Criminal Law as Public Law II

Author(s):  
Vincent Chiao

This chapter develops the “public law conception” of the criminal law. By embodying a form of negative reciprocity, the criminal law plays an important role in stabilizing social cooperation. Stabilizing social cooperation with public institutions is the basic function of the criminal law, in the sense of a function that must be adequately discharged regardless of whatever other functions we might wish to achieve by means of the criminal law. Hence, the criminal law is subject to a “fully political standard of justification”: the criminal law is worth supporting if and only if (1) the institutions whose rules it enforces are worth supporting, and (2) its use in a particular context would be consistent with the principles that make those institutions worth supporting in the first place.

Author(s):  
Vincent Chiao

What is the criminal law for? At its most elemental, criminal law secures the possibility of a shared life under stable and just public institutions. In the age of the administrative state, criminal law performs this task by stabilizing cooperation across a wide range of contexts, from backstopping compliance with tax law to protecting the integrity of a nation’s fisheries. How should we decide when this is a legitimate use of the criminal law? The “public law” conception sketched in this book suggests that because the criminal law is a public institution, it should be evaluated by the very same values that we structure our evaluation of public institutions generally. In contrast to familiar forms of retributivism, the public law conception starts from the political morality of public institutions, rather than the interpersonal morality of private relationships. In a society with democratic and egalitarian aspirations, the legitimacy of the criminal law depends in part upon the democratic and egalitarian character of the institutions it supports, and in part upon its supporting those institutions by means that are themselves consistent with democratic and egalitarian principles. The particular account of those principles sketched in this book is democratic, egalitarian without being equalizing, and focused on a form of freedom—effective access to central capability—as its currency of evaluation. This approach provides a distinctive and illuminating framework for assessing a wide range of problems in criminal law and policy, from mass incarceration, to over-criminalization and the allocation of procedural rights.


Author(s):  
Ethan J. Leib ◽  
Stephen R. Galoob

This chapter examines how fiduciary principles apply to public offices, focusing on what it means for officeholders to comport themselves to their respective public roles appropriately. Public law institutions can operate in accordance with fiduciary norms even when they are enforced differently from the remedial mechanisms available in private fiduciary law. In the public sector, fiduciary norms are difficult to enforce directly and the fiduciary norms of public office do not overlap completely with the positive law governing public officials. Nevertheless, core fiduciary principles are at the heart of public officeholding, and public officers need to fulfill their fiduciary role obligations. This chapter first considers three areas of U.S. public law whose fiduciary character reinforces the tenet that public office is a public trust: the U.S. Constitution’s “Emoluments Clauses,” administrative law, and the law of judging. It then explores the fiduciary character of public law by looking at the deeper normative structure of public officeholding, placing emphasis on how public officeholders are constrained by the principles of loyalty, care, deliberation, conscientiousness, and robustness. It also compares the policy implications of the fiduciary view of officeholding with those of Dennis Thompson’s view before concluding with an explanation of how the application of fiduciary principles might differ between public and private law settings and how public institutions might be designed or reformed in light of fiduciary norms.


Author(s):  
Vincent Chiao

This chapter sketches the gradual emergence of criminal law as public law over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as public institutions gradually asserted control over most aspects of the criminal process. The emergence of criminal law as public law is compared to the development of the welfare state in the early decades of the twentieth century. Public institutions collectively manage the risk of crime, in part by mobilizing practices of policing, prosecution, and punishment. They represent a social commitment to treating crime as a publicly shared burden rather than merely a privately borne tragedy. The emergence of criminal law as public law suggests that, rather than understanding crime and punishment by reference to the rights of individual persons in the state of nature, a normative theory of criminal law should be appropriately sensitive to the institutional morality and political legitimacy of public institutions.


Author(s):  
Ranieri Razzante

Corruption, generally speaking, can be defined as “abuse of power for private gain” that can be classified as grand, petty, and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs. Therefore, it is a phenomenon that compromises rule of law, weakens public institutions and democracy, impacting negatively on productivity and economy. Indeed, because of all these implications, it can be analyzed stressing social, economic, politic, or legal perspectives. These features have allowed experts from different fields to investigate the phenomenon, which does not exclusively concern conduct punishable by criminal law, but also conduct that can be considered just an “expression of maladministration” in both the public and private sectors. This chapter seeks to address the legal aspect of corruption. In particular, it overviews the main anti-corruption measures international community has adopted in recent years. By showing the evolution and steps that led to the actual treaty situation, the Authors offer a hint on the goals achieved and those to be achieved.


Prawo ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 320 ◽  
pp. 57-70
Author(s):  
Witold Małecki

Comments on the public law framework for the scope of public economic lawThe evolution of administrative economic law into public economic law should cause extension of the scope of this section of law, corresponding to its name containing two determinants. However, the scope of public economic law presented in contemporary Polish comprehensive manuals of public economic law does not contain any references to economic criminal law, which is undoubtedly a section of law situated within the confines of public law. In order to determine the meaning of the determinant “public” in the name “public economic law” two models were proposed. In a “shaping” model the determinant “public”, together with the determinant “economic”, defines the scope of public economic law. Only accepting the view on economic law as an independent branch of law and — consequently — the view on public economic law as a divisive factor of the economic law as an independent branch of law allows to justify an omission of economic criminal law provisions which should be included into criminal law. Regarding economic law as an independent branch of law does not entitle one to include such provisions into it if they are classified as a part of another independent branch of law — in this case: criminal law. Another model is a “descriptive” one, in which the determinant “public” does not define the scope of public economic law — the scope is determined by the definition of public economic law. The only role of the determinant “public” is to describe a category of provisions that are included in public economic law. The model, however, does not justify the omission of economic criminal law provisions in the manuals because of a broad shape of the definition of public economic law presented in Polish literature.


Author(s):  
R A Duff

This chapter offers an account of the practice of civic life: of the ‘public realm’, within which criminal law operates as public law. ‘Civil order’, the normative ordering of the polity’s life, is central to this public realm: it is structured by the values through which a polity constitutes itself; it can be partly defined by a written constitution, but is also implicit in the polity’s institutions and practices. A conception of civil order depends on a normative distinction between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’: we must attend to different public–private distinctions. We must also attend to the preconditions of civil order: what kinds of shared understanding are necessary; what can be said to dissenters? Given a conception of a polity’s civil order, and its public realm, we can understand a ‘public wrong’ as a wrong that falls within that public realm, and violates that civil order.


Author(s):  
Vincent Chiao

This chapter extends the public law conception to the theory of criminalization. The first half of the chapter is devoted to considering whether the criminal law has a privileged subject matter or “core,” focusing especially on Feinberg’s influential account of the criminal law as a system of direct prohibitions. The chapter argues that a subject-matter-based approach has difficulty coming to grips with actual criminal law systems in modern administrative states, in which so-called mala prohibita offenses predominate. The second half of the chapter turns to sketching how we might approach the question of criminalization from a public law point of view, both in general and with reference to the political ideal of anti-deference (sketched in Chapter 3) in particular. Along the way, the chapter argues that the (very popular) wrongfulness principle turns out to be either empty or implausible, and hence that we should reject any version of the harm principle, or of legal moralism, that presupposes it.


Author(s):  
Alex Mills

This chapter focuses on private interests and private law regulation in public international law jurisdiction, and discusses how questions of private law are generally marginalized in favour of a focus on public law, particularly criminal law. This is surprising and unfortunate for two main reasons. The first is that private law issues played a central role in the development of public international law jurisdictional principles. The second is that public international lawyers have, in a range of other contexts, increasingly recognized the significance of private law regulation, and the ‘public’ function which it can play in pursuing particular state interests. Recognizing the significance of private law jurisdiction presents, however, some important challenges to the way in which public international law jurisdiction has become to be understood.


to-ra ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Chandra Aritonang

Abstract State Administration in every action must be based on law to solve and resolve the problem mentioned above or there is no law. The State Administration can be forced to use its authority to revoke regulations. Administration as a law maker in its application when related to legal systematics has caused controversial matters in essence State Administration is part of public law, so that all actions in the application based on its function are solely intended for and in the public interest, this is no different from the law State Administration, Criminal Law and Others. A situation can lead to deviations from the State administration of the systematics of law. Therefore the State Administrative Law as a set of special regulations.   Keywords: state administration; public law; special regulations.  


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document