Nietzsche’s Epiphenomenalism about RConsciousness
This chapter argues for an epiphenomenal reading of Nietzsche’s view of reflective consciousness. The position ascribed to Nietzsche is that no reflectively conscious state is among the causally efficacious antecedents of token actions. This reading is defended by showing it is compellingly supported by textual evidence. The chapter also argues that reflective consciousness’s proper function is in the realm of social coordination. More precisely, Rconscious states play a crucial role in the acquisition of social norms. That role, however, is not sufficient for the relevant norm to become behaviourally efficacious and, thus, cause our actions. For only internalized norms are behaviourally efficacious in that sense. In turn, though Rconscious states are often the channel through which we are presented with social norms, it depends on the arrangement of our drives and affects whether we internalize them or not. The chapter ends by surveying and rebutting a range of objections to epiphenomenal readings of Nietzsche.