scholarly journals Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment

2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 628-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane E. Stromseth

What impact will the Iraq war of 2003 have on international law governing the use of force and on the future of the United Nations Security Council? Some commentators have proclaimed that the military intervention led by the United States amounted to the “death” of the UN Charter and the end of “the grand attempt to subject the use of force to the rule of law.” The Security Council’s failure to reach agreement—in die face of French-U.S. antagonisms—spells the end, they argue, of an effective Council role in addressing major threats to peace and security. My own view is that it is premature to pronounce the “death” of the UN Charter or to give up on future prospects for Security Council agreement on the use of force. We are, nevertheless, at a difficult and precarious transitional moment in the international legal system governing the use of force, and the stark tensions reflected in the differences over Iraq are symptomatic of hard problems that may persist for the foreseeable future. Both the rules and the system need refining and reform. Success in doing so will require imagination and much greater willingness by policy makers to consider law’s potential role, not as a barrier to necessary action, but as a means to enhance global security in the face of emerging threats. In seeking such reform, it will be important to build upon the realism of the Charter’s founders, who combined rules governing the use of force with a clear commitment to credible enforcement action in response to threats to peace and security.

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-409
Author(s):  
Naoko Matsumura ◽  
Atsushi Tago

Authorization of the use of force by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is believed to increase levels of public support for military action. While scholars have performed sterling research both in theory and empirics on the power of UNSC authorization, there is still much that we do not understand. In particular, we believe that it is necessary to conduct a further study on ‘failed’ authorization cases. As Terrence Chapman points out in his theoretical framework, the general public can derive valuable information based on which of the permanent members of the Council casts a veto; this in turn affects public attitudes towards the use of force. An expected veto cast by the perpetual nay-sayer would not serve as information for the general public. However, if the veto is cast by an allied state of a proposer of the authorizing resolution, the negative vote functions as an information short-cut signaling that the use of force presents a variety of problems, thus reducing public support for the military action. Using online survey experiments, we find supportive evidence for this argument. Our data also suggest that surprising negative information changes the perceptions of legitimacy, legality, public goods, and US interest in a proposed military action, but is unrelated to the perception of costs, casualties or duration.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
ZOU Keyuan

AbstractThe Charter of the United Nations designates the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as one of the principal organs of the United Nations, assuming the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. It has the power to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, to make recommendations, and decide what measures should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. This article addresses a number of issues concerning how the UNSC Resolutions are enforced at sea in accordance with applicable international law and makes special reference to the circumstances in East Asia, particularly the Korean Peninsula.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 516-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Burns H. Weston

In his recent book The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Thomas Franck defines “legitimacy” as it applies to the rules applicable among states. “Legitimacy,” he writes, “is a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.In adopting Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, implicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq in response to Iraq’s August 2, 1990 invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council made light of fundamental UN Charter precepts and thereby flirted precariously with “generally accepted principles of right process.” It eschewed direct UN responsibility and accountability for the military force that ultimately was deployed, favoring, instead, a delegated, essentially unilateralist determination and orchestration of world policy, coordinated and controlled almost exclusively by the United States. And, in so doing, it encouraged a too-hasty retreat from the preeminently peaceful and humanitarian purposes and principles of the United Nations. As a consequence, it set a dubious precedent, both for the United Nations as it stands today and for the “new world order” that is claimed for tomorrow.


2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (5) ◽  
pp. 1196-1208
Author(s):  
Klara Tothova Jordan

On March 7, 2013, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2094 (2013), bolstering the scope of United Nations (UN) sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Resolution represents the international community’s latest attempt at applying diplomatic and economic pressure to the DPRK so as to curb its nuclear weapons program. The resolution is also a response to the DPRK’s third nuclear test on February 12, 2013 and its subsequent threat to carry out preemptive nuclear strikes against the United States and South Korea. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council responded to these grave violations of its existing Resolutions—seen as clear threats to international peace and security—by building upon, strengthening, and expanding the scope of the sanctions regime against the DPRK.


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 563-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Yoo

In his speech before the United Nations (UN) in September 2002, President George W. Bush characterized the possible use of force against Iraq as necessary to enforce existing Security Council resolutions and to eliminate a dangerous threat to international peace and security. The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1441, which found Iraq to be in material breach of previous Security Council resolutions and threatened serious consequences for further intransigence. When Iraq refused to fully comply with these resolutions, the United States led an ad hoc “coalition of the willing” that invaded Iraq on March 19,2003, quickly defeated Iraq’s armed forces, and ended the regime of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party. On May 1,2003, President Bush announced that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. At the time of this writing, the United States has assumed the position of an occupying power that is responsible for rebuilding Iraq, as recognized by the Security Council in Resolution 1483.


2002 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-37 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractThe article explores the extent to which the Security Council has the legal authority to authorize regional (defence) organizations to enforce military measures on its behalf. In the process it identifies Article 53(1) of the Charter, as well as Articles 42 and 48(2) as the clauses that could facilitate such action. Whereas the first enables enforcement action between the regional organization and its members, the latter two allow for the military utilization of regional organizations outside of their territory and/or against non-members, as well as the military utilization of other organizations such as regional defence organizations. Thereafter, it explains how the centralization of the use of force within the Charter structure requires the Security Council to remain in overall control of the authorization. This factor, in combination with the `opt-in' character of Chapter VII decisions, necessitates the explicit and prior nature of the authorization. In addition, it implies that authorizations that are not subjected to an explicit time limit and from which no functional limitation can be derived, will only remain legal as long as they are supported by all five permanent members of the Security Council. The potential implications of these principles are illustrated with reference to the practise of Security Council with respect to ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as NATO in former Yugoslavia.


Author(s):  
Charlotte Graves Patton

Resolution 1325, adopted by the United Nations Security Council (SC) on October 31, 2000, reaffirms the important role of women in conflict resolution as well as in the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security. Res 1325 urges states to expand the number of women working in UN peacekeeping, diplomacy, the military, and police, while rejecting impunity in matters of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, especially with reference to violence against women. It also calls for greater consideration of the needs of women and girls in conflict circumstances, including in refugee camps, and the different needs of female and male ex-combatants in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Transnational networks, such as the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security (NGOWGWPS), played an influential role in the drafting of Res 1325y. The implementation of this resolution throughout UN agencies may be assessed using two theoretical perspectives, constructivism and neorealism. The NGOWGWPS’s published report, Five Years On Report: From Local to Global: Making Peace Work for Women, describes National Action Plans (NAPs) as a tool that member states could use to detail steps that they will take to fulfill Res 1325’s objectives. It is worth noting that 37 out of 193 member countries of the UN have or are establishing NAPs. However, the UN has been slow to “adopt, consume, and promote” the norms embodied in SC Res 1325. One way to address this is to include changes in national foreign policies actively supporting such norms.


Author(s):  
Ian Johnstone

This chapter examines the scope and limits of the UN Security Council’s competence in dealing with situations requiring the use of force. It discusses the Charter provisions on the delegation of enforcement action to regional organizations or coalitions of the willing, and legal issues that have arisen in practice. It looks at the establishment or authorization of robust peacekeeping missions with some enforcement powers, with both regional organizations and coalitions either occasionally acting on the basis of implicit authorizations to use force or claiming retroactive approval. It analyses three types of case that tend to arise when the Security Council is divided: imprecise authorization, implied mandates, and failure to act due to ‘unreasonable’ exercise of the veto. Although wishing the Council to be clear and consistent, the contestation surrounding these cases is to be expected from a deeply political body and reinforces its value for managing international peace and security.


2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIKA DE WET

AbstractThis article examines the evolution of military operations by the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) over the last three decades. By looking at constitutional (treaty) developments and organizational practice, it questions whether these sub-regional organizations have displaced the primacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in matters pertaining to international peace and security, as foreseen in Articles 24(1) and 103 of the United Nations Charter (the UN Charter). The relevance of this question is underscored by the fact that ECOWAS and SADC have engaged in various peace operations since the 1990s. The article concludes that, since all the interventions under discussion were underpinned by the consent of the recognized government, it would be premature to suggest that the practice of African sub-regional organizations amounts to the emergence of a new customary right to engage in ‘first-instance enforcement action’.


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