scholarly journals Does Skepticism Presuppose Explanationism?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe
Keyword(s):  
General Class ◽  
External World ◽  
Epistemic Closure ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
Explanatory Virtues ◽  
Widespread Acceptance

Explanationist (or abductivist) responses to skepticism maintain that our commonsense beliefs about the external world can be rationally preferred to skeptical hypotheses on the grounds that the former provide better explanations of our sensory experiences than the latter. This kind of response to radical skepticism has never enjoyed widespread acceptance in the epistemological community due to concerns about the epistemic merits of inference to the best explanation and appeals to the explanatory virtues. Against this tide of skepticism about explanationism, the chapter argues that traditional skeptical challenges rest upon central explanationist tenets and thus that one cannot harbor doubts about the general class of explanationist responses to skepticism while at the same time granting the force of the skeptical challenges they seek to answer. This chapter also shows how explanationist principles do a better job than epistemic closure and underdetermination principles in articulating the structure and force of skeptical challenges.

Intuitions and Coherentism

2019 ◽  
pp. 111-131
Author(s):  
William G. Lycan
Keyword(s):  
Data Base ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
External World ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
Explanatory Virtues ◽  
Traditional Problem ◽  
Viable Approach ◽  
Special Case

The method of reflective equilibrium is a special case of explanatory-coherentist epistemology. This chapter defends explanatory coherentism against pertinent objections: Keith Lehrer’s problem regarding the data base; the charge of unacceptable conservatism; Stich’s threat of relativism; Goldman’s problem of wild and crazy beliefs; and Hacking’s doubt that explanatory virtues such as simplicity have anything to do with truth. The epistemological picture defended in this book does not incur the traditional problem of “getting from” one’s own sensory experiences to the external world, and so offers an unusual answer to the skeptic. But if one were to engage that problem, the explanatory coherentist has a viable approach.

The Argument for Radical Skepticism Concerning the External World

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bredo Johnsen
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
External World Skepticism ◽  
Long Chain

In this chapter the author extracts from Hume’s writings a powerful argument that he takes to be the argument for radical external world skepticism as that view is understood by Agrippa in his famous trilemma. According to this argument, no belief can be justified by any other beliefs. There are three reasons for this. First, any attempt to present such a justification will beg the question by appealing to an unjustified belief. Second, it will be circular. Third, it will require an infinitely long chain of justifying beliefs.

scholarly journals Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Moretti ◽  
Tomoji Shogenji
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
The Body ◽  
Component Model ◽  
Epistemic Closure ◽  
Sense Experience ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
The Third ◽  
First Response ◽  
Skeptical Paradox

This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition and proposes an explanation of why we have a faulty intuition. The second response, which we favor, accommodates all three intuitions; it reconciles the first and the third intuition by the dual component model of justification, and defends the second intuition by distinguishing two principles of epistemic closure.

Bodily sensations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.G.F. Martin
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
The State ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Material World ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Bodily Sensations ◽  
The Mind

Bodily sensations are those feelings, or sensory experiences, most intimately associated with one’s body: aches, tickles; feelings of pain and pleasure, of warmth, of fatigue. Many philosophers contrast bodily sensations with perceptions of the external world, claiming that sensations provide one with awareness of nothing independent of them. An alternative approach is to take sensations to be a form of awareness of one’s body – on one view sensations are simply the perception of the state and properties of one’s body. Bodily sensations have been seen as a major problem for any attempt to give an account of the mind that takes it to be part of the material world as investigated by the physical sciences.

In Defense of the Explanationist Response to Skepticism

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-50
Author(s):  
Kevin McCain
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
External World ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
The World ◽  
External World Skepticism ◽  
A Priori Probability

A promising response to the threat of external world skepticism involves arguing that our commonsense view of the world best explains the sensory experiences that we have. Since our commonsense view of the world best explains our evidence, we are justified in accepting this commonsense view of the world. Despite the plausibility of this Explanationist Response, it has recently come under attack. James Beebe has argued that only a version of the Explanationist Response that provides an a priori justification of inference to the best explanation can hope to respond to two serious objections. Additionally, he has argued that providing such an a priori justification requires an acceptable account of a priori probability and that it is unclear whether such an account can be developed. In this paper I argue that Beebe fails to provide adequate support for either of these claims.

scholarly journals On Otherness: An Analysis in the Context of Ibn Sına’s Theory of Relation

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-120
Author(s):  
Zehra Gökgöz
Keyword(s):  
General Class ◽  
External World ◽  
General Concept ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Solution Model ◽  
Ibn Sina ◽  
History Of Thought ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Individual

The mode of existence of relatives has been a matter of debate throughout the history of thought. Having evaluated the debate through the contrast between a first intelligible that has individuals in the external world and a second intelligible that has no counterpart at the individual level in the external world, Ibn Sīnā believed the relative to be a categorical accident with individuals that can be pointed at in the external world. In the Metaphysics of al-Shifā, Ibn Sīnā proposed a solution aimed at eliminating the objections based on the infinite regress against his view. The article tests the applicability of the model built in this solution to the meaning of otherness (al-mughāyara), the results of which reveal the incompatibility of otherness with this model as a problem. When examining the source of this problem, the following findings are noted: The categorical relative (al-muḍāf) and pure relation (iḍāfa) are not the same thing. Pure relation is a general concept upon which the categorical relative is based and to which it cannot be reduced, because the predicate of oneness (wahda) becomes valid for multiplicity (kathra) through pure relation. Otherness is a general predicate that is inherent in and coextensive with pure relation; in this way, otherness is included in the most general class of concepts that explain the order in the existence of all existents including the categorical relative. As Ibn Sīnā’s solution model in Metaphysics aims to explain the result of pure relation in essences, it cannot be applied to pure relation phases that prioritize results and transcend categories and thus cannot be applied to otherness.

Radical Skepticism Concerning the External World

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bredo Johnsen
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Absolute Certainty

Many contemporary philosophers take very seriously such inferences as “It is possible that I am being massively deceived by a Demon; hence, I do not know that I am not.” This is because such inferences appear to be sound. Thus, they must be refuted or otherwise disposed of, since skepticism is a non-starter. However, these philosophers reject the idea that knowledge requires absolute certainty. This means they should consider the inference invalid.

scholarly journals GERIAUSIO PAAIŠKINIMO IŠVEDIMO PSICHOLOGINIS ADEKVATUMAS IR ONTOLOGINIAI ĮSIPAREIGOJIMAI

Problemos ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 41-54
Author(s):  
Adolfas Mackonis
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Science Studies ◽  
Background Knowledge ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
External World ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
Adequate Theory ◽  
Explanatory Virtues ◽  
Epistemic Theory ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

Geriausio paaiškino išvedimas (GPI) dabartinėje analitinėje epistemologijoje ir mokslo filosofijoje yra plačiai tyrinėjama episteminė teorija, teigianti, kad hipotezės buvimas geriausiu paaiškinimu yra pakankama šios hipotezės teisingumo sąlyga. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad GPI analizuotina ne tik kaip episteminė, bet ir kaip psichologinė bei ontologinė teorija. Pirma, aptariami kognityviųjų mokslų tyrimai, kurie leidžia teigti, jog GPI teisingai aprašo žmonių samprotavimų praktiką: paaiškinimas suvokiamas kaip teisingumo požymis; teiginiai, kurie yra geresni paaiškinimai, priimami kaip labiau tikėtini; aiškinimo vertybės bei turimas žinojimas daro įtaką teiginių tikimybės vertinimui. Antra, straipsnyje aptariama, kokia turėtų būti pasaulio ontologija, kad GPI kaip episteminė teorija būtų teisinga. Realizmas apie išorinį pasaulį, gamtos vienodumas, turimo žinojimo teisingumas bei aiškinimo vertybių palankumas tiesai yra būtinos ir pakankamos sąlygos tam, kad GPI būtų teisinga.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: geriausio paaiškinimo išvedimas, abdukcija, psichologija, ontologija, aiškinimo vertybės.Psychological Adequacy and Ontological Commitments of Inference to the Best Explanation Adolfas Mackonis SummaryThe article explicates psychological and ontological aspects of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). IBE is a psychological theory, because cognitive science studies support IBE as descriptively true and psychologically adequate theory, i.e., people perceive best explanations as true and follow the rule of IBE in their reasoning. Moreover, different features of IBE imply that conclusions of IBE can be true only in a world with a very particular ontological constitution. Realism about the external world, the uniformity of nature, the truth of background knowledge and the truth-conduciveness of explanatory virtues are necessary and sufficient for IBE to be truth-conducive. Therefore, IBE is an epistemic theory only because at the same time it is committed to a particular ontology.Keywords: inference to the best explanation, abduction, psychology, ontology, explanatory virtues.

Adam Smith and the Problem of the External World

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Glenney
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
External World ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
External Causes ◽  
The Mind

How does the mind attribute external causes to internal sensory experiences? Adam Smith addresses this question in his little known essay ‘Of the External Senses.’ I closely examine Smith's various formulations of this problem and then argue for an interpretation of his solution: that inborn perceptual mechanisms automatically generate external attributions of internal experiences. I conclude by speculating that these mechanisms are best understood to operate by simulating tactile environments.

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