territorial integrity of states as an international parallel to the bodily integrity of individuals.


2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-207
Author(s):  
Robert J. Knox

AbstractBill Bowring’s book attempts to argue for a Marxist account of international law that embraces it as a tool for progressive politics and revolutionary change. He argues it is necessary to give a substantive account of both, locating them in the real struggles of the oppressed. Specifically, he locates human rights in the three great revolutions ‐ the French, the Russian and the anticolonial. However, this revolutionary heritage has been ‘degraded’ by recent events. As such, it is necessary to adopt ‘revolutionary conservatism’, invoking international law’s origins against its current degradation. This review argues that, owing to international law’s indeterminacy, Bowring’s project is susceptible to imperial appropriation. This means, however, that Bowring cannot give an account of why we should use international law. It then argues that Bowring’s account of Pashukanis is wrong, and that Pashukanis’s work can better make sense of Bowring’s insights and international law more generally.


2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bill Bowring

AbstractThis response to Robert Knox’s very kind and constructive review1 of my 2008 book The Degradation of the International Legal Order: The Rehabilitation of Law and the Possibility of Politics gives me the opportunity not only to answer some of his criticisms, but also, on the basis of my own reflections since 2008, to fill in some gaps. Indeed, to revise a number of my arguments. First, I restate my attempt at a materialist account of human rights. Next I explain why, for me, the right of peoples to self-determination is absolutely central to a materialist understanding of human rights; and also fill a serious gap in my own account in the book. This leads me not only to a reply to Robert Knox on the question of ‘indeterminacy’ in international law, but also to a disagreement with him on the use or misuse of the language of self-determination. My fourth section returns to our very different evaluations of the significance and meaning of the work of Yevgeny Pashukanis, and what, for me, is Pashukanis’s misunderstanding, for reasons consistent with his general theoretical trajectory, of Marx and Lenin on the Irish question. Finally, I present an outline of a re-evaluation of Marx’s principled position on self-determination.


2019 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-250
Author(s):  
Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi

The theme of coordination between different principles and values is becoming central to contemporary international law. This is because the latter has become a broad and complex legal system and is going through a phase of profound transformation. This also implies a paradigmatic and ideological change of the international legal order, which tends to shift from a law of rules to a law of values. In this transition phase, conflicts occur especially between the principles of ‘old’ international law and the principles of ‘new’ international law. In this paper it is claimed that, in international law, three different methods are used to try to resolve the antinomies between conflicting principles: a) a ‘traditional positivist’ method; b) a ‘modern positivist’ method; c) a ‘value-based’ method. These three methods are strictly linked to three different conceptions on the sources of general international law and on the means for identification of that law. This article examines separately the three methods and the practical results to which they arrive, using as a main example the conflict between principles on international immunities and principles on fundamental human rights. The conclusion is that the interpreter should today avoid the ‘traditional positivist’ method, because it is now unsuitable for the reality of contemporary international law. Instead, he should use both the ‘modern positivist’ method and the ‘value-based’ method, coordinating them among themselves. Keywords: Conflicting Principles, Antinomies, Sources of International Law, Jus Cogens, Immunities, Fundamental Human Rights, Access to Justice, Balancing


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Ginsburg

Democracies and authoritarian regimes have different approaches to international law, grounded in their different forms of government. As the balance of power between democracies and non-democracies shifts, it will have consequences for international legal order. Human rights may face severe challenges in years ahead, but citizens of democratic countries may still benefit from international legal cooperation in other areas. Ranging across several continents, this volume surveys the state of democracy-enhancing international law, and provides ideas for a way forward in the face of rising authoritarianism.


1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 622-640 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Byrnes ◽  
Hilary Charlesworth

The scope of international law steadily widens. In addition to the traditional concerns of direct relations between states such as warfare and diplomatic immunity, it now includes human rights, labor law and environmental policy, which deal with the relations of a state with its own citizens and territory.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry Nardin

Despite repeated claims during the past century that the international legal order has been radically transformed, the contours of that order are in many ways the same in 2019 as they were in 1919. New laws govern international institutions, human rights, trade, and the environment and new institutions have emerged that affect how international law is interpreted and applied. War has lost legitimacy as a tool of foreign policy and individual responsibility for aggression and crimes against humanity has been affirmed. Yet these changes build on ideas and practices that may have been rudimentary but were not absent a century ago. Underlying them are persistent differences involving a shifting cast of old and new states as well as differences between local and universal ideals and between instrumental and noninstrumental conceptions of law. The traditional understanding of state sovereignty on which the international legal order rests has been qualified but not discarded, and its persistence confirms that the system it orders remains a system of states.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-174
Author(s):  
GEIR ULFSTEIN

AbstractThe European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is an international court operating in the international legal order. Its judgments are not given direct effect in national law. In this sense we have a system of legal pluralism between international and national law. But the ECtHR has constitutional effects in national law through the weight placed on the Court’s practice by national courts. Therefore, constitutional principles are applicable in the interaction between the ECtHR and national courts. This article discusses the transnational constitutional aspects of the Court, and how this should guide the roles of, respectively, the ECtHR and national courts.


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