The Council
Chapter 5 discusses the pathway to legitimacy of the European Council (and the Council), with a special focus on Germany’s predominance through “one size fits one” rules. The chapter begins with an analysis of the Council’s particular sources of power and grounds for throughput legitimacy in Eurozone governance. It questions member-state leaders’ assumptions about their representativeness (input legitimacy), then asks if they meet the requirements of deliberative mutual accountability (throughput legitimacy) or even whether Germany fits the criteria expected of a benevolent hegemon. Next the chapter discusses the Janus-faced public perceptions of Council crisis governance. These are divided between views of the Council as an unaccountable (German) dictatorship or as a mutually accountable deliberative body (in the shadow of Germany). This part first presents the Council as an unaccountable dictatorship by detailing the ways in which Germany was predominant on its own and/or in tandem with a weaker France. It then counters with a discussion of the Council as a mutually accountable deliberative body, by charting not only the many instances in which member states agreed with German preferences but also where Germany acquiesced to those of other member states. The chapter ends with an examination of the actions of the Council (in particular the Eurogroup of Finance Ministers) and the Troika (IMF, Commission, and ECB) with regard to the program countries. This can be seen as two sides of the same coin: harsh dictatorship (especially the third Greek bailout) or deliberative authoritarianism (eg, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and Greece in the second bailout).