Agency, Time, and Sociality

Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman

Our planning capacities are a fundamental ground of our capacities for temporally extended agency, shared intentional activity, and self-governance. This is the fecundity of planning agency. This essay explores relations between our planning capacities and this further trio of basic capacities. In particular, a defense of this connection to self-governance involves a development of a Frankfurtian model of self-governance, one that draws on resources from the planning theory of our agency. This connection with self-governance, both at a time and over time, helps explain the normative force of the rationality norms involved in our planning agency. This leads to a sketch of a defense of a norm of intention stability over time, a norm that involves a kind of practical conservatism.

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Sheehan

Recovery of mistaken payments in the law of restitution is often justified by reference to a vitiated intention and that of payments where there is a failure of consideration by reference to a qualified intention. This paper aims to investigate whether this is a misleading characterisation and suggests that both causes of action should be understood in terms of conditions affecting our intentions. Specifically we should look at the failure of our planning agency, and Michael Bratman’s theory of agency in particular. In cases of mistaken payments we should look at the failure of a background condition to the payment. In such cases to fail to allow recovery is to fail to respect me as an autonomous actor, acting under norms having agential authority for me. In failure of consideration cases the autonomy of the other party is at stake, but we can take this into account by positing not a failure of a condition affecting personal intention, but affecting collective intention. There are different views on what collective intention is and how it should be understood, which may themselves have different implications in terms of the concurrency of mistake and failure of consideration as unjust factors. The paper examines different ways in which collective intentions might fail and how they fit the failure of consideration paradigm.


Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman

This introduction explains the background for present concerns with a deeper understanding and defense of basic norms of plan rationality, both synchronic and diachronic. It gives an overview of the defense adumbrated in these essays: one that involves but goes beyond appeal to pragmatic benefits of general forms of practical thinking involved in our planning agency. A central idea is that these planning norms track conditions of a planning agent’s self-governance, both synchronic and diachronic. The reflective significance of this tracking thesis depends on an end of one’s self-governance over time. While this end is not essential to agency, it is a rationally self-sustaining keystone of a stable reflective equilibrium involving basic planning norms. It is thereby in a position to play a role in our planning framework that is analogous to the role of concern with quality of will in the framework of reactive attitudes, as understood by Peter Strawson.


Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman

This essay appeals to self-governance to explain why basic planning norms—both synchronic and diachronic—are norms of practical rationality. The best rationale of her own plan-infused practical thinking that is available to a reflective planning agent who has the capacity for self-governance involves a tight connection between plan rationality and conditions of self-governance, both synchronic and diachronic. This leads to the idea that there is rational pressure not only in the direction of forms of coherence involved in a planning agent’s self-governance, both at a time and over time, but also in the direction of an end of one’s diachronic (and so, synchronic) self-governance. This is because that end is central to a planning agent’s diachronic self-governance, given the role of that end in willpower that coheres with such diachronic self-governance. While this end is not essential to agency per se, it is a rationally self-sustaining element of a stable reflective equilibrium that involves basic planning norms.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 32-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vanessa Watson

Planning theory has shifted over time in response to changes in broader social and philosophical theory as well as changes in the material world. Postmodernism and poststructuralism dislodged modernist, rational and technical approaches to planning. Consensualist decision-making theories of the 1980s took forms of communicative and collaborative planning, drawing on Habermasian concepts of power and society. These positions, along with refinements and critiques within the field, have been hegemonic in planning theory ever since. They are, in most cases, presented at a high level of abstraction, make little reference to the political and social contexts in which they are based, and hold an unspoken assumption that they are of universal value, i.e. valid everywhere. Not only does this suggest important research methodology errors but it also renders these theories of little use in those parts of the world which are contextually very different from theory origin—in most cases, the global North. A more recent ‘southern turn’ across a range of social science disciplines, and in planning theory, suggests the possibility of a foundational shift toward theories which acknowledge their situatedness in time and place, and which recognize that extensive global difference in cities and regions renders universalized theorising and narrow conceptual models (especially in planning theory, given its relevance for practice) as invalid. New southern theorising in planning is drawing on a range of ideas on societal conflict, informality, identity and ethnicity. Postcolonialism and coloniality have provided a useful frame for situating places historically and geographically in relation to the rest of the world. However, the newness of these explorations still warrants the labelling of this shift as a ‘southern theorizing project’ in planning rather than a suggestion that southern planning theory has emerged.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-250
Author(s):  
Luca A Minola ◽  
Fred E Foldvary ◽  
David E Andersson

In ‘ Self-organizing’ cities, decisions are based on the unhampered, peaceful, and honest choices of individuals, and governance, aside from penalizing coercive harm, is based on voluntary agreements. Self-organization has become an increasingly important topic in planning theory, as such processes enable urban systems to more effectively adapt to various stimuli and contextual needs over time. Self-organization may lead to emergent spatial configurations that are more in tune with individuals’ values and preferences than the prevailing top-down approaches. The purpose of this article is to analyse how current tax systems impede emergent spatial configurations and, additionally, to explore what kind of fiscal rules and instruments are more supportive of creative (i.e. dynamically productive) processes of self-organization. The main finding is that the use of behavioural rules (such as contractual covenants and easements) and principles of taxation that do not distort the decentralized creation of value, such as user fees, congestion charges, and repayment of rental value received such as land value taxation, are superior to currently dominant approaches.


2021 ◽  
pp. 54-80
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman

This chapter begins with the use of the planning theory of individual temporally extended human action in a construction of shared intention. It then develops a series of further constructions that build on each other: of Hart-type, criticism/demand-involving social rules; of authority-augmented social rules of procedure involved in the rule-guided infrastructure of an organized institution; of institutional intentions as outputs of social rules of procedure (where these intentions require neither corresponding shared intention nor a dense, holistic institutional subject); and of institutional intentional agency. These constructions articulate inter-related roles of our capacity for planning agency in important forms of human practical organization: temporally extended, small-scale social, and institutional.


Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman

Our human capacity for planning agency plays central roles in the cross-temporal organization of our agency, in our acting and thinking together, and in our self-governance. Intentions can be understood as states in such a planning system. The practical thinking essential to this planning capacity is guided by norms that enjoin synchronic plan consistency and coherence as well as forms of plan stability over time. This book’s essays aim to deepen our understanding of these norms and defend their status as norms of practical rationality for planning agents. General guidance by these planning norms has many pragmatic benefits, especially given our cognitive and epistemic limits. But appeal to these pragmatic benefits does not fully explain the normative force of these norms in application to the particular case. In response, some think these norms are norms of theoretical rationality on belief; or are constitutive of agency; or are just a myth. These essays chart an alternative path, which sees these planning norms as tracking conditions of a planning agent’s self-governance, both at a time and over time. This path articulates associated models of self-governance; it appeals to the agent’s end of her self-governance over time; and it argues that this end is rationally self-sustaining. This end is thereby in a position to play a role in our planning framework that is analogous to the role of a concern with quality of will within the framework of the reactive attitudes, as understood by Peter Strawson.


2017 ◽  
Vol 80 ◽  
pp. 25-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman

AbstractOur planning agency contributes to our lives in fundamental ways. Prior partial plans settle practical questions about the future. They thereby pose problems of means, filter solutions to those problems, and guide action. This plan-infused background frames our practical thinking in ways that cohere with our resource limits and help organize our lives, both over time and socially. And these forms of practical thinking involve guidance by norms of plan rationality, including norms of plan consistency, means-end coherence, and stability over time.But why are these norms of rationality? Would these norms be stable under a planning agent's reflection? I try to answer these questions in a way that responds to a skeptical challenge. While I highlight pragmatic reasons for being a planning agent, these need to be supplemented fully to explain the force of these norms in the particular case. I argue that the needed further rationale appeals to the idea that these norms track certain conditions of a planning agent's self-governance, both at a time and over time. With respect to diachronic plan rationality, this approach leads to a modest plan conservatism.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Hirshleifer ◽  
Siew Hong Teoh

AbstractEvolved dispositions influence, but do not determine, how people think about economic problems. The evolutionary cognitive approach offers important insights but underweights the social transmission of ideas as a level of explanation. The need for asocialexplanation for the evolution of economic attitudes is evidenced, for example, by immense variations in folk-economic beliefs over time and across individuals.


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