Second Interlude

Author(s):  
Nicholas Greenwood Onuf

IN 1917, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS published a massive, magnificent book called On Growth and Form. It author, D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson, was a Scottish biologist of formidable range and considerable mathematical prowess. Much influenced by Aristotle, whose Historia Animalium he had translated from the Greek (1910), Thompson began his book by contrasting the organic and mechanical metaphors upon which biology and physics are respectively built, then declaring that neither way of thinking can do without the other. “In Aristotle’s parable, the house is there that men may live in it; but it is also there because the builders have laid one stone upon another” (1945, 6; this is the book’s second, much expanded edition published six years before Thompson’s death). The parable applies not just to the two bodies of knowledge, but to whatever can be said to grow “in conformity with physical and mathematical laws.” While Thompson largely confined himself to “the forms of living things, and of the parts of living things” (15), he did not do so exclusively....

1969 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 107-118
Author(s):  
A. Palmer

The explanation of change or movement has always been a central concern of philosophers. Some, like Aristotle, have taken the movement of living things as their paradigm, and tried to explain all movement or change in that way. Others, after the fashion of Descartes, concentrate on the movement of inanimate things and generalise explanations of this to encompass all movement or change. For Aristotle, things have a principle of growth, organisation and movement in their own right. The movement or change of a natural thing is explained by its tendency to move in that way. The line he draws is not, as the line which we would perhaps like to draw is, between organic and inorganic things, but between these grouped together as subject to the same kind of explanation and, on the other hand, artificial things. A problem that results from this division is that while it might seem plausible to explain changes which occur in a baby when it grows into a man by saying that babies naturally tend to grow into men, and if they do not then something has interfered with their natural development, it seems odd to treat inorganic things in this way. Restricted to the contrast between the natural and the artificial, the explanation of stones falling when unsupported is clearly going to provide some difficulty. Although it is true that Aristotle does not think that because in the case of man the form with which matter is formed to make that substance is called a soul, that therefore any kind of form joined with matter to make a substance is called a soul, nevertheless the explanation of things which are a combination, a natural combination, of form and matter is the same for both man and other substances. Confronted with the explanation of falling bodies in this way, it first of all seems implausible and then suggests that things should happen which in fact do not. If it is assumed that the principle of movement is in the stone, ought it not to be assumed that the principle of stopping is in it too? Babies grow into men because it is in their nature to do so perhaps, but that stones fall downwards because it is in their nature to do so has, as Molière noticed in the case of a similar explanation of why opium puts you to sleep, a hollow ring.


1947 ◽  
Vol 79 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 3-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Marshall

Owing to the exigencies of war I failed to get my copies of the Journal of the American Oriental Society between 1939 and 1945, and it is only within the last few days that I have seen Dr. Ludwig Bachhofer's most interesting article on “Greeks and Sakas in India” which appeared in the Journal as far back as December, 1941. In that article Dr. Bachhofer pays a warm tribute to Dr. W. W. Tarn's epoch-making work on The Greeks in Bactria and India, but at the same time challenges some of the views expressed by that great scholar. Though very late in the day I hope I may be allowed to add a few comments on what Dr. Bachhofer has said. I do so with no little hesitation, because failing eye-sight now makes it difficult for me to read or write, and still more difficult to re-examine the numismatic data and other minutiæ referred to by Dr. Bachhofer. On the other hand, half a life time spent in excavations at Taxila and other sites on the North-West Frontier of India has put me in possession of many relevant facts, of which it is evident that Dr. Bachhofer is still, through no fault of his own, in ignorance; and it is clearly my duty to make these facts known to others without loss of time. Already, it is true, I have written a full and comprehensive account in three volumes of the results of my long labours at Taxila, but though the manuscript of this book was sent to the Cambridge University Press at the end of 1945, I fear that in prevailing conditions it may be a year or two before it can be published; and in the meantime eminent scholars like Dr. Bachhofer may be spending valuable hours on problems which have in effect already been solved.


1969 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 107-118
Author(s):  
A. Palmer

The explanation of change or movement has always been a central concern of philosophers. Some, like Aristotle, have taken the movement of living things as their paradigm, and tried to explain all movement or change in that way. Others, after the fashion of Descartes, concentrate on the movement of inanimate things and generalise explanations of this to encompass all movement or change. For Aristotle, things have a principle of growth, organisation and movement in their own right. The movement or change of a natural thing is explained by its tendency to move in that way. The line he draws is not, as the line which we would perhaps like to draw is, between organic and inorganic things, but between these grouped together as subject to the same kind of explanation and, on the other hand, artificial things. A problem that results from this division is that while it might seem plausible to explain changes which occur in a baby when it grows into a man by saying that babies naturally tend to grow into men, and if they do not then something has interfered with their natural development, it seems odd to treat inorganic things in this way. Restricted to the contrast between the natural and the artificial, the explanation of stones falling when unsupported is clearly going to provide some difficulty. Although it is true that Aristotle does not think that because in the case of man the form with which matter is formed to make that substance is called a soul, that therefore any kind of form joined with matter to make a substance is called a soul, nevertheless the explanation of things which are a combination, a natural combination, of form and matter is the same for both man and other substances. Confronted with the explanation of falling bodies in this way, it first of all seems implausible and then suggests that things should happen which in fact do not. If it is assumed that the principle of movement is in the stone, ought it not to be assumed that the principle of stopping is in it too? Babies grow into men because it is in their nature to do so perhaps, but that stones fall downwards because it is in their nature to do so has, as Molière noticed in the case of a similar explanation of why opium puts you to sleep, a hollow ring.


Imbizo ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi Epongse Nkealah ◽  
Olutoba Gboyega Oluwasuji

Ideas of nationalisms as masculine projects dominate literary texts by African male writers. The texts mirror the ways in which gender differentiation sanctions nationalist discourses and in turn how nationalist discourses reinforce gender hierarchies. This article draws on theoretical insights from the work of Anne McClintock and Elleke Boehmer to analyse two plays: Zintgraff and the Battle of Mankon by Bole Butake and Gilbert Doho and Hard Choice by Sunnie Ododo. The article argues that women are represented in these two plays as having an ambiguous relationship to nationalism. On the one hand, women are seen actively changing the face of politics in their societies, but on the other hand, the means by which they do so reduces them to stereotypes of their gender.


Vox Patrum ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 339-348
Author(s):  
Bogdan Czyżewski

Although St. Basil did not live 50 years, the topic of the old age appears in his works quite often. On the other hand, it is clear that Basil does not discuss this issue in one par­ticular work or in the longer argumentation. The fragmentary statements about old age can be found in almost all his works, but most of them can be found in the correspondence of Basil. In this paper we present the most important ad the most interesting aspect of teach­ing of Basil the Great. As these certificates show that the bishop of Caesarea looked at the old age maturely, rationally estimated passage of time, which very often makes a man different. He experienced it, for example as a spiritual and physical suffering, which often were connected with his person. He saw a lot of aspect of the old age, especially its advan­tages – spiritual maturity and wisdom. What is more, he pointed also to passage of time, which leads a man to eternity, which should be prepared to, regardless how old he is. In his opinion fear is not seen opinions of St. Basil present really Christian way of thinking, well-balanced and calm.


Author(s):  
Hugh H. Benson
Keyword(s):  
The One ◽  

This chapter presents a reading of Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito. These dialogues, in which Plato depicts the weeks leading up to Socrates’s last day, are replete with various philosophical explorations. Among those explorations is the question of how to live our lives. On the one hand, Socrates is clear and straightforward. We should live the examined life—making logoi and examining ourselves and others in order to determine whether we are as wise as we think we are, and we should live the virtuous life. This is how Socrates lives his life. On the other hand, the examined life undercuts, or at least should undercut, the confidence with which he seeks to live the virtuous life. It may help bring some stability to the general principles by which he lives his life, but it can do so only defeasibly and without certainty.


1998 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 387-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felicity J Callard

Geographers are now taking the problematic of corporeality seriously. ‘The body’ is becoming a preoccupation in the geographical literature, and is a central figure around which to base political demands, social analyses, and theoretical investigations. In this paper I describe some of the trajectories through which the body has been installed in academia and claim that this installation has necessitated the uptake of certain theoretical legacies and the disavowal or forgetting of others. In particular, I trace two related developments. First, I point to the sometimes haphazard agglomeration of disparate theoretical interventions that lie under the name of postmodernism and observe how this has led to the foregrounding of bodily tropes of fragmentation, fluidity, and ‘the cyborg‘. Second, I examine the treatment of the body as a conduit which enables political agency to be thought of in terms of transgression and resistance. I stage my argument by looking at how on the one hand Marxist and on the other queer theory have commonly conceived of the body, and propose that the legacies of materialist modes of analysis have much to offer current work focusing on how bodies are shaped by their encapsulation within the sphere of the social. I conclude by examining the presentation of corporeality that appears in the first volume of Marx's Capital. I do so to suggest that geographers working on questions of subjectivity could profit from thinking further about the relation between so-called ‘new’ and ‘fluid’ configurations of bodies, technologies, and subjectivities in the late 20th-century world, and the corporeal configurations of industrial capitalism lying behind and before them.


Traditio ◽  
1948 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 161-185
Author(s):  
Kurt Lewent

Cerveri was decidedly no poetical genius, and often enough he follows the trodden paths of troubadour poetry. However, there is no denying that again and again he tries to escape that poetical routine. In many cases these attempts result in odd and eccentric compositions, where the unusual is reached at the cost of good taste and poetical values. On the other hand, it must be admitted that Cerveri's efforts in this respect were not always futile. His is, e.g. an amusing satire upon bad women. One of his love songs, characteristically called libel by the MS (Sg), assumes the form of a complaint submitted to the king as the supreme earthly judge, in which the defendant is the lady whose charms torture the lover and have made him a prisoner. This poem combines the traditional praise of the beloved and a flattery addressed to the king. Its slightly humoristic tone is also found in a song entitled lo vers del vassayll leyal. Here Cerveri, basing himself on a certain legend connected with St. Mark, gives the king advice in his love affair. Again the poet kills two birds with one stone, flattering the sovereign and pointing, for obvious purposes, to his own poverty. The latter is the only topic of a remarkably personal poem in which the author complains bitterly that, while many of his playmates have become rich in later years, the only wealth he himself did amass were the chans gays and sonetz agradans which he composed for other people to enjoy. Cerveri even tries to renew the traditional genre of the chanson de la mal mariée by adding motifs of—presumably—his own invention. This tendency towards a more independent way of thinking and greater originality in its poetical presentation could not be better illustrated than by the two poems which the MS calls Lo vers de la terra de Preste Johan and Pistola The one puts the poet's moral argumentation against the background of the medieval legend of Prester John, the other, which forms the subject of the present study, sets its teachings in a still more solemn framework, the liturgy of the Mass.


1902 ◽  
Vol 48 (202) ◽  
pp. 434-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. S. Clouston

Dr. Clouston said that when he suggested toxæmia to the secretary as a suitable subject for a discussion at this meeting he had not intended to be the first speaker, because his object was to bring out more fully the views of the younger members who had recently committed themselves so strongly to the toxæmic and bacterial etiology of insanity, and so to get light thrown on some of the difficulties which he and others had felt in applying this theory to many of their cases in practice. It was not that he did not believe in the toxic theory as explaining the onset of many cases, or that he under-rated its importance, but that he could not see how it applied so universally or generally as some of the modern pathological school were now inclined to insist on. He knew that it was difficult for those of the older psychological and clinical school to approach the subject with that full knowledge of recent bacteriological and pathological doctrine which the younger men possessed, or to breathe that all-pervading pathological atmosphere which they seemed to inhale. He desired to conduct this discussion in an absolutely non-controversial and purely scientific spirit. To do so he thought it best to put his facts, objections, and difficulties in a series of propositions which could be answered and explained by the other side. He thought it important to define toxæmia, but should be willing to accept Dr. Ford Robertson's definition of toxines, viz., “Substances which are taken up by the (cortical nerve) cell and then disorder its metabolism.” He took the following extracts from his address at the Cheltenham meeting of the British Association (1) as representing Dr. Ford Robertson's views and the general trend of much investigation and hypothesis on the Continent.


Author(s):  
William Large

This chapter discusses the problem of language in Levinas’s philosophy regarding methodology. Ethics, for Levinas, happens in everyday speech, where the Other demands a response from me. How he describes this relation presents methodological problems for Levinas, because it is resistant to any kind of theoretical approach, including phenomenology. Any writing about ethics, including Levinas’s, would immediately be its betrayal. This chapter describes Levinas’s account of language in Totality and Infinity, the issues that remain there, which it highlights through Blanchot’s and Derrida’s discussion of Levinas’s work. It also outlines a different way of thinking about the alterity of Other that is suggested in Totality and Infinity but comes to the fore in Otherwise Than Being, which is not as an opposition between speech and the visible, but enunciation (the saying) and the sayable (the said).


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