The expert witness in the criminal and civil courts

Author(s):  
John O’Grady

The psychiatric expert witness in court acts at the interface between psychiatry and the law. This chapter explores the legal, ethical, and procedural frameworks for this work, with special reference to the criminal court in common law jurisdictions.

2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-54
Author(s):  
Fiona Milne

From the publication of the first two cantos of Don Juan in 1819, the poem’s legal status was in doubt. Although never found blasphemous or seditious in a criminal court, Byron’s copyright in Don Juan was not upheld by the civil courts, owing to the possibility that the poem might be ‘injurious’ to the public. Alongside these courtroom debates, Byron and his poetry came under increasingly intense scrutiny before the figurative ‘tribunal of the public’, in periodicals and newspapers. Reviewers and commentators appraised Don Juan in the vocabulary of the criminal law, assuming the roles of advocate, jury and judge. This article analyses some of these legal and quasi-legal attacks, and investigates how Byron engaged with them. Don Juan, I propose, bears traces of the legal pressures Byron faced, absorbing the threat of criminal prosecution and exploring the question of what an oppositional statement of self-defence might look like.


1998 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 668-682 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRUCE S. BENNETT

The medieval canon law of affinity as an impediment to marriage combined a large range of prohibited degrees with a wide power of dispensation. After the Reformation, however, English law, in line with mainstream Protestant opinion, prohibited marriages within the degrees mentioned in Leviticus, with no provision for dispensation. The prohibited degrees were set out in ‘Archbishop Parker's Table’ in the Prayer Book, beginning with the memorable declaration that ‘A man may not marry his grandmother’. In the nineteenth century, however, some of these restrictions came to be challenged. The classic case was that of marriage with a deceased wife's sister, and it was under this title that successive bills were introduced to alter the law.Until 1857 the law of marriage was administered by the ecclesiastical courts, according to the canon law. However, the civil courts modified and controlled this canon law by means of the writ of prohibition: canon law was now subordinate to common law, and where the two conflicted the civil courts would over-rule the ecclesiastical courts. Marriage with a deceased wife's sister was illegal, and, as with other impediments to marriage, a case could be brought in the ecclesiastical courts to have such a marriage declared void. A case on these grounds could only be brought during the lifetime of both spouses. Nevertheless, the marriage had theoretically been void ab initio, and even after one spouse had died the survivor could still be proceeded against for incest.


Author(s):  
Christina L England

This paper seeks to address the role of the battered women’s syndrome in criminal court cases where battered women have killed their husbands in self-defense. A historical analysis of law pertaining to domestic relationships and violence reveals the male biases imbedded in the law and the obstacles women face in seeking equality and justice in the legal system. After a brief description of the development of self-defense law and Lenore Walker’s “battered women’s syndrome”, court cases starting mostly from the mid-1970’s during the second wave of the women’s movement are examined. Legal criteria for self-defense are then analyzed along with important precedents that trace the emergence through a series of court cases of legal opportunities to use this psychological condition to support pleas for self-defense. In addition, important precedents are studied that have been made over the past few decades permitting expert witness testimony in the courtroom to explain this psychological theory as it pertains to the case. The latter part of the paper deals mostly with controversies surrounding the use of the battered women’s syndrome in the courtroom and the current state of self-defense law. I conclude with a proposal for reformation of expert witness testimony and for redefining legal terms in the criteria for self-defense.


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 232-250
Author(s):  
Stephanie Dropuljic

This article examines the role of women in raising criminal actions of homicide before the central criminal court, in early modern Scotland. In doing so, it highlights the two main forms of standing women held; pursing an action for homicide alone and as part of a wider group of kin and family. The evidence presented therein challenges our current understanding of the role of women in the pursuit of crime and contributes to an under-researched area of Scots criminal legal history, gender and the law.


2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 326-337
Author(s):  
Steve Hedley

In this article, Professor Steve Hedley offers a Common Law response to he recently published arguments of Professor Nils Jansen on the German law of unjustified enrichment (as to which, see Jansen, “Farewell to Unjustified Enrichment” (2016) 20 EdinLR 123). The author takes the view that Jansen's paper provided a welcome opportunity to reconsider not merely what unjust enrichment can logically be, but what it is for. He argues that unjust enrichment talk contributes little of value, and that the supposedly logical process of stating it at a high level of abstraction, and then seeking to deduce the law from that abstraction, merely distracts lawyers from the equities of the cases they consider.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fawzia Cassim ◽  
Nomulelo Queen Mabeka

Civil procedure enforces the rules and provisions of civil law.  The law of civil procedure involves the issuing, service and filing of documents to initiate court proceedings in the superior courts and lower courts. Indeed, notice of legal proceedings is given to every person to ensure compliance with the audi alteram partem maxim (“hear the other side”). There are various rules and legislation that regulate these court proceedings such as inter alia, the Superior Courts Act, 2013, Uniform Rules of Court, Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act, 2012 and the Magistrates’ Courts Act of 1944. The rules of court are binding on a court by virtue of their nature.  The purpose of these rules is to facilitate inexpensive and efficient legislation. However, civil procedure does not only depend on statutory provisions and the rules of court.  Common law also plays a role. Superior Courts are said to exercise inherent jurisdiction in that its jurisdiction is derived from common law.  It is noteworthy that whilst our rules of court and statutes are largely based on the English law, Roman-Dutch law also has an impact on our procedural law. The question thus arises, how can our law of civil procedure transform to accommodate elements of Africanisation as we are part and parcel of the African continent/diaspora? In this regard, the article examines the origins of Western-based civil procedure, our formal court systems, the impact of the Constitution on traditional civil procedure, the use of dispute resolution mechanisms in Western legal systems and African culture, an overview of the Traditional Courts Bill of 2012 and the advent of the Traditional Courts Bill of 2017. The article also examines how the contentious Traditional Courts Bills of 2012 and 2017 will transform or complement the law of civil procedure and apply in practice once it is passed into law.


Author(s):  
Eva Steiner

This chapter examines the law of contract in France and discusses the milestone reform of French contract law. While this new legislation introduces a fresh equilibrium between the contracting parties and enhances accessibility and legal certainty in contract, it does not radically change the state of the law in this area. In addition, it does not strongly impact the traditional philosophical foundations of the law of contract. The reform, in short, looks more like a tidying up operation rather than a far-reaching transformation of the law. Therefore, the chapter argues that it is questionable whether the new law, which was also intended to increase France's attractiveness against the background of a world market dominated by the Common Law, will keep its promise.


Author(s):  
Lusina HO

This chapter examines the law on contract formation in Hong Kong which is closely modelled on the English common law but adapts the English solutions to the local context if and when required. The test for ascertaining the parties’ meeting of the minds is objective, the agreement (an offer with a matching acceptance) must be certain, complete, and made with the intention to create legal relations—the latter being presumed to be present in a commercial context and absent in a familial or social context. Offers are freely revocable although the reliance of the offeree is protected in exceptional circumstances. Acceptances become effective as soon as they are dispatched. In the ‘battle of forms’ scenario, the Hong Kong courts follow the traditional ‘last-shot’ rule. There is no general duty to negotiate in good faith, and even agreements to negotiate in good faith are normally unenforceable for lack of certainty. As a general rule, contracts can be validly made without adhering to any formal requirement. Online contracts will normally be valid and enforceable; the formation of such contracts is governed by common law as supplemented by legislation.


Author(s):  
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling

This chapter studies intellectual property (IP). A hallmark of the New Private Law (NPL) is attentiveness to and appreciation of legal concepts and categories, including the traditional categories of the common law. These categories can sometimes usefully be deployed outside of the traditional common law, to characterize, conceptualize, and critique other bodies of law. For scholars interested in IP, for example, common law categories can be used to describe patent, copyright, trademark, and other fields of IP as more or less “property-like” or “tort-like.” Thischapter investigates both the property- and tort-like features of IP to understand the circumstances under which one set of features tends to dominate and why. It surveys several doctrines within the law of copyright that demonstrate how courts move along the property/tort continuum depending on the nature of the copyrighted work at issue—including, in particular, how well the work’s protected contours are defined. This conceptual navigation is familiar, echoing how common law courts have moved along the property/tort continuum to address disputes over distinctive types of tangible resources.


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