The Politics of Electoral Reform

2020 ◽  
pp. 239-263
Author(s):  
Lee Drutman
Keyword(s):  
American Politics ◽  
Political System ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
The Political ◽  
American Democracy ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
The Future ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

This chapter explains how electoral reform can happen in America. Nobody doubts American politics is broken. Poll after poll confirms a deeply discontented electorate. However, there is less agreement around a solution. Americans seem to agree they want more parties. However, few Americans understand the institutional reasons why more parties do not emerge: The first-past-the-post electoral system. Absent this understanding, Americans are unlikely to demand electoral reform. Instead, they will keep blaming politicians for responding to the incentives the political system demands, and continue to be disappointed. As such, it is urgent that people make the connection between electoral reform and more parties. The encouraging news is that Americans may now be unusually open to institutional reforms. Politicians may also be open to reform; they do not like the system either. Ultimately, America must end the winner-take-all system of elections that is powering the two-party doom loop. The future of American democracy depends on it.

The Twilight of Westminster? Electoral Reform and its Consequences

2001 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 877-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pippa Norris
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Political System ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
The Political ◽  
Effective Governance ◽  
Primary Advantage ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Comparative Study

The UK political system has long exemplified ‘majoritarian’ or ‘Westminster’ government, a type subsequently exported to many Commonwealth countries. The primary advantage of this system, proponents since Bagehot have argued, lie in its ability to combine accountability with effective governance. Yet under the Blair administration, this system has undergone a series of major constitutional reforms, perhaps producing the twilight of the pure Westminster model. After conceptualizing the process of constitutional reform, this paper discusses two important claims made by those who favor retaining the current electoral system for Westminster, namely that single-member districts promote strong voter-member linkages and generate greater satisfaction with the political system. Evidence testing these claims is examined from comparative data covering 19 nations, drawing on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The study finds that member-voter linkages are stronger in single member than in pure multimember districts, but that combined districts such as MMP preserve these virtues. Concerning claims of greater public satisfaction under majoritarian systems, the study establishes some support for this contention, although the evidence remains limited. The conclusion considers the implications of the findings for debates about electoral reform and for the future of the Westminster political system.

scholarly journals El sistema electoral de Bélgica y sus reformas electorales

2020 ◽  
pp. 503
Author(s):  
Carlos Fernández-Esquer
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Turn Of The Century ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Political Agenda ◽  
The Political ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Electoral Reforms ◽  
El Sistema

El presente artículo aborda el estudio del sistema electoral de la Cámara de Representantes belga y sus reformas electorales. Bélgica fue el primer país europeo en adoptar un sistema de representación proporcional y, desde entonces, sus elementos centrales han exhibido una extraordinaria estabilidad. Sin embargo, con el cambio de siglo, el gobierno de coalición liderado por el liberal Guy Verhofstadt situó el debate sobre las reformas institucionales en el centro de la agenda política. Ello condujo a una reforma electoral que supuso la «provincialización» del mapa electoral, el establecimiento de una barrera electoral del 5 por ciento y la reducción a la mitad del peso de voto de lista. En 2012, se produjo la última reforma electoral, que consistió en la división de la polémica circunscripción de Bruselas-Halle-Vilvoorde. Este último episodio evidencia la complejidad del modelo federal belga, de carácter consociacional, bipolar y con dinámicas centrífugas.This paper deals with the study of the electoral system of the Belgian House of Representatives and its electoral reforms. Belgium was the first European country to adopt an electoral system of proportional representation and, since then, its main elements have exhibited extraordinary stability. However, with the turn of the century, the coalition government headed by the liberal Guy Verhofstadt put the debate on institutional reforms at the center of the political agenda. This led to an electoral reform that involved several novelties: the «provincialization» of the electoral map, the establishment of a 5 percent threshold and the reduction of the list vote weight by half. In 2012, there was the last electoral reform, which consisted of the division of the controversial constituency of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. This last episode shows the complexity of the Belgian federal model, consociational, bipolar and with centrifugal dynamics. 

The Internal Stakes of the 2005 Elections: The Struggle for Influence in Egypt's National Democratic Party

2007 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-111
Author(s):  
Virginie Collombier
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Political System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
The Future ◽  
External Actors ◽  
First Time

Beyond the relative opening of the political system that characterized 2005 in Egypt — with the President being elected directly for the first time and the increased competition allowed during legislative elections — the 2005 elections also constituted an opportunity to consider and evaluate the internal struggles for influence under way within the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). In a context largely influenced by the perspective of President Husni Mubarak's succession and by calls for reform coming from both internal and external actors, changes currently occurring at the party level may have a decisive impact on the future of the Egyptian regime.

Class Politics, American-Style

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 659-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Waddell
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Middle Class ◽  
Political Science ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Rich ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson's Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class is both a work of political science and a contribution to broad public discussion of distributive politics. Its topic could not be more relevant to a US polity wracked by bitter partisan disagreements about taxes, social spending, financial regulation, social insecurity, and inequality. The political power of “the rich” is a theme of widespread public attention. The headline on the cover of the January–February 2011 issue of The American Interest—“Inequality and Democracy: Are Plutocrats Drowning Our Republic?”—is indicative. Francis Fukuyama's lead essay, entitled “Left Out,” clarifies that by “plutocracy,” the journal means “not just rule by the rich, but rule by and for the rich. We mean, in other words, a state of affairs in which the rich influence government in such a way as to protect and expand their own wealth and influence, often at the expense of others.” Fukuyama makes clear that he believes that this state of affairs obtains in the United States today.Readers of Perspectives on Politics will know that the topic has garnered increasing attention from political scientists in general and in our journal in particular. In March 2009, we featured a symposium on Larry Bartels's Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. And in December 2009, our lead article, by Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin I. Page, starkly posed the question “Oligarchy in the United States?” and answered it with an equally stark “yes.” Winner-Take-All Politics thus engages a broader scholarly discussion within US political science, at the same time that it both draws upon and echoes many “classic themes” of US political science from the work of Charles Beard and E. E. Schattschneider to Ted Lowi and Charles Lindblom.In this symposium, we have brought together a group of important scholars and commentators who offer a range of perspectives on the book and on the broader themes it engages. While most of our discussants are specialists on “American politics,” we have also sought out scholars beyond this subfield. Our charge to the discussants is to evaluate the book's central claims and evidence, with a focus on three related questions: 1) How compelling is its analysis of the “how” and “why” of recent US public policy and its “turn” in favor of “the rich” and against “the middle class”? 2) How compelling is its critique of the subfield of “American politics” for its focus on the voter–politician linkage and on “politics as spectacle” at the expense of an analysis of “politics as organized combat”? 3) And do you agree with its argument that recent changes in US politics necessitate a different, more comparative, and more political economy–centered approach to the study of US politics?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor

Electoral system as a motivation to reforming political system- The Iraqi model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shamall Ahmad
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Political Reform ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
Political Life ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
The Masses

The flaws and major flaws in the political systems represent one of the main motives that push the political elite towards making fundamental reforms, especially if those reforms have become necessary matters so that: Postponing them or achieving them affects the survival of the system and the political entity. Thus, repair is an internal cumulative process. It is cumulative based on the accumulated experience of the historical experience of the same political elite that decided to carry out reforms, and it is also an internal process because the decision to reform comes from the political elite that run the political process. There is no doubt that one means of political reform is to push the masses towards participation in political life. Changing the electoral system, through electoral laws issued by the legislative establishment, may be the beginning of political reform (or vice versa), taking into account the uncertainty of the political process, especially in societies that suffer from the decline of democratic values, represented by the processes of election from one cycle to another. Based on the foregoing, this paper seeks to analyze the relationship between the Electoral and political system, in particular, tracking and studying the Iraqi experience from the first parliamentary session until the issuance of the Election Law No. (9) for the year (2020).

Political Agreements — A Critical Introduction

1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 407-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kretzmer
Keyword(s):  
Political Party ◽  
Political System ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Parliamentary System ◽  
System A ◽  
Absolute Majority ◽  
Political Alliances ◽  
Dominant Parties

Political agreements are an integral part of the political system in Israel. For various reasons — mainly the proportional representation electoral system and the existence of a “third bloc” of religious parties that do no fit into the centre-right and centre-left political alliances — no political party has ever enjoyed an absolute majority in the Knesset. The dominant parties have therefore always had to rely on coalition agreements with smaller parties in order to obtain, and subsequently maintain, the parliamentary majority required for a government to rule under Israel's parliamentary system. A similar situation exists in many municipal councils and in other elected bodies, such as the Bar Council.

A Feasible Reform

2020 ◽  
pp. 155-168
Author(s):  
Edward B. Foley
Keyword(s):  
New Hampshire ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Rust Belt ◽  
Ballot Initiatives ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Take All

Each state already has the constitutional power to require that candidates win a majority of the popular vote to receive all of the state’s electoral votes. Each state could adopt the kind of runoff that New Hampshire used in the past, or instant runoff voting. There is no need for a multistate compact. If only two or three states had used runoffs, or instant runoff voting, in 2016—for example, Florida and Michigan, or the three Rust Belt states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania—and if Clinton had won those runoffs, then she would have been president. In the future, it might be a Republican candidate who prevails in runoffs in pivotal states but would lose using plurality winner-take-all. States with ballot initiatives can use them to require majority rule for appointing electors as long as they leave the specific details to legislation.

scholarly journals Class Politics, American-Style

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 654-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Pontusson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Middle Class ◽  
Political Science ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Rich ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson'sWinner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle Classis both a work of political science and a contribution to broad public discussion of distributive politics. Its topic could not be more relevant to a US polity wracked by bitter partisan disagreements about taxes, social spending, financial regulation, social insecurity, and inequality. The political power of “the rich” is a theme of widespread public attention. The headline on the cover of the January–February 2011 issue ofThe American Interest—“Inequality and Democracy: Are Plutocrats Drowning Our Republic?”—is indicative. Francis Fukuyama's lead essay, entitled “Left Out,” clarifies that by “plutocracy,” the journal means “not just rule by the rich, but rule by and for the rich. We mean, in other words, a state of affairs in which the rich influence government in such a way as to protect and expand their own wealth and influence, often at the expense of others.” Fukuyama makes clear that he believes that this state of affairs obtains in the United States today.Readers ofPerspectives on Politicswill know that the topic has garnered increasing attention from political scientists in general and in our journal in particular. In March 2009, we featured a symposium on Larry Bartels'sUnequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. And in December 2009, our lead article, by Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin I. Page, starkly posed the question “Oligarchy in the United States?” and answered it with an equally stark “yes.”Winner-Take-All Politicsthus engages a broader scholarly discussion within US political science, at the same time that it both draws upon and echoes many “classic themes” of US political science from the work of Charles Beard and E. E. Schattschneider to Ted Lowi and Charles Lindblom.In this symposium, we have brought together a group of important scholars and commentators who offer a range of perspectives on the book and on the broader themes it engages. While most of our discussants are specialists on “American politics,” we have also sought out scholars beyond this subfield. Our charge to the discussants is to evaluate the book's central claims and evidence, with a focus on three related questions: 1) How compelling is its analysis of the “how” and “why” of recent US public policy and its “turn” in favor of “the rich” and against “the middle class”? 2) How compelling is its critique of the subfield of “American politics” for its focus on the voter–politician linkage and on “politics as spectacle” at the expense of an analysis of “politics as organized combat”? 3) And do you agree with its argument that recent changes in US politics necessitate a different, more comparative, and more political economy–centered approach to the study of US politics?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor

Class Politics, American-Style

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 648-651
Author(s):  
Jodi Dean
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Middle Class ◽  
Political Science ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Rich ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
Take All

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson's Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class is both a work of political science and a contribution to broad public discussion of distributive politics. Its topic could not be more relevant to a US polity wracked by bitter partisan disagreements about taxes, social spending, financial regulation, social insecurity, and inequality. The political power of “the rich” is a theme of widespread public attention. The headline on the cover of the January–February 2011 issue of The American Interest—“Inequality and Democracy: Are Plutocrats Drowning Our Republic?”—is indicative. Francis Fukuyama's lead essay, entitled “Left Out,” clarifies that by “plutocracy,” the journal means “not just rule by the rich, but rule by and for the rich. We mean, in other words, a state of affairs in which the rich influence government in such a way as to protect and expand their own wealth and influence, often at the expense of others.” Fukuyama makes clear that he believes that this state of affairs obtains in the United States today.Readers of Perspectives on Politics will know that the topic has garnered increasing attention from political scientists in general and in our journal in particular. In March 2009, we featured a symposium on Larry Bartels's Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. And in December 2009, our lead article, by Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin I. Page, starkly posed the question “Oligarchy in the United States?” and answered it with an equally stark “yes.” Winner-Take-All Politics thus engages a broader scholarly discussion within US political science, at the same time that it both draws upon and echoes many “classic themes” of US political science from the work of Charles Beard and E. E. Schattschneider to Ted Lowi and Charles Lindblom.In this symposium, we have brought together a group of important scholars and commentators who offer a range of perspectives on the book and on the broader themes it engages. While most of our discussants are specialists on “American politics,” we have also sought out scholars beyond this subfield. Our charge to the discussants is to evaluate the book's central claims and evidence, with a focus on three related questions: 1) How compelling is its analysis of the “how” and “why” of recent US public policy and its “turn” in favor of “the rich” and against “the middle class”? 2) How compelling is its critique of the subfield of “American politics” for its focus on the voter–politician linkage and on “politics as spectacle” at the expense of an analysis of “politics as organized combat”? 3) And do you agree with its argument that recent changes in US politics necessitate a different, more comparative, and more political economy–centered approach to the study of US politics?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor

scholarly journals EVOLUTION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS: FROM BIRTH TO STABILIZATION

2018 ◽  
pp. 16-22
Author(s):  
Nataliya Khoma
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political System ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Internal Conflict ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Republic Of Cyprus ◽  
The Eu

The process of the formation of the party system of Cyprus was considered. The period from colonial to 1981 is covered. The factors that influenced the evolution of the parties of Cyprus, in particular the internal conflict, were underlined. Emphasizes the importance of the ethnic component of the population of Cyprus. The attention was paid to the role of the Orthodox Church in shaping the political system of Cyprus. The article analyzes the norms of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960) concerning political parties, in which the focus was on the parliamentary aspect of party activity. The role of Archbishop Makarios III, the first president of Cyprus, for the further evolution of the party system in the 1960–70s was revealed. Presented chronology of the appearance of the main parties of Cyprus and their participation in elections and coalitions. The article emphasizes that after the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, the party system of the state is experiencing the trend of the newest European tendencies on the national party palette: the level of people’s confidence in the parties is decreasing, the party identity is blurred, the voter turnout is gradually decreasing, new types of parties are emerging, Radicalization is notable and so on. The party system of Cyprus is special, even if only within the EU there is a pro-communist party (Progressive Party of the Labor People of Cyprus), represented in the European Parliament, among the leading political forces. It was emphasized that the political parties of Cyprus until 1974 were purely electoral mechanisms. The new stage of development began with the stabilization of the post-colonial political system of Cyprus. At this time, the church lost its past influence, and the majoritarian electoral system alienated itself. This led to a new stage in the development of the party system in the late 1970s. It is noted that the determining factor was the transition to a proportional electoral system and the introduction of mandatory participation of voters in the vote. It was emphasized that these legislative innovations became important factors in the development of the modern party system of Cyprus. Since that time, the Cypriot parties have become more independent and united in the coalition.

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