Consequences of the Nature of the Parody Exception

Author(s):  
Sabine Jacques

This chapter examines the consequences of the nature and function of the parody exception in copyright law. It first explains the ‘mechanics’ behind the parody exception, particularly as a defence to copyright infringement, before discussing the legal nature of copyright exceptions and in relation to copyright and contract laws. It then addresses the question of whether copyright exceptions, especially the parody exception, amount to rights or are more akin to interests. It also considers the principle of strict interpretation as a rule of interpretation for the parody exception and reviews recent decisions that illustrate whether the user rights approach resulted in any noticeably broader interpretation of copyright exceptions. Finally, it explores the principles underpinning freedom of contract and how judges, notwithstanding the parody exception’s procedural label as a defence, assess fair use, fair dealing, or rules of the genre in light of the right to freedom of expression.

2001 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 18-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rina Elster Pantalony

A previous article by this author discussed an emerging phenomenon on the Internet. That is, how the law, by denying copyright protection to certain kinds of digital works, may have restricted access to such works instead of liberating them, as was initially intended by the judiciary. This absurd conclusion has resulted from owners whose works are no longer protected by copyright law, who have resorted to restrictive contractual provisions on-line to control access and use of their works. And in turn, owners of such content are still able to generate revenue by charging a subscription fee for the right to gain access to the information contained therein. The result is particularly troubling to end users of digital content. If copyright law is no longer applicable, then what of the Fair Use/Fair Dealing defences available to users of these works? Does this mean that these defences are not applicable either? Are users of such content completely at the mercy of the owners’ terms and conditions of use as dictated by click-on agreements and Rules of Use posted on Web sites? This article discusses the application of Fair Dealing and Fair Use to Internet-based works, by examining the legislative and judicial responses to the ambiguities in their intellectual property protection which new technologies create.


Author(s):  
Pascale Chapdelaine

This chapter looks at the nature of exceptions to copyright infringement (e.g., fair use, fair dealing) and at how copyright user rights are often assimilated to exceptions to copyright infringement. It discusses whether copyright user rights should be better understood as a rule of interpretation of exceptions, rather than giving rise to ‘rights’ as the legal meaning of that term suggests. It further investigates the consequences of exceptions to copyright infringement being characterized as rights or privileges and whether they are (or should be) mandatory (i.e., that exceptions may not be waived by contract). It looks at the mechanics and shortcomings of exceptions to copyright infringement as a regulatory tool. The chapter concludes that exceptions are probably better characterized as privileges than rights, and that, unless expressly stated otherwise, they may be waived by contract. This account of exceptions to copyright infringement reveals a weak strain of copyright user rights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 94-219
Author(s):  
I.S. CHUPRUNOV

The paper provides analysis of the legal nature and the mechanism for exercise of the right of pre-emption (right of first refusal) in respect of execution of a contract taking as an example of right of first refusal to purchase a stake in a non-public corporation, and also examines the boundaries of parties’ autonomy and freedom of contract in this area. The author comes to the conclusion that the key elements of the construction of the right of pre-emption are the transformation powers that belong to the right holder. The author also demonstrates that, notwithstanding their dominance in Russian law, the views, which suggest that exercise of the right of pre-emption leads to “transfer of rights and obligations of a purchaser” (the translative theory), should be rejected. These views must be replaced with the constitutive theory, according to which exercise of the right of pre-emption results in a new contract between the right holder and the seller (as a general rule, on the same terms that were agreed between the seller and the purchaser).


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 921-940
Author(s):  
Michael D. Murray

ccess to innovative scientific, literary, and artistic content has never been more important to the public than now, in the digital age. Thanks to the digital revolution carried out through such means as super-computational power at super-affordable prices, the Internet, broadband penetration, and contemporary computer science and technology, the global, national, and local public finds itself at the convergence of unprecedented scientific and cultural knowledge and content development, along with unprecedented means to distribute, communicate, and access that knowledge. This Article joins the conversation on the Access-to-Knowledge, Access-to- Medicine, and Access-to-Art movements by asserting that the copyright restrictions affecting knowledge, innovation, and original thought implicate copyright’s originality and idea-expression doctrines first and fair use doctrine second. The parallel conversation in copyright law that focuses on the proper definition of the contours of copyright as described in the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent constitutional law cases on copyright—Feist, Eldred, Golan, and Kirtsaeng—interprets the originality and idea-expression doctrines as being necessary for the proper balance between copyright protection and First Amendment freedom of expression. This Article seeks to join together the two conversations by focusing attention on the right to access published works under both copyright and First Amendment law. Access to works is part and parcel of the copyright contours debate. It is a “first principles” question to be answered before the question of manipulation, appropriation, or fair use is contemplated. The original intent of the Copyright Clause and its need to accommodate the First Amendment freedom of expression support the construction of the contours of copyright to include a right to access knowledge and information. Therefore, the originality and idea-expression doctrines should be reconstructed to recognize that the right to deny access to published works is extremely limited if not non-existent within the properly constructed contours of copyright.


2021 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 571-594
Author(s):  
Emily Hudson ◽  
Paul Wragg

This article asks whether the catastrophic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic justifies new limitations or interventions in copyright law so that UK educational institutions can continue to serve the needs of their students. It describes the existing copyright landscape and suggests ways in which institutions can rely on exceptions in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), including fair dealing and the exemption for lending by educational establishments. It then considers the viability of other solutions. It argues that issues caused by the pandemic would not enliven a public interest defence to copyright infringement (to the extent this still exists in UK law) but may be relevant to remedies. It also argues that compulsory licensing, while permissible under international copyright law, would not be a desirable intervention, but that legislative expansion to the existing exceptions, in order to encourage voluntary collective licensing, has a number of attractions. It concludes by observing that the pandemic highlights issues with the prevailing model for academic publishing and asks whether COVID may encourage universities to embrace in-house and open access publishing more swiftly and for an even greater body of material.


The present article touches upon the issue of negative obligation interpretation in civil law. The provisions of foreign civil legislature concerning negative obligations are reviewed in detail. The article gives a detailed analysis of main issues in the scientific literature concerning the legal nature of negative obligations: impossibility of negative obligations delays, impossibility of partial performance, impossibility of negative obligation termination because of failure to perform, impossibility to enforce debt assignment . The opportunity of negative obligation counter-performance is also stressed. It is concluded that negative obligation counter-performance is considered to be possible in case such obligations are interrelated. The author comes to the conclusion that the existence of counter-negative obligations is possible that are also exposed to counter-performance provided they are interrelated. The peculiarities of such negative obligations as distribution agreements and agency contracts are pointed out. The article goes on to say about the possibility of non-concurrence agreements conclusions under civil law of Ukraine. The author states that there are some legal obstacles to it: the correlation with the principle of freedom of contract, the limitations on active civil capacity, termination employment or contractual relationships termination with creditors. Domestic trial practice is given to illustrate the indicated positions. The author draws reader`s attention to the correlation of negative obligation with such definitions as «prohibition», « right restriction» and « waiver of the right». The author justifies that negative obligations can be considered neither as right restriction nor waiver of the right. Taking into account the fact that negative obligations imposes a prohibition on a debtor to commit certain actions but such a prohibition is provided by the agreement and works in favor of creditors it is considered to be a personal prohibition. The author also draws the line between negative obligations and negative servitude that is characterized by the burden of real estate as property rights and not by establishing the commitment in respect of a person.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Sag

This Article shows how the substantive balance of copyright law has beenovershadowed online by the system of intermediary safe harbors enacted aspart of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) in 1998. The Internetsafe harbors and the system of notice-and-takedown fundamentally changedthe incentives of platforms, users, and rightsholders in relation to claimsof copyright infringement. These different incentives interact to yield afunctional balance of copyright online that diverges markedly from theexperience of copyright law in traditional media environments. This articlealso explores a second divergence: the DMCA’s safe harbor system is beingsuperseded by private agreements between rightsholders and large commercialInternet platforms made in the shadow of those safe harbors. Theseagreements relate to automatic copyright filtering systems, such asYouTube’s Content ID, that not only return platforms to their gatekeepingrole, but encode that role in algorithms and software.The normative implications of these developments are contestable. Fair useand other axioms of copyright law still nominally apply online; but inpractice, the safe harbors and private agreements made in the shadow ofthose safe harbors are now far more important determinants of onlinebehavior than whether that conduct is, or is not, substantively incompliance with copyright law. The diminished relevance of substantivecopyright law to online expression has benefits and costs that appearfundamentally incommensurable. Compared to the offline world, onlineplatforms are typically more permissive of infringement, and more open tonew and unexpected speech and new forms of cultural participation. However,speech on these platforms is also more vulnerable to over-reaching claimsby rightsholders. There is no easy metric for comparing the value ofnon-infringing expression enabled by the safe harbors to that which hasbeen unjustifiably suppressed by misuse of the notice-and-takedown system.Likewise, the harm that copyright infringement does to rightsholders is noteasy to calculate, nor is it easy to weigh against the many benefits of thesafe harbors.DMCA-plus agreements raise additional considerations. Automatic copyrightenforcement systems have obvious advantages for both platforms andrightsholders; they may also allow platforms to be more hospitable tocertain types of user content. However, automated enforcement systems mayalso place an undue burden on fair use and other forms of non-infringingspeech. The design of copyright enforcement robots encodes a series ofpolicy choices made by platforms and rightsholders and, as a result,subjects online speech and cultural participation to a new layer of privateordering and private control. In the future, private interests, not publicpolicy will determine the conditions under which users get to participatein online platforms that adopt these systems. In a world wherecommunication and expression is policed by copyright robots, thesubstantive content of copyright law matters only to the extent that thosewith power decide that it should matter.Keywords: Copyright, DMCA, Infringement, Internet, Safe harbors,Enforcement, Fair use, Automation, Algorithms, Robots.


Author(s):  
Siva Vaidhyanathan

Copyright is the most pervasive cultural regulatory system in the world. In recent decades, copyright law has become stronger, covers more activities, restricts more uses, and lasts longer than ever before. Is the current system the best possible system for the current and future creative environment? And are the benefits of the copyright system justly distributed or do the wealthy and powerful continue to reap the bulk of the rewards for it at the expense of everyone else? “Copyright, commerce, and culture” considers what copyright does, and the four major limits of copyright—expiration, fair use or fair dealing, first sale, and the idea/expression dichotomy.


Author(s):  
Vogenauer Stefan

This chapter contains three groups of ‘general provisions’ of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC). The first group deals with fundamental principles of contract law, including freedom of contract, freedom from formal requirements, the bindingness of contract, good faith and fair dealing, and the so-called ‘prohibition of inconsistent behaviour’. The second group of provisions addresses the role and function of mandatory rules and the third group deals with the application of the PICC, focusing on general guidelines for the interpretation of the various articles of the instrument; specific key terms that are used throughout the following Chapters of the PICC such as ‘court’, ‘place of business’, ‘obligor’, ‘obligee’, and ‘writing’; the role of usages and practices established between the parties; and rules for certain scenarios that may arise in various contexts if the PICC apply.


Author(s):  
Akanksha Jumde ◽  
Nishant Kumar

The chapter seeks to explore the extent to which copyright law impedes the fulfillment of the right to education and discuss the alternatives that seek to balance these conflicting rights. The chapter is divided into three parts: the first part of the chapter discusses the embodiment of the right to education in several national and international instruments, the extent of problem of the lack of access to educational materials due to copyright protection. The next part of the chapter discusses the flexibilities provided in international copyright law and efficacy of the same, primarily the doctrine of fair use. The last part of the chapter discusses alternatives to fair use and impact of these supplementary mechanisms.


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