2 The prohibition of the use of force

Author(s):  
Gray Christine

This chapter examines the prohibition of the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which provides that ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’. States and commentators generally agree that the prohibition is not only a treaty obligation but also customary law. However, there are disagreements between states on the interpretation and application of Article 2(4): does ‘the use of force’ include not only armed force but also economic coercion and, more recently, cyber attacks. Can humanitarian intervention ever be lawful? Is Responsibilty to Protect now a substitute for humanitarian intervention?

2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 910-925 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Chinkin

The use of force has been prohibited in international relations since at least the United Nations Charter, 1945. Article 2 (4) of the Charter states:All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the United Nations.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Yitzhak Benbaji ◽  
Daniel Statman

The legal prohibition on aggression was first posited in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand pact (‘The Pact of Paris’), which outlawed ‘war as an instrument of national policy’. The parties to this pact undertook the duty not to use force to resolve ‘disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them’. Later, the United Nations Charter gave expression to the same idea: ‘All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.’...


1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
pp. 809-837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Franck

Twenty-five years ago, the Allied nations gathered at San Francisco in the warming glow of victory and signed a solemn treaty giving effect to their determination “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war …” and “to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest …” Specifically, they undertook in Article 2(4) to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state …” They also committed themselves to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means …”


Author(s):  
W Scholtz

This article focuses on three instances of the use of armed force in international relations. The three instances that are explored are the intervention by NATO in Kosovo, the armed attack by mainly the USA and the UK against Afghanistan and the war against Iraq in 2003. The purpose of this investigation is to examine the legality of the coercive measures in order to ascertain the effects that these actions had in relation to article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The proposed justifications for the attacks differ and these are carefully scrutinized against the jus ad bellum as to determine the legality of the attacks. The notion of humanitarian intervention was used as a ground for justification by various international scholars to explain the use of force in Kosovo, but this concept is not recognized in terms of international law. The attack on Afghanistan was based on article 51 of the UN Charter. The attacks were directed at Afghanistan as this state harboured the terrorists responsible for the attacks on the USA. The mere harbouring of terrorists does not give rise to the use of armed force on the basis of article 51 and as such the use of coercive measures against Afghanistan was illegal. The use of force in Iraq was mainly based on the doctrine of pre-emptive force which is alien to international law. The USA and its coalition partners also acted in contravention with the jus ad bellum in this regard. The author poses certain proposals in relation to the jus ad bellum and stresses the importance of article 2(4) which must ensure that international relations are not once more regulated by the use of armed force. 


Author(s):  
Nicole Scicluna

This chapter explores the justness, legitimacy, and legality of war. While 1945 was a key turning point in the codification of jus ad bellum (i.e. international law on the use of force), that framework did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it was the product of historical political contingencies that meant that codification of the laws of war was contemporaneous, both geographically and temporally, with the solidification of the norms of sovereign nation-statehood and territorial integrity. The chapter focuses on the UN Charter regime and how it has shaped the politics of war since 1945. Importantly, the Charter establishes a general prohibition on the use of force in international relations. It also grants two exceptions to the prohibition: actions undertaken with Security Council authorization and actions taken in self-defence. Today, many of the most serious challenges to the Charter regime concern the definition and outer limits of the concept of self-defence. Another set of challenges to the Charter regime concerns the contested concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. The chapter then looks at the development of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 458-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingvild Bode ◽  
John Karlsrud

Since the failures of the United Nations of the early 1990s, the protection of civilians has evolved as a new norm for United Nations peacekeeping operations. However, a 2014 United Nations report found that while peacekeeping mandates often include the use of force to protect civilians, this has routinely been avoided by member states. What can account for this gap between the apparently solid normative foundations of the protection of civilians and the wide variation in implementation? This article approaches the question by highlighting normative ambiguity as a fundamental feature of international norms. Thereby, we consider implementation as a political, dynamic process where the diverging understandings that member states hold with regard to the protection of civilians norm manifest and emerge. We visualize this process in combining a critical-constructivist approach to norms with practice theories. Focusing on the practices of member states’ military advisers at the United Nations headquarters in New York, and their positions on how the protection of civilians should be implemented on the ground, we draw attention to their agency in norm implementation at an international site. Military advisers provide links between national ministries and contingents in the field, while also competing for being recognized as competent performers of appropriate implementation practices. Drawing on an interpretivist analysis of data generated through an online survey, a half-day workshop and interviews with selected delegations, the article adds to the understanding of norms in international relations while also providing empirical insights into peacekeeping effectiveness.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 79
Author(s):  
Pshtiwan Mohammed Qader

The present paper examines the problem of cyber-attacks under existing international law. It takes the view that the (United Nations) UN Charter provisions on the use of force can be extended to cyber-attacks by means of interpretation although the relevant provisions do not explicitly address such issue. This Article argues that cyber-attacks resulting in material damage or destruction to property, death or injury to persons, or severe disruption of the functioning of critical infrastructures can be characterized as use of armed force and therefore violate the prohibition contained in article 2(4) of the Charter. However, cyber-attacks not resulting in the above consequences may be illegal intervention in the internal affairs of other states if such attacks are coercive in nature. In addition, the current study discusses that a cyber-attack which amounts to a use of armed force per se is not sufficient to give the victim state the right to self-defense, unless its scale and effects are equivalent to those of a conventional armed attack. Finally, the study concludes that an international cyber treaty is truly necessary to more effectively address cyber-attacks.


2021 ◽  
pp. 149-164
Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Arts 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the United Nations Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years, the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.


Author(s):  
Christopher Daase ◽  
Nicole Deitelhoff

The present chapter turns from the justification of war (the use of force) to the justification of coercion. It proceeds on the assumption that to stabilize the current international order requires less ‘legitimate force’ and more ‘legitimate coercion’ since in most institutions the enforcement of norms—as the very basis of order—does not only or even primarily rely on physical force but on various forms of political and economic coercion. The chapter distinguishes various forms of coercion and reconstructs debates in International Law and International Relations with regard to their legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Doing so, Christopher Daase and Nicole Deitelhoff intend to broaden the debate on world order by redirecting the focus from the use of force to the use of less violent coercive measures. Specifically, the chapter introduces a concept of sanction as a means of communicating normative expectations to the normative community rather than executing punishments.


Author(s):  
Marina Mancini

This chapter explores how a state of war or armed conflict affects the relations between belligerents, between belligerents and third states, and the belligerents’ subjects. It begins by describing how a state of war arose between two states, along with its far-reaching consequences, in classical international law. The effects on diplomatic relations, trade relations, treaties, and contracts are highlighted. The chapter then considers the prohibition on the use or threat of armed force in international relations and its implications for the concept of a state of war as well as the consequences traditionally attached to it. It also looks at state practice regarding the creation of a state of war in the United Nations era and concludes by analysing the effects of an interstate armed conflict in contemporary international law.


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