Part III Understanding Words, 7 Principle 7: Unnatural Meanings

Author(s):  
Calnan Richard
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

This chapter discusses the circumstances in which the courts do not give words their natural meaning. Very occasionally, it is clear that the parties cannot objectively have intended words they have used to have their ordinary meaning. If so, they are given the meaning which the parties must objectively have intended. The more unreasonable the result, the more unlikely it is that the parties can have intended it. This is a very controversial principle and different judges take a more—or less—expansive view of it. The chapter discusses the different views, and why they are held. It analyses the recent cases to establish where the law is at the moment. It looks at particular types of case where the courts have been more willing to twist the meaning of words. These include exclusion and limitation clauses, clauses limiting liability for negligence, and termination for minor breach. It discusses recent cases in which the courts have twisted the meaning of words in contracts, and also those where the courts have declined to do so.

Author(s):  
О. В. Бойко

The scientific article identifies the peculiarities of appealing the decisions, actions or omissions of public administration subjects on the provision of public services at the stage of initiation and preparation for judicial review of an administrative case. The author substantiates the feasibility of improving the legal regulation of the procedure for holding a preliminary hearing before the court hearing of the case. In particular, it is considered expedient to set the terms of the preparatory meeting from the moment of receipt of the administrative claim, as well as to determine the cases when the parties are not reconciled.It is established that the preliminary stage of the court hearing often ends with the conclusion of the preliminary proceedings and the appointment of the case to trial in the field of public services. This is not against the law. However, it should be borne in mind that in accordance with Art. 121 of the CAS of Ukraine such a decision is delivered by the consequences of preparatory proceedings, not the previous court hearing. Obviously, preparatory proceedings are not limited to, and do not always end at, a previous court hearing. Preparation may continue after a preliminary hearing. Therefore, the decision to close the preliminary proceedings and assign the case to trial after the consequences of the previous court hearing can only be made if the judge has taken all the measures necessary to hear the case. If during a previous court hearing in the field of public services, to which all persons involved in the case have arrived, the issues necessary for its consideration have been resolved, then, with the written consent of these persons, a court hearing may be initiated on the same day. In this case, the termination order is also delivered.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-136
Author(s):  
Adam J. Kolber
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

Abstract The law inevitably draws lines. These lines distinguish, for example, whether certain conduct reflects ordinary recklessness constituting manslaughter or more extreme recklessness constituting murder. There is no way to meaningfully draw such lines, however, absent shared ways of representing amounts of recklessness or at least knowledge of the consequences of drawing lines in particular places. Yet legal actors frequently draw lines in the dark, establishing cutoffs along a spectrum with little or none of the information required to do so in a way that suits the law’s goals. For example, jurors must decide whether some conduct constitutes extreme recklessness without knowing prior precedent nor the sentencing consequences of drawing cutoffs in particular places. Judges and lawyers cite line drawing precedents from other jurisdictions without considering whether the lines drawn in prior cases had the same consequences as those in the case at bar. And scholars argue about how to classify conduct without making clear what consequences they believe ought to attach once the classification is made, leaving it hard to tell when scholars have substantive or simply superficial disagreements. In this Article, I discuss some line drawing problems and briefly suggest ways we can add meaning to cutoffs. More generally, I argue, we can “smooth” certain features of the law to both reduce our vulnerability to line drawing in the dark and improve the fit between the law and what our best theories of law recommend. Even when we cannot easily smooth the law, thinking about the law in a smoother fashion can help reduce the jurisprudential pathologies I describe.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Roberts

The notion that the Earth has entered a new epoch characterized by the ubiquity of anthropogenic change presents the social sciences with something of a paradox, namely, that the point at which we recognize our species to be a geologic force is also the moment where our assumed metaphysical privilege becomes untenable. Cultural geography continues to navigate this paradox in conceptually innovative ways through its engagements with materialist philosophies, more-than-human thinking and experimental modes of ontological enquiry. Drawing upon the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon, this article contributes to these timely debates by articulating the paradox of the Anthropocene in relation to technological processes. Simondon’s philosophy precedes the identification of the Anthropocene epoch by a number of decades, yet his insistence upon situating technology within an immanent field of material processes resonates with contemporary geographical concerns in a number of important ways. More specifically, Simondon’s conceptual vocabulary provides a means of framing our entanglements with technological processes without assuming a metaphysical distinction between human beings and the forces of nature. In this article, I show how Simondon’s concepts of individuation and transduction intersect with this technological problematic through his far-reaching critique of the ‘hylomorphic’ distinction between matter and form. Inspired by Simondon’s original account of the genesis of a clay brick, the article unfolds these conceptual challenges through two contrasting empirical encounters with 3D printing technologies. In doing so, my intention is to lend an affective consistency to Simondon’s problematic, and to do so in a way that captures the kinds of material mutations expressive of a particular technological moment.


2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 926-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen MacDonald

AbstractFrom the mid-twentieth century, England's coroners were crucial to the supply of organs to transplant, as much of this material was gleaned from the bodies of people who had been involved in accidents. In such situations the law required that a coroner's consent first be obtained lest removing the organs destroy evidence about the cause of the person's death. Surgeons challenged the legal requirement that they seek consent before taking organs, arguing that doing so hampered their quick access to bodies. Some coroners willingly cooperated with surgeons while others refused to do so, coming into conflict with particular transplanters whom they considered untrustworthy. This article examines how the phenomenon of “spare part” surgery challenged long-held conceptions of the coroner's role.


1996 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-165
Author(s):  
Stephen H. Schwebel

Andrés Aguilar Mawdsley had a national and international career of the highest distinction. After his studies in Venezuela and at McGill University in Montreal – where more than the law he found the lovely wife who was at his side until the moment of his death – he began his career as a teacher of law, early attaining the rank of professor and dean of the law faculty in Caracas. By the age of thirty-four, he was appointed Minister of Justice. He subsequently served as the legal counsel of the Venezuelan national oil company and in many other positions of responsibility in Venezuela.


2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 434-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cath Crosby

This article considers the basis upon which a person should be held to be criminally liable, and to do so, it is necessary to examine the leading theories of character and choice that underpin the State holding a person to be culpable of a criminal offence, i.e. the link between culpability and fault. The case of R v Kingston1 is used to examine the application of these leading theories and it is observed that choice theorists would not excuse such a defendant from criminal liability even though his capacity to make a choice to refrain from law breaking was made extremely difficult by external factors beyond his control. Only character theory could possibly offer exculpation in such circumstances on the basis that the defendant acted ‘out of character’ and his deed did not deserve the full censure and punishment of the criminal law. The Court of Appeal in R v Kingston would have been prepared to excuse, but the House of Lords, and most recently the Law Commission have adopted a pragmatic approach to the involuntarily intoxicated offender. This case serves as a reminder that while justice is the aim of the criminal justice system, it is not an absolute standard.


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Göran Sluiter

AbstractThis article deals with the question of possible effect of the law of international criminal procedure for domestic war crimes trials. With the increasing number of national prosecutions for war crimes this question will gain in relevance.The article starts with an exploration of the origin and development of the law of international criminal procedure, to reach the conclusion that because of the lack of a strong foundation it is difficult to discern firmly established rules in this field. Next, two areas are examined where the law of international criminal procedure is capable of producing effect for national trials: human rights and rules that have developed in the specific context of war crimes prosecutions.Whether rules of international criminal procedure are formally effective in the domestic legal order remains to be seen. There is no clear obligation under international law to do so. Furthermore, the law of international criminal procedure may be difficult to harmonise with domestic inquisitorial systems.In spite of these difficulties, the article concludes that national courts will increasingly face similar procedural problems in complex war crimes trials as international criminal tribunals and will be happy to learn from their experiences.


Author(s):  
Yoann Della Croce ◽  
Ophelia Nicole-Berva

AbstractThis paper seeks to investigate and assess a particular form of relationship between the State and its citizens in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, namely that of obedience to the law and its related right of protest through civil disobedience. We do so by conducting an analysis and normative evaluation of two cases of disobedience to the law: (1) healthcare professionals refusing to attend work as a protest against unsafe working conditions, and (2) citizens who use public demonstration and deliberately ignore measures of social distancing as a way of protesting against lockdown. While different in many aspects, both are substantially similar with respect to one element: their respective protesters both rely on unlawful actions in order to bring change to a policy they consider unjust. We question the extent to which healthcare professionals may participate in civil disobedience with respect to the duty of care intrinsic to the medical profession, and the extent to which opponents of lockdown and confinement measures may reasonably engage in protests without endangering the lives and basic rights of non-dissenting citizens. Drawing on a contractualist normative framework, our analysis leads us to conclude that while both cases qualify as civil disobedience in the descriptive sense, only the case of healthcare professionals qualifies as morally justified civil disobedience.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-288
Author(s):  
Katayoun Hosseinnejad

Abstract Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties calls for consideration of the ordinary meaning as the starting point in the process of interpretation. Although the linguistic concept of ordinary meaning is founded on the idea that the meaning of a sentence is directly imposed by the norms of language so that interpreters are provided with an objective standard which is external to their subjectivity, this article demonstrates that the interpretive jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice has departed from the imperatives of the ordinary meaning doctrine. Rather, the Court, mindful of the problem that no mere sequence of words can represent actual legal meaning, has moved towards construction of ordinary meaning.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-48
Author(s):  
Whitney K. Taylor

When do individuals choose to advance legal claims to social welfare goods? To explore this question, I turn to the case of South Africa, where, despite the adoption of a "transformative" constitution in 1996, access to social welfare goods remains sorely lacking. Drawing on an original 551-person survey, I examine patterns of legal claims-making, focusing on beliefs individuals hold about the law, rights, and the state, and how those beliefs relate to decisions about whether and how to make claims. I find striking differences between the factors that influence when people say they should file a legal claim and when they actually do so. The way that individuals interpret their own material conditions and neighborhood context are important, yet under-acknowledged, factors for explaining claims-making.


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