Strange loops of attention, awareness, action, and affect in musical improvisation

2019 ◽  
pp. 113-124
Author(s):  
David Borgo

This chapter champions the notion of ‘strange’, paradoxical, level-crossing feedback loops as a means to address the shortcomings of information-processing approaches to cognition, especially as applied to musical improvisation. It highlights the inherent challenges of studying improvisation and consciousness, and suggests ways that embodied and enactive theories of cognition, and emerging ideas in predictive processing and social psychology, may offer productive ways to understand mind and consciousness, and the dynamics of collective musical improvisation. Improvising music together, the chapter argues, involves joint action, embodied coordination, collective attention, and shared intention in ways that challenge conventional understandings of cognition and consciousness.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh McGovern ◽  
Marte Otten

Bayesian processing has become a popular framework by which to understand cognitive processes. However, relatively little has been done to understand how Bayesian processing in the brain can be applied to understanding intergroup cognition. We assess how categorization and evaluation processes unfold based on priors about the ethnic outgroup being perceived. We then consider how the precision of prior knowledge about groups differentially influence perception depending on how the information about that group was learned affects the way in which it is recalled. Finally, we evaluate the mechanisms of how humans learn information about other ethnic groups and assess how the method of learning influences future intergroup perception. We suggest that a predictive processing framework for assessing prejudice could help accounting for seemingly disparate findings on intergroup bias from social neuroscience, social psychology, and evolutionary psychology. Such an integration has important implications for future research on prejudice at the interpersonal, intergroup, and societal levels.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter Van Dessel ◽  
Jan De Houwer ◽  
Sean Hughes ◽  
Ian Hussey

Dalege, Borsboom, van Harreveld, and van der Maas (2018) describe a novel framework for the conceptualization of attitudes that draws on principles from statistical mechanics. A core idea in their framework is that systems are often characterized by randomness (i.e., entropy) and that there is both heuristic and predictive value in applying the idea of entropy to the study of attitudes and related phenomena. We applaud their initiative: the attitudinal entropy framework provides an intriguing new perspective on theoretical questions and empirical findings in social psychology. It opens up new avenues for research in many areas and is a timely contribution given the growing popularity of predictive processing theories emphasizing entropy as an important factor in human cognition (for a recent overview see Metzinger & Wiese, 2017).


1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 505-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Milton Lodge ◽  
Ruth Hamill

Based on their interest in politics and knowledge of political leaders, individuals are classified into three levels of partisan sophistication: (1) those scoring high in interest and knowledge (partisan schematics), (2) a middle group, and (3) those scoring low (partisan aschematics). In this experimental study, and consistent with findings from cognitive and social psychology, partisan schematics prove better able than partisan aschematics to classify campaign statements as either Republican or Democratic and to recall the policy stands taken by a fictitious congressman. Aschematics, at the other extreme, perform at no better than chance levels in either the recognition or recall of the congressman's policy statements. There are, however, liabilities to sophistication as well: Schematics demonstrate a “consistency bias” in recalling significantly more policy statements that are consistent with the congressman's party identification than are inconsistent with it. This “restructuring” of memory is especially pronounced among sophisticates, and reflects a serious bias in the processing of political information.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma Kate Ward ◽  
Ricarda Braukmann ◽  
Jan Buitelaar ◽  
Sabine Hunnius

Predictive Processing accounts of autism posit that individuals with autism rely less on expectations than those without autism when it comes to interpreting incoming sensory information. Since these expectations are claimed to underlie all information processing, we reason that any differences in how they are formed or adjusted should be persistent across multiple cognitive domains and detectable much earlier than clinicians can currently diagnose autism, around 3 years of age.This experiment is part of a longitudinal prospective study of young children with increased familial likelihood of autism. Around 20% of these children will receive an autism diagnosis themselves, compared to 1% of the general population. The current EEG study used an adaptation paradigm to investigate whether a reduced effect of expectations is already present in high-risk 2-year-olds, before autism can reliably be diagnosed. While we did not observe the adaptation after-effect we expected, high-likelihood children habituated more than low-likelihood children and the two groups did not differ in their overall responses to the manipulation, contrary to our hypotheses and previous findings.


2020 ◽  
pp. 121-154
Author(s):  
Shaun Gallagher

In this chapter I further develop interaction theory and the concept of primary intersubjectivity by providing evidence for our ability to directly perceive intentions and emotions. Intentions and emotions can be understood at least in part as composed of perceivable patterns of contextualized embodied behaviors. I argue that perception is “smart” and in no need of inferential or simulational supplementation in most instances of social interaction. I consider that even some theory theorists have acknowledged the role of perception but not without giving up the idea of a subpersonal processing that amounts to an inferential mindreading. I also consider recent predictive processing accounts and argue for an embodied-enactive interpretation of such processes. Finally, I consider concerns about direct social perception raised by research in social psychology.


Author(s):  
Graham Bodie ◽  
Susanne M. Jones

Like other constructs studied by communication scientists, listening has been viewed as a predominantly deliberate process that requires considerable cognitive resources to perform well. Listening, contrasted with hearing as a more passive mode of information processing, requires a person to actively receive, process, and sensibly respond to aural information. The emphasis on deliberate processing might perhaps have been fueled by research in social psychology, from which much communication theory is drawn. That literature has emphasized rational, deliberate processing at the expense of a more intuitive mode that tends to be viewed as inferior in human decision making and grounded much more in emotions. Using a general dual-process framework, the authors argue that an intuitive, experiential system plays a much more important role in the listening process than previously recognized. They lay out their rationale and model for experiential listening and discuss ways in which people can improve their intuitive listening through mindfulness-based metacognitive practices.


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