Armed Groups and Crimes against Humanity

Author(s):  
Katharine Fortin

The chapter considers the relevance of the law on crimes against humanity to explanations of how armed groups are bound by international human rights law. Exploring the two-tiered nature of crimes against humanity, it shows that responsibility for crimes against humanity exists at two levels: the level of the individual perpetrator (individual criminal responsibility) and the level of the entity behind the perpetrator (a civil responsibility). From this starting point, the chapter analyses what the case law on crimes against humanity can tell us about whether and when armed groups can commit crimes against humanity. The chapter ends by exploring the connection between crimes against humanity and human rights law in a normative sense, examining what a conclusion that armed groups can commit crimes against humanity demonstrates about their obligations under human rights law.

Author(s):  
Tilman Rodenhäuser

Chapter 5 adds to the contemporary discourse on human rights obligations of non-state armed groups by showing that in many situations, there is a clear legal need for these obligations. This chapter first engages in the debate on whether and to what extent certain human rights treaties address armed groups directly. Second, it shows that under the law of state responsibility, states are generally not responsible for human rights violations committed by non-state entities. Third, it recalls that under international human rights law, states have an obligation to protect human rights against violations committed by armed groups. However, it argues that because this cannot be a strict obligation but is one that depends on states’ capacities and the particular circumstances, often this framework cannot adequately protect individuals against human rights violations by armed groups. The result is a legal and practical need for human rights obligations of non-state armed groups.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 433-449
Author(s):  
Surya Deva

Abstract COVID-19 has affected the full range of human rights, though some rights holders have experienced a disproportionate impact. This has triggered debate about the respective obligations and responsibilities of states and business enterprises under international human rights law. Against this backdrop, this article examines critically whether the “protect, respect and remedy” framework operationalised by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights is “fit for the purpose” to deal with the COVID-19 crisis. I argue that while the UNGPs’ framework provides a good starting point, it is inadequate to bring transformative changes to overcome deep-rooted socio-economic problems exposed by this pandemic. Realising human rights fully would not only require harnessing the potential of states’ tripartite obligations, but also move beyond limiting the responsibility of businesses to respect human rights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-33
Author(s):  
Joshua Joseph Niyo

The restriction of personal liberty is a critical feature in all conflicts, whether they are of an international character or not. With the increased prevalence of non-international armed conflict and the drastic proliferation of non-state armed groups, it is critical to explore whether such groups can legally detain or intern persons during conflict. This article proposes that there exists a power and a legal basis for armed groups to intern persons for imperative security reasons while engaged in armed conflict. It is suggested that this authorisation exists in the frameworks of both international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as it does for states engaged in such conflicts. It is proposed that such power and legal basis are particularly strong for armed groups in control of territory, and can be gleaned from certain customary law claims, treaty law, as well as some case law on international humanitarian law and human rights. Certain case law of the European Court of Human Rights on detention by de facto non-state entities conceivably reflects a change in traditional thinking on ‘legal’ detention by armed groups.


2015 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Farrell

The prohibition on torture in international human rights law seems a fairly straightforward candidate for productive use in international criminal law. The Convention against Torture contains an elaborate definition of torture and human rights institutions have developed substantial jurisprudence on the prohibition and definition of torture. Indeed, the ad hoc Tribunals and the drafters of the Rome Statute have employed the human rights law approach to torture to varying degrees. But the conception of torture reached by human rights bodies is problematic and unsuitable for usage where individual criminal responsibility is sought. It is unsuitable because the human rights law understanding of torture is subjective and victim-derived. Human rights bodies do not scrutinize intent, purpose and perpetration, central aspects of international criminal legal reasoning. The communication on torture between these bodies of law to date shows that cross-fertilisation, without detailed reasoning, is inappropriate - because rights are different to crimes.


2021 ◽  
pp. 79-96
Author(s):  
Ebru Demir

In its recent jurisprudence on domestic violence, the European Court of Human Rights started to examine the domestic violence cases in the light of relevant international human rights law developed in this specific area. This article examines the engagement of the European Court of Human Rights with other international and regional human rights instruments in domestic violence cases. Upon examination, the article concludes that by integrating its case law into international human rights law the European Court of Human Rights broadens the scope of protection for domestic violence victims and maintains the unity of international law.


Author(s):  
Pat Lauderdale ◽  
Nicholas D. Natividad

The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues estimates that there are over 370 million indigenous people spread across 70 countries worldwide. Practicing unique traditions, they retain social, cultural, economic, and political characteristics that are distinct from those of the dominant societies in which they live. Dialogue and political negotiations with indigenous peoples has a long history that began at least a half a millennium ago when the notion of an inter-national” community and the concept of the nation-state became dominant. Since that time, the concepts of sovereignty, self-determination, rule of law, and human rights have led to the establishment of the frameworks and structures of organization that are now referred to collectively as modern international law. But unlike most modern international human rights law, which emphasizes rights of the individual, indigenous peoples generally think in terms of collective rather than individual rights. Because indigenous peoples’ “law” suggests the importance of collective rights, it renders a culture of responsibility and accountability to the collective. At present, international indigenous rights are a type of superficial bandage, giving the appearance of propriety to the crisis faced by the hegemonic “international system of states.” Therefore, indigenous rights standards propagated by organizations such as the UN currently are largely symbolic. However, they could potentially lead to real change if they are coupled with widespread acknowledgment of the fact that diverse societies exist throughout the world with different forms of social organization and diverse conceptions of law.


2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Poels

Although safeguards for the individual human right guarantees for protection against double jeopardy are strongly entrenched in international and domestic law as well as widely reflected in State practice, such protection is generally limited in scope and applicability to surrender or extradition procedures. Where criminal offenders face courts of a State after having been prosecuted and punished or acquitted by a court of another State, the absence of transnational non bis in idem protection constitutes a serious lacuna in international human rights law. Although legislative and judicial initiatives are being undertaken – notably under the aegis of the European Union – to remedy this lacuna, the international community must incontestably act upon this need for individuals' protection against abuses of power and breaches of due process through the amendment or complementing of the classical international human rights conventions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 526-554
Author(s):  
Edin Hodžić

Abstract Consociational democracy rests on the idea of granting certain collective political rights to the most powerful ethno-cultural groups, in addition to the individual rights of political participation of all citizens. Despite its relative popularity among scholars and international policymakers alike, its collectivist ethos has long been exposed to critique on various grounds, including the perspective of international human rights law. The essence of this critique is the allegation that, by institutionalising ethno-cultural identity as the basis of political participation, consociational arrangements discriminate against persons not belonging to the dominant groups. Focusing on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this article argues that equality analysis of consociational democracies, if taken seriously, illuminates our thinking about the possible compromises between the extremes of liberal individualism of the human rights perspective and inherent collectivism of consociational thought and practice. The article concludes that such compromises are both possible and necessary, but they seem to invite the embracing of additional institutional complexity in devising consociational arrangements.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Lea Raible

The introduction begins by setting out puzzles that any account of extraterritorial human rights obligations would need to address. These puzzles are meant to illustrate that economic and social rights bring to the fore two of the most foundational issues of international human rights law more broadly. These are, namely, what it means for a state to have a human rights obligation towards an individual, and how we justify the specification of the relevant right holder and duty bearer in each case. A clear textual basis or even a starting point is lacking in international law. Making reference to economic and social rights forces us to frame extraterritoriality as a question of identifying right holders and duty bearers. In turn, answering this question allows us to challenge conventional wisdom on extraterritoriality in general. The Introduction sets out the method, theoretical background, and aims of this book, outlining the arguments based on the analysis of legal practice and scholarly literature, and their implications.


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