The Complications of Penal Federalism

Author(s):  
Franklin E. Zimring

This chapter discusses two punishments most often mentioned as examples of American national exceptionalism—capital punishment and imprisonment. It examines the available data on state penal power and patterns of these two most prominent issues implicated in discourse about American penal exceptionalism. The chapter shows that, in each setting, there are huge variations among American states. Moreover, in both cases, the study of interstate variation is a useful method of investigating the causes of penal difference. In the case of imprisonment trends over time, there may also be a nearly uniform pattern that reveals much about the influences of culture and public opinion on penal policy.

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-105
Author(s):  
Christian Caron

Capital punishment remains legal in most U.S. states even though only a small number of them regularly impose it. I attribute the persistence of death penalty statutes to the existence of direct democracy institutions in about half the states. Applying a longitudinal research design that leverages annual estimates of state death penalty opinion, I show that these institutions strengthen the connection between public opinion and capital punishment’s legality, indicating that they foster policy responsiveness. By extension, because citizens have generally favored capital punishment, I find that direct democracy states are more likely to have the death penalty. I also demonstrate that direct democracy increases the likelihood that policy will be congruent with majority opinion, especially in states where opinion leans strongly in one direction. The representation-enhancing effect of direct democracy, however, does not extend to the punishment’s application, as measured by states’ issuance of death sentences.


Author(s):  
Kathryn L. Schwaeble ◽  
Jody Sundt

The United States is unique in its reliance on incarceration. In 2018 the United States had the largest prison population in the world—more than 2.1 million people—and incarcerated 655 per 100,000 residents, the highest incarceration rate in the world. The U.S. public also holds more punitive attitudes in comparison to citizens of other Western, developed countries. For example, when presented with the same description about a hypothetical criminal event, Americans consistently prefer longer sentences compared to residents of other countries. Attitudes about the death penalty are also instructive. Although international support for the death penalty has declined dramatically over time, the majority of Americans are still in favor of capital punishment for certain crimes. In comparison, Great Britain abolished the death penalty in 1965, and only 45% of its citizens continue to support capital punishment. This raises an important question: Can understanding the will of the public help explain how governments respond to crime? The answer to this question is more complicated than expected upon first consideration. The United States generally starts from a more punitive stance than other countries, in part because it experiences more violent crime but also because Americans hold different moral and cultural views about crime and punishment. U.S. public officials, including lawmakers, judges, and prosecutors, are responsive to trends in public attitudes. When the public mood became more punitive during the 1990s, for example, U.S. states universally increased the length of prison sentences and expanded the number of behaviors punishable by incarceration. Similarly, the public mood moderated in the United States toward the end of the 2000s, and states began reducing their prison populations and supporting sentencing reform. It is also true, however, that public officials overestimate how punitive the public is while citizens underestimate how harsh the justice system is. Moreover, the public supports alternatives to tough sentences including prevention, treatment, and alternatives to incarceration, particularly for juveniles and nonviolent offenders. Thus public opinion about punishment is multifaceted and complex, necessitating the exploration of many factors to understand it. Looking at public attitudes about punishment over time, across culture and societies, and in a variety of ways can help explain why social responses to crime change and why some people or groups of people are more punitive than others. Two ideas are helpful in organizing motivations for punishment. First, public support for punishment may be motivated by rational, instrumental interests about how best to protect public safety. Public concern about crime is a particularly important influence on trends in the public mood, but fear of crime and victimization are inconsistently related to how individuals feel about punishment. Second, attitudes about punishment are tied to expressive desires. Attitudes are influenced by culture and moral beliefs about how to respond to harm and violations of the law. Thus attitudes about punishment are relevant in understanding how the public thinks about the problem of crime, as how people think and feel about crime influences what they think and feel should be done about it.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 405-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin T. Pickett

This article reviews evidence for the effects of public opinion on court decision-making, capital punishment policy and use, correctional expenditures, and incarceration rates. It also assesses evidence about the factors explaining changes over time in public support for punitive crime policies. Most of this evidence originates from outside of our discipline. I identify two reasons that criminologists have not made more progress toward understanding the opinion-policy relationship. One is an unfamiliarity with important theoretical and empirical developments in political science pertaining to public policy mood, parallel opinion change, majoritarian congruence, and dynamic representation. Another is our overreliance on cross-sectional studies and preoccupation with comparing support levels elicited with different questions (global versus specific) and under different conditions (uninformed versus informed). I show how the resultant findings have contributed to misunderstandings about the nature of public opinion and created a false summit in our analysis of the opinion-policy relationship.


Author(s):  
Manuel Fröhlich ◽  
Abiodun Williams

The Conclusion returns to the guiding questions introduced in the Introduction, looking at the way in which the book’s chapters answered them. As such, it identifies recurring themes, experiences, structures, motives, and trends over time. By summarizing the result of the chapters’ research into the interaction between the Secretaries-General and the Security Council, some lessons are identified on the changing calculus of appointments, the conditions and relevance of the international context, the impact of different personalities in that interaction, the changes in agenda and composition of the Council as well as different formats of interaction and different challenges to be met in the realm of peace and security, administration, and reform, as well as concepts and norms. Taken together, they also illustrate the potential and limitations of UN executive action.


Author(s):  
Catherine E. De Vries

This chapter introduces a benchmark theory of public opinion towards European integration. Rather than relying on generic labels like support or scepticism, the chapter suggests that public opinion towards the EU is both multidimensional and multilevel in nature. People’s attitudes towards Europe are essentially based on a comparison between the benefits of the status quo of membership and those associated with an alternative state, namely one’s country being outside the EU. This comparison is coined the ‘EU differential’. When comparing these benefits, people rely on both their evaluations of the outcomes (policy evaluations) and the system that produces them (regime evaluations). This chapter presents a fine-grained conceptualization of what it means to be an EU supporter or Eurosceptic; it also designs a careful empirical measurement strategy to capture variation, both cross-nationally and over time. The chapter cross-validates these measures against a variety of existing and newly developed data sources.


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