Improving the Guardrails

2020 ◽  
pp. 191-210
Author(s):  
Michael A. Livermore ◽  
Richard L. Revesz
Keyword(s):  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Regulatory System ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Regulatory Review ◽  
Regulatory Decision ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Regulatory Decisions ◽  
Ex Post Analysis ◽  
Trump Administration

Future administration can begin undoing the mistakes of the Trump administration by reinstating prior norms concerning cost-benefit analysis and meaningful regulatory review. Several reforms can go even further and improve the regulatory system. One reform involves rethinking the role of ex-post analysis of regulation, to focus resources on identifying and addressing cross-cutting areas of uncertainty in regulatory decision making. A second area where improvements can be made is improving the quantification of costs and benefits that are currently left unquantified. A third area for improvement involves developing general guidelines for examining and weighing the distributional effects of regulatory decisions.

The Role of the Discount Rate in Cost–Benefit Analysis Between Theory and Practice: A Comparative Survey

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-71
Author(s):  
Felice Simonelli
Keyword(s):  
Discount Rate ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Economic Literature ◽  
Institutional Practice ◽  
Two Samples ◽  
Regulatory Decisions

This study focuses on the role of the discount rate in cost–benefit analysis (CBA) of regulation, providing a systematic investigation into regulatory practice vis–à–vis the existing economic theories. In the first part, a quick survey of the main economic literature on the social discount rate (SDR) is presented. In the second part, the current institutional practice is investigated, firstly comparing the recommendations on discounting issued by institutional actors in the US (Office of Management Budget, Environmental Protection Agency) and the EU (Commission), and secondly examining the SDRs adopted in two samples of CBAs selected among Regulatory Impact Analyses of US EPA and Impact Assessments of EU Directorate–General for the Environment. A gap exists between economic theory and institutional practice in the selection of the SDR. Regulatory decisions which are based on CBA reflect the most workable economic literature on discounting rather than the most theoretically consistent one, thus yielding less reliable and less robust results. Scholars who aim at improving the quality of rule–making and at fostering the application of CBA in regulatory decisions should improve the “operational validity” of their research, thus providing practitioners with methods that are both consistent and workable.

Decision rules and regulatory reform

1982 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen H. Linder
Keyword(s):  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Regulatory Reform ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
The United States ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Regulatory Decisions

ABSTRACTThe regulation of risks to health and the environment in the United States is currently undergoing serious criticism for its impact on the recession economy. Attempts to diminish health risks by placing stringent limitations on potentially harmful substances are thought to be excessively expensive and ineffective. To remedy this problem, basic reforms in the way these regulations are fashioned have been proposed. Perhaps the best known is cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless, there are a number of areas where agencies purposely avoid making tradeoffs between costs and benefits and instead assign priorities among levels and types of benefits. However, despite a considerable literature examining the merits of making tradeoffs in regulatory decisions, little attention has been given to the disparate premises of the tradeoff and no-tradeoff rules and how the choice of decision rules determines the role of cost considerations in agency decision making. This paper not only examines these issues, but develops an analytical framework for restructuring the choice between rules. Instead of abolishing the no-tradeoff rules, the analytical framework proposed here can be used to generate a compromise rule which permits partial tradeoffs under certain well-defined circumstances.

Hostile Takeovers and Anti-takeover Defenses in the Russian Corporate Market

2007 ◽  
pp. 70-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Demidova
Keyword(s):  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Hostile Takeovers ◽  
Russian Market ◽  
Takeover Defenses ◽  
The Cost ◽  
European Markets

This article analyzes definitions and the role of hostile takeovers at the Russian and European markets for corporate control. It develops the methodology of assessing the efficiency of anti-takeover defenses adapted to the conditions of the Russian market. The paper uses the cost-benefit analysis, where the costs and benefits of the pre-bid and post-bid defenses are compared.

Rationalisation of non-sterile latex disposable gloves in clinical settings – a brief study using the purchase of expertise consultancy model

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-19
Author(s):  
Duncanson V
Keyword(s):  
Secondary Care ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Clinical Nurse Specialist ◽  
Small Study ◽  
Clinical Settings ◽  
Nurse Specialist ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Clinical Nurse

T his article describes a small study aimed at making a purchasing recommendation to the purchasing manager, providing a cost-benefit analysis of the most commonly used brands of non-sterile latex examination gloves. One of the nine makes of glove tested remained consistent with the agreed criteria for assessment and, if introduced as the only option available, would result in a saving of $15,150 per annum on Site A of a recently merged secondary care Trust. Also, the importance of the consultancy role of the clinical nurse specialist in improving practice was demonstrated.

Better Regulation – An Ongoing Journey

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 378-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Chase ◽  
Adam Schlosser
Keyword(s):  
Good Governance ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Regulatory Process ◽  
Post Evaluation ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Better Regulation ◽  
Regulatory Measures ◽  
Guidance Needs ◽  
Key Aspects

The Commission's new Better Regulation package represents a step forward in the European Union’s decade–long journey to bringing coherence and rationality to its legislative and regulatory process. But as the Communication on the package itself suggests, the journey is far from over.The Communication consistently emphasizes the key aspects of good regulation: quality over quantity; taking time to get proposals right; evidence–based decision making; open and continuous consultation to gather evidence from all stakeholders; rigorous impact assessments and cost–benefit analysis; applying these tools to regulatory measures as well as legislation; and implementing a robust ex–post evaluation program. It is important as well that the Secretariat General published unified and detailed guidance for Commission officials on how each step of the regulatory process should work, with a “tool–box” to elaborate further on these steps.All of this is good. Yet in some areas, the Commission misses opportunities to go farther down the good governance road, and in others the guidance needs to be made much more explicit.

Citizens–experts’ interactions under different institutional arrangements: assessing the role of uncertainty, interests, and values

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 861-879
Author(s):  
Francesco Bogliacino ◽  
Cristiano Codagnone ◽  
Giuseppe Alessandro Veltri
Keyword(s):  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Value Relevance ◽  
Epistemic Uncertainty ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Value Conflicts ◽  
Normative Criterion ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Deliberative Governance

AbstractIn this paper, we develop a framework to analyze the relationship between evidence and policy. Postulating a normative criterion based on cost–benefit analysis and the value of a piece of information, as well as a topology of the policy space defined by three characteristics (epistemic uncertainty, interests, and the degree of value conflicts), we identify the (Nash) equilibria of an interaction between experts and citizens in providing information to a decision maker. In this setup, we study three institutional arrangements (evidence-based policy, deliberative governance, and negotiated conflict) that differ in terms of reliance on experts and citizens for providing information. We show that different degrees of uncertainty, interests, and value-relevance surrounding the issue at stake result in vastly different arrangement performances; hence, to foster efficiency, rules should be contingent.

The Role of Science

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilles Saint-Paul
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Population Distribution ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Gains And Losses ◽  
Social Engineer

This chapter describes the social sciences. Unlike the natural sciences, the social sciences are inevitably statistical. When documenting human behavior, for example, they can at most claim that a trait is present in a certain fraction of the population. However, the social engineer of the paternalistic state must take into account that the “science of happiness” that is being implemented does not apply uniformly to all individuals. A policy that benefits some by preventing mistakes or removing their biases harms those who are immune to these issues. This difficulty, however, entirely disappears as long as the state is utilitarian or, more generally, pursues any objective that aggregates welfare between individuals, for the statistics are the only thing the utilitarian needs to know. Once the population distribution of the relevant effects and mechanisms is known, the social planner can safely use it to balance gains and losses across incarnations and perform the cost-benefit analysis of its policies.

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