EMU as Constitutional Law

Author(s):  
Bruno De Witte

The creation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was an important enterprise of constitutional engineering and expressed a belief in the capacity of constitutional law to accomplish economic objectives. The Treaty of Maastricht was prepared by not one but two intergovernmental conferences, namely one on ‘European Political Union’ and another one on ‘European Monetary Union’. The negotiators participating in the latter of the two conferences were given a free hand in drafting a lengthy set of norms that were eventually included in the Maastricht Treaty, either in the body of the new Treaty or in detailed Protocols. At the moment of entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, all EMU law was therefore constitutional law of the European Union, and still today, when many further norms of secondary law have been enacted, an important part of EMU law is still of a formally constitutional nature, by being contained in the text of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and its annexed Protocols. There is thus a consistent body of EMU constitutional law, which is the object of this contribution.

Author(s):  
Finn Laursen ◽  
Sophie Vanhoonacker

The Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union (EU), was signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992, and it entered into force on November 1, 1993, after being ratified by the then 12 member states of the European Communities. The Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) on Political Union (PU) and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) where the member states negotiated the amendments to the founding treaties took place against the turbulent geopolitical background of the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), German unification, and the end of the Cold War. The new treaty amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and established the European Community (EC) as the first pillar of the Union. It also amended the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). It further added two pillars of intergovernmental cooperation, namely Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in a second pillar and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation in a third pillar. Overall, the Maastricht Treaty constituted one of the most important treaty changes in the history of European integration. It included provisions on the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), including a single European currency. It tried to increase the democratic legitimacy and efficiency of the decision-making process through empowerment of the European Parliament (EP) and the extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). Next to introducing the principle of subsidiarity and the concept of European citizenship, it further developed existing policies such as social policy and added new ones including education, culture, public health, consumer protection, trans-European networks, industrial policy, and development cooperation.


Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3(66)) ◽  
pp. 15-27
Author(s):  
Klaudia Kudławiec

Intensification of Economic Cooperation in the European Union in the Years 2010-2019 in the Light of the Theory of New Intergovernmentality The subject of the article is the process of intensifying economic integration in the European Union in the years 2010-2019, which is to lead to the creation of a real Economic and Monetary Union. The article is based on the theory of new intergovernmentalism, through which the eurozone system reform has been analyzed. The first part presents the main assumptions of the theory of new intergovernmentalism in relation to two models of European integration: intergovernmental and supranational. The second part was devoted to four projects included in the future Economic and Monetary Union: Financial Union, Economic Union, Fiscal Union and Political Union.


European Union, but their immediate impact has to be looked at in a different light. There was no shortage of speeches, and presumably internal memoranda, drawing attention to the significance of events beyond the Eastern border, but it is hard to see what practical difference they actually made in the short term to policies being pursued by the member states or to the development of the Community. The process which would lead to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union was set in motion in the first part of 1988. The treaty itself was signed at the end of 1991. There is no evidence that this process would have proceeded differently even if none of the events to the East had occurred! In concluding this chapter it may be appropriate to summarise the major events which led up to the Maastricht Treaty and its subsequent ratification. Although implementation of the single market brought the Commission to the centre stage, the real driving force for developing the Community was undoubtedly the European Council. In the course of 1988 and 1989 it agreed to establish two separate but parallel IGCs to consider respectively Political Union and Economic and Monetary Union. After some preparations, the two IGCs came into formal existence at the Rome European Council in December 1990. Working throughout 1991 they reported to the Maastricht European Council just one year later, resulting in the Treaty on European Union. Inevitably the attitudes of France and Germany were crucial. Initially there was some difference of emphasis. Once German reunification was secured, Kohl’s major aim was to complete the process of locking the newly united Germany irrevocably into an integrated Europe through Political Union. Mitterrand’s concern was the preeminence of the Deutschmark and the desirability of establishing some European political control over monetary issues. By mid 1990 the positions of the two chief partners were broadly in line, henceforth working towards both political and economic and monetary union, with strong support from Italy, who took over the Council Presidency in the second half of the year. Meanwhile ,British policy was in turmoil. Following her third successive election victory, Thatcher became increasingly strident in her condemnation of further European integration. This was undoubtedly fuelled by growing concern over possible German dominance. However, many of Thatcher’s leading ministers were committed to extending the European agenda. During 1989 the British government both agreed that at last it would join the exchange rate mechanism and vainly opposed the establishment of the IGC on EMU. Late in 1990, following the resignation of Geoffrey Howe as Foreign Minister, essentially on issues concerned with Europe, Thatcher was deposed as Prime

2006 ◽  
pp. 87-87

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
LB ◽  
JHR

In between the writing of this editorial and the publication of this issue of EuConst, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, in everyday parlance the ‘Fiscal Compact’, will have been signed by the representatives of the governments of the contracting parties — the member states of the European Union minus the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. The Fiscal Compact is intended to foster budgetary discipline, to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area.


Author(s):  
Eugenia Dumitriu Segnana ◽  
Alberto de Gregorio Merino

The Council of the European Union (EU) occupies a central place in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), even more so than in any other Union policies. It exercises in this area a variety of roles going from a forum for coordination of national policies to legislative functions and executive powers. The different crises that affected the Union and in particular the euro area in the last ten years have strengthened its prominent position, in no small part due to the Council’s ownership by the Member States. Alongside the Council, the Euro Group, which is presided by a fixed-term president, has developed itself as the informal forum where Ministers from the Member States whose currency is the euro discuss matters of common interest. Its role has been decisive, in particular in the Cypriot and Greek crisis, which could have put into question the very existence of the euro area as a whole.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-237
Author(s):  
László Andor

The article provides a critical assessment of how the Economic and Monetary Union was designed, implemented and reformed in the European Union and discusses the risks of a slow-motion reform process. It is argued that the fact that the euro area economy has recovered in the last few years has become a source of complacency and delays. In particular, powerful forces continue to downplay the importance of systemic reconstruction and the risk of disintegration remains high despite the relative tranquillity of markets in the 2014–2018 period. Finally, the article evaluates competing paradigms about the eurozone crisis and the pros and cons of fiscal capacity building.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (22) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Luengo Escalonilla Lucía Vicent Valverde

<p> </p><p>The article reflects about the viability and implications of the Economic and Monetary Union from a Southern periphery of the European Union perspective, especially that of the Spanish economy. The argument is developed through two ideas: a) euro zone’s reconfiguration carried out by community leaders has preserved and also has sharpened imbalances and asymmetries that triggered the economic crisis, b) the debate on how to overcome it contains and transcends the dilemma that arises from being  part of the European Monetary area, or not.</p><p> </p>


Author(s):  
Richard Griffiths

Twenty years ago, amid a great fanfare of enthusiasm, the Treaty of Maastricht created the European union and inaugurated the process for creating a single European currency for most of the then members (except the UK and Sweden, and later Denmark, that were given a temporary exemption) and all future members. Twenty years later, the anniversary of the treaty passed almost unnoticed (European Policy Centre, 2012). On that day, however, the impact of the treaty was never far from the headlines, as had also been the case for almost every day over the previous months. The Lehman brothers bankruptcy in September 2008 not only triggered a financial crisis that threatened to engulf the world, but it set in motion a series of shocks that have since reverberated through the Euro-area. It is fair to say that the crisis-management has not been an example of stream-lined efficiency, and there are lessons to be learned from that experience.However, the development of the Euro, and the crisis that has subsequently engulfed it, holds lessons in another direction. The European Union has long been held as a model, or an inspiration, for other experiments in regional cooperation and integration, including Mercosul, ASEAN and SADC. The model embodied an sequence of steps leading to ‘ever closer union’ that moved from a free trade area through a customs union and a single market and culminated in economic and monetary union. With the signing and implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Union had embarked on the penultimate step in this progression. But only half of it – a monetary union without a fiscal union. The Euro-crisis has now called that achievement into question and, in the process, undermined the authority of those espousing a European route towards closer integration, both for themselves as well as for other nations. As a convinced federalist, myself, I would not recommend abandoning the European example altogether, but if there is a lesson to be learned from this sorry episode, it is this: “if you are going to do it, do not do it this way”.This article examines the European experience with economic and monetary union from three perspectives – the design, the implementation and the management of the euro – before exploring the implications of the current crisis.


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