Introduction

Author(s):  
Francesco Papadia ◽  
Tuomas Vӓlimӓki

Fundamental questions about the optimal set-up for central banks are examined in this book. In particular, we ask whether the model of an independent central bank devoted to price stability,1 which affirmed itself in most advanced economies at the turn of the last century, is the final resting point of a long and complex development that started centuries ago. We dissect the hypothesis that the Great Recession has prompted a reassessment and a possible revision of that model....

Author(s):  
Francesco Papadia ◽  
Tuomas Vӓlimӓki

The chapter describes the historical process as well as the analytical and empirical factors that, at the end of the twentieth century, led to the dominance, in advanced economies, of a central bank model based on an independent institution devoted to price stability as its overriding objective. The central bank pre-crisis model was elegant, performing, and efficient. However, it could not easily accommodate the pursuit of a traditionally important central bank objective: financial stability. Indeed, since central banks have, in essence, just one tool, that is, the interest rate, the pursuit of a financial stability objective in addition to a price stability objective could create dilemma situations. In the two decades between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s, the economies of advanced economies were very stable, and this period was thus identified as Great Moderation. However, subsequent experience showed that, in this period, the crisis was incubating.


Author(s):  
Francesco Papadia ◽  
Tuomas Välimäki

The book describes the long and difficult process that led to the central banking model prevailing in most advanced economies at the end of last century. The critical institutional basis of that model is an independent central bank with price stability as its dominant objective. The book, which looks in particular at the Federal Reserve of the United States (Fed) and at the European Central Bank (ECB), also presents the essential components of that model, while noting that financial stability did not fit well in it and was the neglected child of central banks before the Great Recession. The book then illustrates the hits that the Great Recession delivered to that model and asks whether a radical rethinking of the model is necessary. In particular, it examines whether the renewed importance of the financial stability objective, the blurred borders between fiscal and monetary policies, the moral hazard created by the central bank’s forceful actions, and, finally, the actions of the ECB to protect the euro have jeopardized the pre-crisis central bank model. The answer to this question is that, while it is not possible to simply return to the pre-crisis central bank model, the adaptations that are needed are more incremental than radical when considered in a long historical perspective. They nevertheless require changes in the statutes of both the Fed and the ECB, and thus will have to overcome a high institutional hurdle.


2014 ◽  
pp. 1284-1302
Author(s):  
Yıldız Özkök

Today, Central Banks' primary target is to maintain the price stability. In that context, through their monetary policy, they intervene in the money market with different tools. The Analytical Balance Sheet was created upon summing up and offsetting Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) in order to represent specific monetary aggregates. By means of that, CBRT aims to make the balance sheet more understandable and simple. In this chapter, firstly the sub items of the Analytical Balance Sheet are explained; secondly, the economic crises of Turkey during 2000-2009 is mentioned; finally, effects of these crises on the CBRT's Analytical Balance Sheet, changes in monetary aggregates which are Currency Issued, Reserve Money, Monetary Base, and Central Bank's Money, and in this context structure of the monetary policy of the CBRT in this period is analyzed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. p419
Author(s):  
Mehdi Monadjemi ◽  
John Lodewijks

The global financial crises of 2007-2009 was followed by the Great Recession which was the worst since the Great Depression of 1930s. The crises left significant adverse effects on global growth and employment. Policymakers of affected countries responded differently to the outcomes of these crises. The central banks, including US Federal Reserve Bank and Bank of England, provided ample liquidity for the financial institutions and lowered the interest rate to near zero. The policymakers and regulators realized that capital inadequacy and insufficient liquidity of financial institutions were the main problems preventing the financial firms to protect themselves against major financial crises. In addition, lack of guidelines for compensations encourages managers to take the extra risks. The US Federal Reserve Bank took the initiative, in cooperation with international central banks to introduce rules and regulations to safeguard the financial systems against another major crisis. It is not guaranteed that another episode of financial instability will not happen again. However, with existing regulations on financial institutions in force, the severity of the crises on the whole global financial system may possibly become weaker. This is a conjecture we explore here.


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 253-262
Author(s):  
Daniela-Georgeta Beju ◽  
Maria-Lenuţa Ciupac-Ulici ◽  
Codruța-Maria Fǎt

Abstract Today, both policymakers and academicians consider that the central bank’s main goal is to guarantee price stability. The central bank can sustain the government’s economic policies, but only without prejudicing this objective. In order to focus on price stability several studies found that central bank should have a high level of independence. This is why during the recent decades the majority of developed countries, but also several emerging economies have employed institutional reforms that conferred their monetary authorities – the central bank – more independence. Within the European Union the central bank independence is a crucial issue, since the Maastricht Treaty stipulates that one requirement for joining Economic and Monetary Union for the candidate member states is to give their central banks a sufficiently high level of independence. This official requirement has encouraged the countries from Centre and East Europe engaged on the way to adhere the Economic and Monetary Union to confer their central bank a great level of independence. In this paper we analyze some important theoretic issues about central bank independence. We also make an empirical investigation regarding the evolution of inflation within European Union relative to the independence of member states’ central banks.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (237) ◽  
Author(s):  
Szilard Benk ◽  
Max Gillman

Real oil prices surged from 2009 through 2014, comparable to the 1970’s oil shock period. Standard explanations based on monopoly markup fall short since inflation remained low after 2009. This paper contributes strong evidence of Granger (1969) predictability of nominal factors to oil prices, using one adjustment to monetary aggregates. This adjustment is the subtraction from the monetary aggregates of the 2008-2009 Federal Reserve borrowing of reserves from other Central Banks (Swaps), made after US reserves turned negative. This adjustment is key in that Granger predictability from standard monetary aggregates is found only with the Swaps subtracted.


2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-15
Author(s):  
Wojciech Gasiński ◽  
Anna Misztal

The aim of this paper is to present the price stability oriented monetary policy of the European Central Bank. The European Central Bank began activities in 1998 and the primary objective of the European System of Central Banks is to maintain price stability and the ESCB should also support the general economic policies in the Community. Monetary policy is a special tool that national governments and central banks uses to influence on its economy, especially to control the supply of money and to influence on the level of economic indicators. This paper investigates the assumed objective of the European System of Central Banks which is to maintain price stability. What is more, we would like to present the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank and analysis of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (198) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Baksa ◽  
Zsuzsa Munkacsi

The evidence on the inflation impact of aging is mixed, and there is no evidence regarding the volatility of inflation. Based on advanced economies’ data and a DSGE-OLG model, we find that aging leads to downward pressure on inflation and higher inflation volatility. Our paper is also the first, using this framework, to discuss how aging affects the transmission channels of monetary policy. We are also the first to examine aging and optimal central bank policies. As aging redistributes wealth among generations and the labor force becomes more scarce, our model suggests that aging makes monetary policy less effective and in more gray societies central banks should react more strongly to nominal variables.


Author(s):  
Stefan Homburg

Chapter 4 considers economies with borrowing constraints. This assumption is motivated by the observation that monetary expansions after the Great Recession did not entail inflation in the expected manner. At the same time, nominal and real interest rates tended to decline in many advanced economies. The text offers an in-depth analysis of credit crunches, liquidity traps, and interest rates at the zero lower bound and demonstrates that borrowing constraints help reconcile theory and evidence. According to the key insight, a binding borrowing constraint detaches money creation from credit creation. In this case, inflation ceases to be a monetary phenomenon, as in standard models, but becomes a credit phenomenon. This finding explains why expansionary monetary policies failed to produce inflation since the Great Recession.


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