The UUP during the Troubles, 1969–1998

2019 ◽  
pp. 9-40
Author(s):  
Thomas Hennessey ◽  
Máire Braniff ◽  
James W. McAuley ◽  
Jonathan Tonge ◽  
Sophie A. Whiting
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Direct Impact ◽  
British Government ◽  
The Troubles ◽  
Irish Government

The opening chapter examines the UUP during the Troubles from 1969 until 1998. The era posed numerous political problems for the Party, in addition to the direct impact of violence upon many members. The 1973 power-sharing Sunningdale Agreement had divided the UUP under Faulkner but its collapse in 1974 and the restoration of direct rule, later accompanied by participation in a scrutiny-only Northern Ireland Assembly, helped restore internal unity. Unionist unity extended amid strident but fruitless opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which gave the Irish government a consultative role on Northern Ireland. The chapter considers the quiet integrationist approach of James Molyneaux and his contribution to the 1993 Downing Street Declaration, before analysing the unravelling of the Molyneaux strategy, with the British Government producing the strongly all-Ireland Framework Documents in 1995. The departure of Molyneaux and election of David Trimble as UUP leader in 1995 are assessed.

Power sharing and the Irish dimension: the conundrum for the SDLP in Northern Ireland

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
The Troubles ◽  
Popular Narrative ◽  
Irish Government ◽  
History Of ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Real Challenge ◽  
Lost Opportunity

This chapter traces the ideas that shaped the concept of power-sharing within the SDLP, and subsequently Northern nationalism, highlighting the significance attached to the Irish dimension as a core feature of power-sharing, which caused divisive debates within the party post-Sunningdale. It will also trace how the concept evolved within British and Irish government circles, where much of the talk focussed on ‘government by consent’ as opposed to power-sharing during the rest of the 1970s. The fall of Sunningdale in 1974 has been attributed to many things, and the popular narrative emphasises that it was an agreement too soon, or a lost opportunity. This explanation does not account for the level of intra-party conflict that existed before the executive was even set up or during the negotiations. Further, it overlooks the very real challenge that power-sharing posed (and continues to pose) to democracy and legitimacy. Brian Faulkner, Chief Executive in the 1974 power-sharing Executive, retrospectively questioned the legitimacy of the SDLP sharing power in Northern Ireland: ‘Given the history of the SDLP over the previous years, and particularly their attitude that Northern Ireland had no right to exist, it was natural that unionists should feel strongly against SDLP participation in government’. The mandatory coalition between parties who were at ideologically opposite ends of the spectrum, including a party that had the demise of the state as one of its core aims, further highlighted the undemocratic nature of the agreement that inevitability would have caused problems, had the experiment not failed in 1974. The emphasis the SDLP attached to the Irish dimension as an integral part of power-sharing additionally eroded the democratic complexion of power-sharing. This has very real repercussions for the Northern Ireland Assembly today. While the 1998 Agreement ended the violence (or at least the level of violence) associated with the prior three decades of the ‘troubles’, there is no real commitment to democratic pluralist institutions at Stormont and instead there has been a reinforcing of the historical choices offered to the electorate of selecting candidates or voting on the basis of their shade of orange or green.

scholarly journals The pope’s man in London: Anglo-Vatican relations, the nuncio question and Irish concerns, 1938-82

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-84
Author(s):  
Daithí Ó Corráin
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Catholic Church ◽  
Public Life ◽  
British Government ◽  
Roman Catholicism ◽  
Holy See ◽  
British Foreign Policy ◽  
Irish Government ◽  
National Life ◽  
Diplomatic Relationship

Although a British mission to the Holy See was established in 1914, the diplomatic relationship was not on a basis of reciprocity. From 1938 the pope was represented in London not by a nuncio (the Vatican equivalent of an ambassador) but by an apostolic delegate whose mission was to the hierarchy alone and not the British government. The evolution of the nuncio question sheds light on the nature of Anglo-Vatican relations, the place of Catholicism in British public life, inter-church rapprochement and British foreign policy considerations. This article assesses the divergent positions of the Foreign and Home Offices. The former was sympathetic to a change of status, whereas the latter was cautious due to the opposition of the archbishop of Canterbury and concerns about anti-Catholicism. The nuncio question was also of great interest to the Irish government. It feared that a nuncio in London would exert jurisdiction over Northern Ireland and undermine the all-island unity of the Irish Catholic Church. The Northern Ireland Troubles and the support displayed by the apostolic delegate for British policy hastened the restoration of full ambassadorial relations between London and the Holy See in 1982, ending a diplomatic breach that had existed for more than four centuries. It paved the way for Pope John Paul II’s historic pastoral visit to Britain which helped to consolidate the position of Roman Catholicism in British national life.

British Intervention

2019 ◽  
pp. 176-196
Author(s):  
Brendan O’Leary
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Civil Rights ◽  
Civil Rights Movement ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Loss Of Control ◽  
British Government ◽  
The North ◽  
Modern Media ◽  
Irish Government ◽  
Normative Order

The puzzle addressed in this chapter is why one British government intervened in Northern Ireland in 1969 and why another eventually resorted to direct rule in 1972. British conduct in this period stands out in comparison with the inactivity of their predecessors during similar historical junctures when the Ulster Unionist Party had been able to repress Catholic or nationalist discontent. Though the preference of many British officials was to shore up the Stormont regime, the civil-rights movement had corroded the previous normative order protecting the UUP’s control because its marchers demanded British rights for British citizens, in the full glare of modern media. The immediate precipitants of intervention in the loss of control by the RUC and the Specials are examined. They took place against the background of the mobilization of Irish forces and field hospitals and riotous pogroms directed against Catholics in Derry and Belfast. Whether Northern Ireland was reformable is addressed, as are the dynamics of the descent into loyalist violence, British counterinsurgency, and IRA insurgency. The development of Irish government policy toward the North in 1969–70 is treated in a brief appendix.

scholarly journals The Irish Government and the Sunningdale Council of Ireland: a vehicle for unity?

2012 ◽  
Vol 38 (150) ◽  
pp. 283-303
Author(s):  
Shaun McDaid
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Executive Functions ◽  
Labour Party ◽  
White Paper ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Stepping Stone ◽  
Irish Government ◽  
Formal Recognition ◽  
Formal Establishment

In December 1973, the British and Irish governments and the Northern Ireland Executive designate agreed to the formal establishment of a ‘Council of Ireland’ as part of the historic Sunningdale Agreement. This council was to have executive functions and co-ordinate the provision of certain services on both sides of the border; it would have ‘executive and harmonising functions and a consultative role, and a consultative assembly with advisory and review functions’. The Council of Ireland proposal was the British government's formal recognition of the ‘Irish dimension’ which it had accepted in the March 1973 White Paper, the Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals. The proposed council was one of the most divisive issues in Northern Ireland politics during the 1972–4 period, and was strongly resisted by a majority of unionists. The council issue led to the collapse of the power-sharing Executive which had taken office in January 1974. Loyalist opponents of Sunningdale argued that the Council of Ireland, if allowed to operate, would be a stepping-stone to a united Ireland. Recently, some scholars have retrospectively endorsed this interpretation of the council, arguing that the Irish government, in concert with the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (S.D.L.P.), sought a particularly strong institution – with the goal of Irish reunification. But was the proposed Council of Ireland really intended as a vehicle for future Irish unity?

Legislating For Fair Employment: The Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Bill, 1988

1989 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Miller
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Religious Discrimination ◽  
British Government ◽  
Political Will ◽  
Legislative Reform ◽  
The Troubles ◽  
Fair Employment ◽  
The Government ◽  
Employment Legislation ◽  
Chronic Problem

ABSTRACTTwo decades ago allegations of religious discrimination and the onset of ‘the troubles’ led the British Government to institute a programme of administrative and legislative reform in the province. These reforms culminated in the Fair Employment Act (1976). More recently, the Government began a review of the efficacy of the existing legislation and this has now resulted in a new Fair Employment Bill for Northern Ireland. The new Bill should be seen as a serious attempt to grapple with the chronic problem of religious discrimination in the province. The realisation of equality of opportunity in Northern Ireland, however, continues to be as much a test of political will as of the ability of those who frame ‘fair employment’ legislation.

Banalising Evil?

2021 ◽  
pp. 164-175
Author(s):  
Veronica Membrive
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Growing Up ◽  
Television Show ◽  
The Troubles ◽  
Good Friday ◽  
Good Friday Agreement ◽  
20Th Anniversary

2018 was the celebration year of the 20th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, bringing power-sharing and much peace to Northern Ireland. Twenty years seem a fair distance to address the issue from a comical viewpoint. Lisa McGee's television show Derry Girls (2018) released in Channel 4, and recently in Netflix, seems to convey a nostalgic and caustic outlook at the 1990s during the last years of The Troubles and focuses on the lives of a gang of four Irish teenagers growing up in the setting of Catholic Derry. This chapter will interrogate the banalization of evil conveyed by McGee by tackling the representation of evil and violence in Northern Ireland during The Troubles.

The Framework Document on Northern Ireland and the Theory of Power‐Sharing

1996 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arend Lijphart
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
British Government ◽  
Divided Societies ◽  
Democratic Government ◽  
Consociational Democracy ◽  
The Future ◽  
Framework Document

The Purpose of This Article is To Analyse The Document ‘A Framework for Accountable Government in Northern Ireland’, published by the British government in early 1995, and to assess its significance in terms of the theory of powersharing (consociational democracy). The Framework Document, as it is usually called, received a hostile reception from many Unionist politicians in Northern Ireland. The ideas that it contains, however, resonate with many previous blueprints for the future of Northern Ireland. In some form they are very likely to re-emerge in the proposed solutions that will follow the ‘all-party’ talks set for June 1996. I shall show that the Framework plan for democratic government in Northern Ireland is completely and thoroughly consociational in its orientation. It confirms the proposition that power-sharing is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for viable democracy in deeply divided societies.

Reconciliation or Irredentism? The Irish Government and the Sunningdale Communiqué of 1973

2007 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER FARRINGTON
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Archival Material ◽  
National Question ◽  
Irish Government

AbstractThis article uses recently released archival material to examine the role of the Irish government in the negotiation of the Sunningdale communiqué of 1973, which marked, among other things, an agreement to establish a Council of Ireland and was therefore a key part of the first attempt to establish a power-sharing devolved executive in Northern Ireland. The article will problematise the distinctions which have been made between various strains of political thought held by leading intellectuals and politicians on the national question and show how the discourse of ‘revisionist nationalism’ and reconciliation which sponsored the key institution of the Sunningdale communiqué, the Council of Ireland, was in contradiction to the meaning attached to the functions of the Council, which was in fact closer to traditional nationalist aims.

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