Compensating for limitations in domestic output performance? Member state delegation of policy competencies to regional international organizations

Policy Area ◽

Member States ◽

Domestic Output ◽

Window Dressing ◽

Output Performance ◽

Policy Goals ◽

Energy States

Cooperation in regional international organizations (RIOs) can help member states to work toward and perhaps achieve policy goals that would not be feasible unilaterally. Thus, RIOs might be used as a means of states to compensate for domestic shortcomings in output performance. Do states equip RIOs with policy competencies in order to compensate corresponding domestic performance shortcomings? The analysis of a novel database on policy competencies of 76 RIOs between 1945 and 2015 reveals that usually RIOs are not usually used as window-dressing devices by which states disguise limited domestic output performance. Instead, governments tend to equip RIOs with policy competencies in order to further strengthen their already good output performance in most policy areas. However, in the policy area, ‘energy’ states tend to confer more competencies to their respective RIOs, the worse they perform domestically, indicating that output-related compensation dynamics might be at play in this field.

Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Responsibility of Member states of an International Organization

International Organizations Law Review ◽

10.1163/157237411x633881 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 8 (2) ◽

pp. 291-347 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Odette Murray

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Member State ◽

International Law ◽

Good Faith ◽

Member States ◽

Draft Article ◽

Legal Limit ◽

Primary Rule

AbstractThis paper applies two manifestations of the principle of good faith – pacta sunt servanda and the doctrine of abuse of rights – to the complex relationship between member states and international organizations. The paper argues that these existing doctrines operate as a legal limit on the conduct of states when creating, controlling and functioning within international organizations. The paper begins by exploring an innovative provision in the International Law Commission's recently finalised Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations – Draft Article 61 – according to which a member state will bear international responsibility for the act of an international organization where the member state uses the organization to circumvent its own international obligations. Examining the development of Draft Article 61 and the jurisprudence upon which it is based, this paper argues that the principle which the Commission in fact seeks to articulate in Draft Article 61 is that of good faith in the performance of treaties. As such, being based on a primary rule of international law, this paper queries whether Draft Article 61 belongs in a set of secondary rules. The paper then considers the role of states in the decision-making organs of international organizations and argues that the widely held presumption against member state responsibility for participation in decision-making organs can and should be displaced in certain cases, in recognition of the various voting mechanisms in international organizations and the varied power which certain states may wield. The paper argues that the doctrine of abuse of rights operates as a fundamental legal limit on the exercise of a member state's voting discretion, and thereby forms a complementary primary obligation placed on states in the context of their participation in international organizations.

Functionalism

The Concept of an International Organization in International Law ◽

10.1093/oso/9780192895790.003.0002 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 17-32

Author(s):

Lorenzo Gasbarri

Keyword(s):

Member State ◽

International Law ◽

Member States ◽

Institutional Rules ◽

Contractual Relationship ◽

The Law

Functionalism is conventionally considered the mainstream paradigm of the law of international organizations: organizations are agents of their member states by the means of a contractual relationship; the law created by international organizations is purely international law; the institutional veil is characterized by a crystallin transparency; the autonomy of the organization is minimal and only granted by a rigid conferral of competences and few implied powers; the conduct of member states acting in the institutional forum is relevant as a matter of international law. This chapter introduces the historical roots of this conceptualization and elaborates why under this perspective the rules of the organizations are purely international law. It describes the flaws of this theory, discussing the breach of institutional rules by the organization and the adoption of countermeasures against a wrongful act committed by a member state.

Litigating Member State Responsibility

International Organizations Law Review ◽

10.1163/15723747-01202010 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 12 (2) ◽

pp. 468-483 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Paolo Palchetti

Keyword(s):

Member State ◽

Present Article ◽

Third Party ◽

State Responsibility ◽

International Tribunal ◽

Member States

It is not rare that, in a dispute brought before an international tribunal against a member State of an organization, that State, by relying on the Monetary Gold principle, asks the tribunal to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction, arguing that this would lead to determining the responsibility of the organization. Such an objection raises the question of whether the Monetary Gold principle, which so far has been applied in cases when the absent third party was a State, also applies to absent organizations. The present article intends to study the question of the applicability of the Monetary Gold principle in relation to situations in which member States can be held responsible for the conduct of the organization. While in principle there are situations in which the determination of the responsibility of the organization appears to be a precondition to the determination of the responsibility of the member State, the fact that an international tribunal does not have jurisdiction over international organizations should lead one to exclude that the Monetary Gold principle applies at all to situations in which the absent third party is an international organization.

Leanings and Dealings: Exploring Bias and Trade Leverage in Civil War Mediation by International Organizations

International Negotiation ◽

10.1163/15718069-12341280 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 19 (2) ◽

pp. 315-342 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

Magnus Lundgren ◽

Isak Svensson

Keyword(s):

Civil War ◽

Member State ◽

Member States ◽

Unique Data ◽

International Mediation ◽

The Impact

Two characteristics of mediators – bias and leverage – are discussed intensively in the research on international mediation. However, whereas bias and leverage have been examined in mediation by states, relatively little is known about their role in mediation by international organizations (ios). This study provides new ways of conceptualizingiobias and leverage and utilizes unique data to measure the impact ofiobias and leverage on mediation outcomes. Exploring all cases of civil war mediation byios in the period 1975–2004, we find thatios where member states provide support to both sides in a conflict outperformios whose member states remain disinterested.ios with significant trade leverage also increase the likelihood of mediation success. The study demonstrates thatios rarely have a neutral relationship to civil war combatants, that mediation byios is laden with member state interests, and that such interests shape outcomes.

International organizations' responses to member state contestation: from inertia to resilience

International Affairs ◽

10.1093/ia/iiab169 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 97 (6) ◽

pp. 1963-1981

Author(s):

Gisela Hirschmann

Keyword(s):

Member State ◽

Coalition Building ◽

Threat Perception ◽

Institutional Changes ◽

Budget Cuts ◽

Member States ◽

Multilateral Cooperation ◽

Relevant Factors

Abstract International organizations (IOs) play a key role in promoting multilateral cooperation on critical transnational issues. Yet, their authority has increasingly been contested by member states that cut financial contributions or even withdraw their membership. How do IOs respond to such contestation? While the existing literature has mostly focused on reactions by other member states, I argue in this article that our understanding of IOs' responses to contestation remains incomplete without an analysis of IO bureaucracies. I propose a conceptual framework to analyse three types of bureaucratic responses: inertia, i.e. no immediate response; adaptation, i.e. institutional changes to maintain the support of the challenging member state(s); and resilience-building, i.e. developing organizational capacities to limit contestation. I argue that each of these responses is shaped by specific bureaucratic mechanisms, namely hunkering, negotiation, framing, coalition-building, shaming and professionalization. Based on a comparative within-case study analysing the reactions of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) to budget cuts by the Reagan, Bush and Trump administrations, I further theorize that the organization's threat perception, the position of other member states and bureaucratic leadership are relevant factors that need to be considered to explain the variation in IO responses to contestation.

Reforming and Integrating Pension Systems in the Eurasian Economic Union

Moscow University Economics Bulletin ◽

10.38050/01300105201953 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 2019 (5) ◽

pp. 40-64

Author(s):

Egor Zabolotskii

Keyword(s):

Member State ◽

Financial Market ◽

Theoretical Framework ◽

Pension Funds ◽

Member States ◽

Pension Systems ◽

Eurasian Economic Union ◽

Economic Commission ◽

Economic Union

In recent years the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) pursues a policy aimed at improving cooperation among the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) member states in pension area. Creation of a single financial market, to which pension funds are also parties, is expected to be completed in the EEU by 2025. The purpose of this paper is to make recommendations for further reforms of the EEU pension systems and their possible integration. The scope of the study refers to existing arrangements in pension area among the EEU member states and their pension systems. The theoretical framework of research relates to works of national and international organizations and scientists in pension area as well as relevant normative legal acts and agreements between the EEU member states. The results of the study can be used by EEC and member state executive authorities for further cooperation in pension area.

Identities of States in International Organizations

International Organizations Law Review ◽

10.1163/15723747-01202002 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 12 (2) ◽

pp. 293-318 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Ramses A. Wessel ◽

Ige F. Dekker

Keyword(s):

Member State ◽

Crucial Role ◽

General Introduction ◽

Member States ◽

International Responsibility ◽

The Law ◽

Further Development

In academic debates on the responsibility of international organizations and their member States the different identities of States play a crucial role. However, apart from the difficulty to clearly separate ‘State’ and ‘member State’ identities, it is even more complex to distinguish between the different roles ‘member States’ may have in the framework of international organizations. As a general introduction to this special forum, this essay aims to clarify the different identities and roles States may have in relation to international organizations, especially in the context of the responsibility of international organizations. As the subsequent contributions reveal, the law on the international responsibility of international organizations takes account of the possible responsibility of their members. By mapping the different identities States may have in different settings, this contribution argues that such differentiations may be crucial for the further development of adequate international rules on the responsibility of international organizations and their members.

Constitutionalism

The Concept of an International Organization in International Law ◽

10.1093/oso/9780192895790.003.0003 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 33-48

Author(s):

Lorenzo Gasbarri

Keyword(s):

Member State ◽

International Law ◽

Member States ◽

The Law

Constitutionalism emerged as a reaction to functionalism to rebut the international nature of the relation between organizations and member states: member states are organs of the organization when they act in the fulfilment of its purposes; the law created by international organizations is purely internal law; the institutional veil is characterized by an impermeable opacity; the autonomy of the organization is maximal; the conduct of a member state acting in the institutional forum is not relevant as a matter of international law. This chapter describes the historical roots of this conceptualization and posits why under this perspective the rules of the organizations are internal law of each particular organization. Afterwards, it describes the flaws of this theory discussing the problems arising in terms of the principle of lex specialis and concerning the attribution of conduct to an international organization.

Informalism

The Concept of an International Organization in International Law ◽

10.1093/oso/9780192895790.003.0004 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 49-63

Author(s):

Lorenzo Gasbarri

Keyword(s):

Member State ◽

International Law ◽

Civil Service ◽

Administrative Law ◽

Legal Systems ◽

Member States ◽

Internal Relation ◽

The Law

Informalism comprises the theories that frame the law produced by international organizations in shades of normativity: member states and international organizations are integrated in heterarchical relationships primarily governed by politics; the law created by international organizations belongs to hybrid legal systems; the institutional veil is characterized by degrees of transparency depending on the internal relation of power; the conduct of a member state acting in the institutional forum is alternatively relevant or not relevant as a matter of international law, depending on the internal relation of power. This chapter describes the historical roots of this conceptualization and elaborates why under this perspective the rules of the organizations are considered as a matter of degrees of legality. Afterwards, it describes the flaws of this theory focusing on the law of the international civil service and on global administrative law.

THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ APPROACH TO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MEMBER STATES IN CONNECTION WITH ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

International and Comparative Law Quarterly ◽

10.1017/s0020589311000467 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 60 (4) ◽

pp. 997-1016 ◽

Cited By ~ 12

Author(s):

Cedric Ryngaert

Keyword(s):

Member State ◽

International Law ◽

General Rule ◽

Member States ◽

Legal Personality ◽

European Court ◽

Droit International ◽

International Legal Personality

It is generally considered that an international organization (‘IO’) has an international legal personality which is distinct from that of its Member States, as a result of which the IO itself, rather than the Member States, is to be held responsible for the IO's internationally wrongful acts.1 It appears to be an accepted principle that Member States cannot generally be held liable for the acts of IOs by virtue of their membership of an IO alone. This view can be found in a 1996 resolution of the Institut de Droit International, which provides that ‘there is no general rule of international law whereby States members are, due solely to their membership, liable, concurrently or subsidiarily, for the obligations of an international organization of which they are members.’2 This is echoed in the International Law Commission's (‘ILC’) Commentary to article 62 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (‘ILC DARIO’): ‘It is clear that … membership does not as such entail for member States international responsibility when the organization commits an internationally wrongful act’.3 The ILC holds the view that only in the case of an intervening act by a Member State that influences the commission of a wrongful act by the IO (aid and assistance, direction and control, coercion, avoidance of compliance, acceptance) could the Member State be held responsible.4