America at War: 2003–2005
Robert Hutchings arrived as chairman just a month before the US invasion of Iraq, a move that he privately felt was a major mistake, for reasons that proved all too accurate. Once combat operations gave way to a heavy-handed US occupation regime, the analysis the NIC provided—that the anti-American insurgency was intensifying, and that this was because of the occupation itself—was badly received by policymakers. Such can be the consequences of telling truth to power. Moreover, when no WMD were found in Iraq, criticism mounted, some of it justified but some pure scapegoating. The perceived “intelligence failures” of 9/11 and Iraqi WMD crystallized in pressure toward major reforms to US intelligence. Nonetheless, during this period the NIC did seminal work in reassessing the nature of the terrorist threat and in producing the pathbreaking report, Mapping the Global Future, the newest iteration of the Global Trends series.