The BRICS and Collective Financial Statecraft

Author(s):  
Cynthia Roberts ◽  
Leslie Armijo ◽  
Saori Katada

In the context of an ongoing global power shift, the largest emerging economies (China, Russia, India, Brazil) formed an exclusive and informal club called the BRICs. Subsequently joined by South Africa, the BRICS have exercised collective financial statecraft, defined as the use of financial and monetary policies by sovereign governments for the purpose of achieving larger foreign policy goals. This volume identifies four types of such financial statecraft, ranging from pressure for inside reforms of either multilateral institutions or global markets, to outside options exercised through creating new multilateral institutions or jointly pushing for new realities in international financial markets. The joint actions of the BRICS have been largely successful. Although each member has its own unique rationale for collaboration, the largest member, China, controls resources that afford it the greatest influence in intraclub decision-making. The BRICS hang together due to common aversions (resentment over being perennial junior partners in global economic and financial governance, resistance to infringements on their autonomy and dollar dominance) and common interests (obtaining greater voice in international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund). The BRICS are neither revolutionaries nor shirkers. The group seeks reforms, influence, and leadership roles within the existing liberal capitalist global economic order. Where blocked, they experiment with parallel multilateral institutions in which they are the dominant rule-makers. The future of the BRICS depends not only on their bargaining power and adjustment to market players, but also on their ability to overcome domestic impediments to the sustainable economic growth that provides the basis for their international positions.

Author(s):  
Roberts Cynthia ◽  
Leslie Armijo ◽  
Saori Katada

The chapter analyzes the prospects for continued BRICS collective financial statecraft. Contrary to initial expectations, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have hung together by identifying common aversions and pursuing common interests within the existing international order. Their future depends not only on their bargaining power, but also on their ability to overcome domestic impediments to the sustainable economic growth that provides the basis for their international positions. To continue successfully with collective financial statecraft, the members must tackle the so-called middle-income trap, as well as their preferences for informal rules originating from their own institutional weaknesses or regime preferences. This study shows that, in the context of a global power shift, the BRICS club has operated to protect the member countries’ respective policy autonomy, while also advancing their joint voice in global governance. Recently, the BRICS have made concrete institutional gains, giving them expanded outside options to achieve specific objectives in global finance.


Author(s):  
Matthew D Stephen

Abstract As China has risen to the status of a global power, it has taken the lead in fostering several new multilateral institutional initiatives. Some of these are formal intergovernmental organizations; others are informal clubs, forums, or platforms. Collectively, these acts of institutional creation suggest that China is no longer content to “join” the existing global order but is constructing its own multilateral infrastructure. What do such institutions mean for global governance? This article provides a framework for studying such multilateral institutions and sketches an emerging research agenda. First, it provides a systematic empirical overview of China's participation in the creation of multilateral institutions between 1990 and 2017. Second, it develops analytical categories for describing types of new institutions based on their relationships with incumbent institutions. Central to this typology is (1) whether new multilateral institutions’ governance functions are additive or rivalrous to those of existing ones, and (2) whether they promote congruent or distinct social purposes. Based on these characteristics, new multilateral institutions may be complementary, divergent, substitutive, or competing. Third, it considers the implications of China's multilateral institution-building for global governance in the context of an international power shift. A medida que China ha ido adquiriendo la condición de potencia mundial, ha asumido el mando de promover varias iniciativas nuevas relacionadas con las instituciones multilaterales. Algunas de estas son organizaciones intergubernamentales formales, mientras que otras son clubes, foros o plataformas informales. En conjunto, estos actos de creación institucional sugieren que China ya no está interesada en «unirse» al orden mundial actual, sino que está construyendo su propia infraestructura multilateral. ¿Qué implican dichas instituciones para la gobernabilidad mundial? Este artículo ofrece un marco para el estudio de dichas instituciones multilaterales y describe brevemente un programa de investigación emergente. En primer lugar, ofrece una visión general empírica y sistemática de la participación de China en la creación de instituciones multilaterales entre 1990 y 2017. En segundo lugar, desarrolla categorías analíticas para describir los tipos de nuevas instituciones en función de sus relaciones con las instituciones vigentes. Un aspecto clave de esta tipología es (1) si las funciones de gobernabilidad de las nuevas instituciones multilaterales se adhieren o se oponen a las de las existentes y (2) si promueven propósitos sociales congruentes o distintos. En función de estas características, las nuevas instituciones multilaterales pueden ser complementarias, divergentes, sustitutivas o competidoras. En tercer lugar, se analizan las consecuencias de la creación de instituciones multilaterales por parte de China para la gobernabilidad mundial en el contexto de un cambio de poder internacional. En s’élevant au rang de puissance mondiale, la Chine a pris la main dans l'encouragement de plusieurs nouvelles initiatives institutionnelles multilatérales. Certaines d'entre elles concernent des organisations intergouvernementales, et d'autres concernent plutôt des plateformes, forums ou clubs informels. Collectivement, ces actes de création institutionnelle suggèrent que la Chine ne contente plus de « rejoindre » l'ordre mondial existant, mais qu'elle construit sa propre infrastructure multilatérale. Que signifient de telles institutions pour la gouvernance mondiale ? Cet article propose un cadre pour l’étude de telles institutions multilatérales et esquisse un programme de recherche émergent. Il commence par fournir une présentation empirique systématique de la participation de la Chine dans la création d'institutions multilatérales entre 1990 et 2017. Il développe ensuite des catégories analytiques permettant de décrire les types de nouvelles institutions en se basant sur leurs relations avec les institutions en place. Pour cette typologie , deux questions centrales consistent à se demander (1) si les fonctions de gouvernance des nouvelles institutions multilatérales s'ajoutent ou rivalisent avec celles des institutions existantes, et (2) si elles promeuvent des objectifs sociaux congruents ou distincts. Sur la base de ces caractéristiques, les nouvelles institutions multilatérales peuvent être complémentaires, divergentes, substitutives ou concurrentes. Enfin, cet article prend en considération les implications de la construction d'institutions multilatérales de la Chine pour la gouvernance mondiale dans le contexte du changement des puissances mondiales.


Author(s):  
Roberts Cynthia ◽  
Leslie Armijo ◽  
Saori Katada

This chapter evaluates multiple dimensions of the global power shift from the incumbent G5/G7 powers to the rising powers, especially the members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Taking note of alternative conceptualizations of interstate “power,” the text maps the redistribution of economic capabilities from the G7 to the BRICS, most particularly the relative rise of China and decline of Japan, and especially Europe. Given these clear trends in measurable material capabilities, the BRICS have obtained considerable autonomy from outside pressures. Although the BRICS’ economic, financial, and monetary capabilities remain uneven, their relative positions have improved steadily. Via extensive data analysis, the chapter finds that whether one examines China alone or the BRICS as a group, BRICS members have achieved the necessary capabilities to challenge the global economic and financial leadership of the currently dominant powers, perhaps even the United States one day.


2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212110522
Author(s):  
Niall Duggan ◽  
Bas Hooijmaaijers ◽  
Marek Rewizorski ◽  
Ekaterina Arapova

Over the past decades, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries have experienced significant economic growth. However, their political voices in global governance have not grown on par with their economic surge. The contributions to the symposium ‘The BRICS, Global Governance, and Challenges for South–South Cooperation in a Post-Western World’ argue there is a quest for emerging markets and developing countries to play a more significant role in global governance. There is a widening gap between the actual role of emerging markets and developing countries in the global system and their ability to participate in that system. However, for the moment, various domestic and international political-economic challenges limit this quest. To understand why this is the case, one should understand the BRICS phenomenon in the broader context of the global power shift towards the Global South.


2020 ◽  
pp. 177-200
Author(s):  
Yun Wen

The concluding chapter discusses the distinct experience generated from the Huawei case. It is argued that the Chinese state possesses strong autonomy and capacity to seek reorientation of China’s ICT developmental path and to increase the country’s competence in indigenous technology, which formed a strong state-capital alliance to carry out strategic developmental plans. The Huawei story sheds light on geoeconomic and geopolitical implications of China’s globalized corporate power, suggesting China’s role in the global power shift. It also underscores the significance of “self-reliant” development that constitutes the distinct “Chinese model” of ICT development.


2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (04) ◽  
pp. 537-551
Author(s):  
Paul Evans

At a moment of strategic transition in Asia Pacific security, views differ widely on the inevitability of conflict and the prospects of a managed accommodation of great power relations. There is widespread agreement that economic integration is deep and valuable, that a power shift is underway, and that the new array of multilateral institutions are welcome but merely formative. At the end of the Cold War period, there was a creative moment in which key concepts like cooperative and comprehensive security underpinned an era of institution building. The essay argues that it is time to revisit these ideas and look at the fundamental elements of a security order appropriate to a diverse and increasingly interconnected region in the midst of a power transition. It examines some of the key ideas offered by security thinkers from several countries and pays particular attention to the concept of a consociational security order as an entree to constructive discussion. As important as the U.S.-China relationship is to a future security order, a G2 is neither likely nor desirable. The conclusion poses a series of questions that will need to be answered as a new version of cooperative security with 21st century characteristics is developed.


Both monetary and fiscal policies have a crucial role in the financial markets of the countries. In this framework, policies can be used for mainly two different purposes, which are contractionary and expansionary policies. Hence, it can be said that monetary policies play a key role especially for the emerging economies. The main reason is that these are the economies that aim to be a developed economy. In order to reach this objective, they aim to make investment to obtain sustainable economic growth. Similar to this aspect, this chapter aims to identify different monetary policy operations of the central banks. Thus, various monetary policy instruments are explained. After this issue, necessary information is given related to the central banking operations of E7 economies. As a result, it is defined that central banks of these countries play an active role especially during the recession period.


Author(s):  
A. V. Torkunov

The article analyses the new Eastern foreign policy of Russia, which has been developing since 2011, and the realization of various projects within this policy. The author posits that world is undergoing profound and dynamic changes, which boil down to two interconnected processes: 1) economic power shift towards Asia-Pacific region, which will define in the near future the shape of the world system; 2) shift of the main political, economic and military contradictions in world politics to this region. These core changes in world politics are also effected by trends in development of Russia and its near abroad. For more than a quarter of the century Russia has been pursuing a regional leadership in building among post-soviet states a mutual space for common interests open for other members of international community. This policy became known as "new Russian Eastern policy" or a policy of Eurasian integration. Its main goal is to establish Eurasian economic union by 2015 which will open boarders of the member states for unrestricted movement of goods, services, capital and workers within the emerging regional market with the total volume of 170-180 million people. Russian leaders look forward to discussing with their European partners prospects for merging Eurasian and European unions into a single economic space stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Conceptually the strategy of Eurasian integration stems from a belief in unity of economic, cultural, civilizational interests of the Eurasian member states with state interests in Asia and Asia-Pacific. Realization of the new Eastern policy will be accompanied by the long awaited development of the Russian Eastern regions.


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