Christian Colonialism and Capitalism

2021 ◽  
pp. 189-208
Author(s):  
Kathleen Wellman

The nineteenth century tells the story of Christian success in England and America. Victorian England set a model of patriarchal family virtue rooted in “biblical Christianity.” God rewarded it with industrial development and capitalist expansion in its colonial ventures. The Industrial Revolution advances these curricula’s crucial economic argument: economic success reveals God’s favor. England’s virtues also allowed it to avoid the political tumult that beset the European continent. England and the United States enjoyed religious revivals, and missionaries spread Christianity throughout the world. Colonialism opened the world to missionary evangelization in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The capitalist success of the United States reveals it as the beneficiary of Divine Providence. Nineteenth-century evangelicals not only asserted these claims but also saw Christian hegemony as a realistic aspiration.

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-154
Author(s):  
Marlene L. Daut

This essay explores the genealogy of historian and anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s writings as related to broader trends in historical scholarship. The author suggests that it was through Silencing the Past’s acceptance and ascendance within the very North Atlantic “guild” that Trouillot deconstructs in his historical writings that the ideas of nineteenth-century Haitian historians such as Baron de Vastey, Hérard Dumesle, Beaubrun Ardouin, and Thomas Madiou produced an immeasurable influence on the direction of historical scholarship across the world. The author argues that the influence of these nineteenth-century Haitian authors can be seen everywhere in social history, especially in the concept of history from below, even though most historians in Europe and the United States have never even heard the names of these other Haitian authors.


Author(s):  
William H. McNeill

IN THE LATTER part of the nineteenth century, east coast city dwellers in the United States had difficulty repressing a sense of their own persistent cultural inferiority vis-à-vis London and Paris. At the same time a great many old-stock Americans were dismayed by the stream of immigrants coming to these shores whose diversity called the future cohesion of the Republic into question almost as seriously as the issue of slavery had done in the decades before the Civil War. In such a climate of opinion, the unabashed provinciality of Frederick Jackson Turner's (1861-1932) paper "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," delivered at a meeting of the newly founded American Historical Association in connection with the World Columbian Exposition in Chicago (1892), began within less than a decade to resound like a trumpet call, though whether it signalled advance or retreat remained profoundly ambiguous....


Author(s):  
W. W. Rostow

I have tried in this book to summarize where the world economy has come from in the past three centuries and to set out the core of the agenda that lies before us as we face the century ahead. This century, for the first time since the mid-18th century, will come to be dominated by stagnant or falling populations. The conclusions at which I have arrived can usefully be divided in two parts: one relates to what can be called the political economy of the 21st century; the other relates to the links between the problem of the United States playing steadily the role of critical margin on the world scene and moving at home toward a solution to the multiple facets of the urban problem. As for the political economy of the 21st century, the following points relate both to U.S. domestic policy and U.S. policy within the OECD, APEC, OAS, and other relevant international organizations. There is a good chance that the economic rise of China and Asia as well as Latin America, plus the convergence of economic stagnation and population increase in Africa, will raise for a time the relative prices of food and industrial materials, as well as lead to an increase in expen ditures in support of the environment. This should occur in the early part of the next century, If corrective action is taken in the private markets and the political process, these strains on the supply side should diminish with the passage of time, the advance of science and innovation, and the progressively reduced rate of population increase. The government, the universities, the private sector, and the professions might soon place on their common agenda the delicate balance of maintaining full employment with stagnant or falling populations. The existing literature, which largely stems from the 1930s, is quite illuminating but inadequate. And the experience with stagnant or falling population in the the world economy during post-Industrial Revolution times is extremely limited. This is a subject best approached in the United States on a bipartisan basis, abroad as an international problem. It is much too serious to be dealt with, as it is at present, as a domestic political football.


Author(s):  
Andrew Preston

By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States had become the world’s preeminent economic power. Yet for such a large and wealthy country, by 1890 the United States was in a curious position: it was an economic colossus, but a diplomatic and military dwarf. In comparison to the great powers of Europe or Japan, America was a minor actor on the world stage. That would all soon change. ‘Global America’ explores two phenomena—globalization and world war—that brought America deeper into world affairs. By the end of the period, in 1919, the United States had become one of the greatest powers of the world—and yet refused to play its part.


Author(s):  
Deepak Nayyar

This chapter analyses the striking changes in the geographical distribution of manufacturing production amongst countries and across continents since 1750, a period that spans more than two-and-a-half centuries, which could be described as the movement of industrial hubs in the world economy over time. Until around 1820, world manufacturing production was concentrated in China and India. The Industrial Revolution, followed by the advent of colonialism, led to deindustrialization in Asia and, by 1880, Britain became the world industrial hub that extended to northwestern Europe. The United States surpassed Britain in 1900, and was the dominant industrial hub in the world until 2000. During 1950 to 2000, the relative, though not absolute, importance of Western Europe diminished, and Japan emerged as a significant industrial hub, while the other new industrial hub, the USSR and Eastern Europe, was short lived. The early twenty-first century, 2000–2017, witnessed a rapid decline of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan as industrial hubs, to be replaced largely by Asia, particularly China. This process of shifting hubs, associated with industrialization in some countries and deindustrialization in other countries in the past, might be associated with premature deindustrialization in yet other countries in the future.


1931 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 625-641
Author(s):  
Thomas Baty

It has been the peculiar glory of the United States in history to be a great neutral Power and the champion of neutral rights. From the earliest days of the republic, the sentiments of her statesmen, of Washington and Hamilton no less than of Jefferson and Franklin, were whole-heartedly for peace and neutrality, for the protection of the merchant against the soldier. And throughout the nineteenth century, the world acclaimed neutrality with her, and regarded the United States as the standing exemplar of a Peace Power. It was recognized that there might indeed be excusable wars, just wars, necessary wars. But the ideal of the nineteenth century was peace. Just and necessary as his cause might be, the belligerent was an ipso facto nuisance. He must be allowed to interfere as little as possible with the peaceful affairs of the world. On any doubtful question of interference with neutral commerce, the presumption was against him. He had always been a nuisance, and he was coming to be an anachronism. As an anachronistic nuisance, the scales were heavily poised against a belligerent.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-351
Author(s):  
Konstantin V. Blokhin

Article analyzes predictive estimates and concepts presented by the Western intellectual community, regarding prospects for development of new trends in the global economy, caused by the fourth industrial revolution. Author draws on a variety of sources, including reports from US think tanks, works by representatives of global financial and technocratic elite, and works by American intellectuals. Methodological basis of the study is a theory of the world system of I. Wallerstein, which allows to identify dynamic and conflicting lines of interaction between two geopolitical centers of the world - the United States and China. Based on an analysis of current trends, modern experts predict revolutionary changes in modern technologies that can decisively affect socio-political stability, not only in Western countries, but in developing countries as well. Author shows that the new technological structure is changing not only sector structure of the economy, but also has a strong impact on employment. According to American analysts, new technologies can destabilize socio-political stability in any country, especially in countries where cheap labor is a traditional tool. Robotization and automation of production can become a competitive advantage of the United States and Western countries in competition with China. Article notes that Russia is only at the very beginning of technological revolution, behind big five leading countries. Overcoming its lag in the field of AI and robotics requires adoption of comprehensive measures of economic, scientific and political nature. Ignoring realities of technological progress is fraught with increase in threats to national security.


2012 ◽  
pp. 50-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Astra Bonini

During the post-war period, natural resource production has often been associated withperipheralization in the world-economy. This paper seeks to demonstrate that this associationdoes not hold when examined from a long-term perspective, and explains the conditions underwhich natural resource production can support upward economic mobility in the world-system.First, this paper provides evidence that the production of cash crops and resource extraction hasnot always equaled peripheralization in the world-economy, as demonstrated by, among otherthings, the upward economic mobility of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealandduring the nineteenth century. It then puts forth a new hypothesis that the existence ofopportunities for raw material producing countries depends on whether the hegemonic regime ofaccumulation at a given time structures the economy in a way that is either complementary orcompetitive to the economic development of raw material producing countries. By examining theBritish centered regime of accumulation during the nineteenth century, we find that it wascomparatively complementary to economic development in raw material producing countrieswhereas the twentieth century United States centered regime was comparatively competitive withraw material producers. Based on a comparison with Britain and the United States, the paperalso suggests that China’s increasingly central role in the world-economy may be comparativelycomplementary to economic development in raw material producing countries.


Author(s):  
Jay Sexton

Jay Sexton’s opening essay focuses on the role of the Civil War in the realization of U.S. national and global power in the nineteenth century. Though the Civil War gave evidence of the immense military and economic power of the United States, he shows, the projection of that power on the world stage also required foreign collaboration.


2020 ◽  
pp. 301-356
Author(s):  
Duncan Bell

This chapter traces the Anglotopian visions of universal peace in the context of fin-de-siècle debates about democracy, empire, race, and war. It contends that the most ambitious projects for Anglo-American synthesis promoted the idea of global racial peace — the abolition of war through the unification of Britain and the United States. Recognizing the character and significance of such arguments requires a reappraisal of the genealogy of modern peace discourse. After delineating several popular visions of peace that circulated during the nineteenth century, the chapter introduces the “democratic war thesis” and the “democratic empire thesis.” The former posited that democratic political structures caused or exacerbated inter-state conflict, while the latter suggested that vast empires could cooperatively govern the world and eradicate war. The chapter examines the racial peace thesis, which was propounded, albeit in different forms, by Andrew Carnegie, Cecil J. Rhodes, W. T. Stead, and H. G. Wells, many of the science fiction writers discussed in Chapter 5, and an array of other unionist political thinkers. This was the utopian core of the Anglo-racial dreamworld.


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