The Self
This book is about the ways that the concept of an ‘I’ or a ‘self’ has been developed at different times in the history of western philosophy; it also offers a striking contrast case, the ‘interconnected’ self, who appears in some expressions of African philosophy. If ‘human being’ is a biological classification, ‘I’ is a mental one. What I’s do is think. The most common theme across western accounts of ‘I’s that think’ is that they are self-conscious. A second theme (in the west) is that selves have unity: There is one self who recalls past experiences and anticipates future actions. Despite being self-conscious selves, it has proven difficult to say what a self is without paradox. Normally, the object of consciousness pre-exists the consciousness, but we cannot be a self without being self-conscious, so it seems that a self and the consciousness thereof must be coeval. How can we be self-aware and yet have no idea of what a self is? (It cannot just be a body, since a live human body might not be able to think.) The essays in this volume engage many philosophical resources—metaphysics, epistemology, phenomenology, philosophy of psychology and philosophy of language—to illuminate these puzzles. The Reflections present attempts to approach some aspects of these puzzles scientifically and also provide a sense of how central they are to human life.