Being Someone Else
It is a fact about me that I am Martin Glazier; a corresponding fact obtains in your case. Contingentism is the view that such facts are contingent. This chapter argues that contingentism is, if not true, then at least not absurd. The best defense of the view appeals to the principle that the way the world is from someone else’s perspective is a possible way for the world to be. The notion of perspective here is metaphysical rather than epistemic: the way the world is from one’s perspective is not a matter of how one takes the world to be. It is argued that by distinguishing two forms of metaphysical modality, the contingentist may insist that one’s identity, though metaphysically contingent, is also no accident.
2017 ◽
Vol 225
(4)
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pp. 324-335
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2019 ◽
Vol 16
(4)
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pp. 429-443
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2018 ◽
2020 ◽