Can Pragmatism about Quantum Theory Handle Objectivity about Explanations?
Richard Healey’s pragmatist approach to quantum theory promises a middle road between realism and anti-realism. However, in order to capture quantum theory’s explanatory power the pragmatist approach gives up a putative truism about explanation. Namely, that explanation demands accurate representation of the target system. This threatens to undermine our ability to distinguish explanations from nonexplanations in an objective way. Chapter 8 develops a criterion internal to explanation that puts a systematic restriction on the explanatory roles of non-representational (or not adequately representing) explanatory resources. It shows that this allows the pragmatist approach to keep the realist commitment to objective explanation even while weakening the typical realist commitment to the putative truism about explanation. However, the chapter also argues that this way of tackling the problem does not allow us to have a middle road without some explanatory sacrifices. Quantum states and the Born rule can be part of explanations but no longer the explanatory initial input.