Empty Reference

2021 ◽  
pp. 128-146
Author(s):  
Stephen Mumford
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Theories Of Meaning

We seem able to talk about things that do not exist, such as centaurs, Oliver Twist, and the highest prime. But the axiom of existence tells us that we can refer to something only if it exists, since reference is a relation. What, then, is it to which we refer in the case of non-existents? Various proxy referents are dismissed since they will either trivialize statements about non-existents or give implausible theories of meaning. Instead, we should think of our statements as being about non-existents instead of referring to them where this involves only a pretended referring. We can distinguish pretended reference from unintentional reference failure by the factive component required for genuine reference. Aboutness can be a substitute for reference and, if based on a public theory of meaning, it allows us to talk about what does not exist.

Transcendental Idealism in Wittgenstein, and Theories of Meaning

2019 ◽  
pp. 71-89
Author(s):  
A.W. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Theories Of Meaning

This essay involves exploration of certain repercussions of Bernard Williams’ view that there is, in Wittgenstein’s later work, a transcendental idealism akin to that found in the Tractatus—sharing with it the feature that it cannot be satisfactorily stated. It is argued that, if Williams is right, then Wittgenstein’s later work precludes a philosophically substantial theory of meaning; for such a theory would force us to try to state the idealism. In a postscript written for the reprint of the essay, reasons are given for thinking that Williams is not right: Wittgenstein’s later work actually helps us to repudiate as ill-conceived all those questions whose answers invite us to embrace any such idealism. But the main thesis of the essay remains intact. Indeed the idea that Wittgenstein’s later work precludes a philosophically substantial theory of meaning is reinforced.

The Basis of Semantic Structure

Dialogue ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 624-641
Author(s):  
Michael Beebe
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Structure ◽  
Conceptual Base ◽  
Super Structure ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Meaning Theory ◽  
Theories Of Meaning

The Concept of the whole utterance, we are inclined to to believe, is basic in meaning-theory. But any theory which locates a conceptual base must show how items in the super-structure relate to that base, and so for theories of meaning. There are units of meaning both larger and smaller than whole utterances: narrative, in which several whole utterances follow one another in some organized fashion, seems relatively unproblematic, but the relations of meaningful parts of utterances to the utterances themselves remains unclear. Grice's theory of meaning secures the logical priority of whole utterances, and in addition, lends itself to an attractive and theoretically fruitful view of the relations between whole utterances and their meaningful parts; or so I shall try to demonstrate.

scholarly journals Kann man die Gebrauchstheorie der Bedeutung in der Semantik gebrauchen?

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (29) ◽  
pp. 73
Author(s):  
Klaus Robering
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Theoretical Underpinning ◽  
Fourth Section ◽  
The Third ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Linguistic Sign ◽  
Theories Of Meaning

The following article deals with some aspects of special theories of meaning – namely those which consider the meaning of a linguistic sign as a function of its use. Although this approach to meaning is commonly attributed to Wittgenstein, I do not aim at an interpretation or exegesis of this philosopher but rather at a systematic discussion of meaning-as-use-theories. In the first section, I discuss the very notion of a theory of meaning. The next section provides a list of criteria which a theory of meaning should fulfill in order to be a meaning-as-use-theory. The formal architecture of semantic theories is discussed in the third section and – dealing with the simpler case of a referential theory of meaning as an example – the fourth section explains how semantic theories are given a theoretical underpinning by being interpreted within a theory of meaning. The same is done for the case of meaning-as-use-theories in the final section.

Why does semantics matter to the study of religion?

1995 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans H. Penner
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
The Third ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Principle Of Charity ◽  
Truth Conditional ◽  
Theories Of Meaning ◽  
The Brain

AbstractBeware of meaning! Meaning is not an entity. It does not refer to anything. This essay is an attempt to describe Donald Davidson's theory of semantics. It took Davidson some time to realize that his truth conditional theory of meaning entailed a radical repudiation of traditional correspondence and coherence theories of meaning. We now have a third theoretical alternative in semantics. In this theory "truth" is left undefined. It is essential that you grasp firmly the fact that truth does not refer, or, "connect-up" anything that makes a sentence true. That is the work of epistemology, or perhaps psycho-neurology. The first theoretical task, therefore, is to describe truth, or meaning, as "convention-T". The second principle, the principle of charity, provides an explanation for testing the theory. The third principle, the principle of holism, provides the theoretical framework for truth-conditions and charity. The theory provides new and powerful refutations of relativism and the notion that semantics must be reduced to the function of the brain, sensations, specific stimuli, and the like. It also provides warrants for denying that religion is "symbolic" of experience of the numinous, the sacred, or other "given" foundations of what might be described as "religious experience". Davidson's theory has important, if not radical, consequences for the study of religion. The essay briefly describes a few of these.

The Money and the Cow

Philosophy ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 67 (259) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. F. Thompkins
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Profound Influence ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Discernible Effect ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Theories Of Meaning ◽  
Alternative Theories

In spite of his profound influence on philosophy in general, Wittgenstein has had no discernible effect upon the philosophy of education. It was not to be expected that his rejection of doctrine in favour of the clarification of language as the goal of philosophical activity would readily find favour with those for whom the medium was intrinsically less important than the message it was intended to convey. Nevertheless philosophers of education have no medium other than language and no means of identifying the subject of their discourse other than the word ‘education’. They cannot convey a clear message if the meaning of their words, ‘education’ in particular, is not clear. Accordingly they cannot take for granted but must clarify in accordance with a postulated theory of meaning the nexus between ‘education’ and education. In his early Tractatus and his later Philosophical Investigations respectively, Wittgenstein proposes alternative theories of meaning. I apply each in turn to ‘education’ and sketch my view of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of education.

Triggers of Thought: Impressions within Hume’s Theory of Mind

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-121
Author(s):  
Anik Waldow
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Associative Processes ◽  
Sensory Inputs ◽  
The World ◽  
Theories Of Meaning ◽  
Conceptual Resources

This essay argues that Humean impressions are triggers of associative processes, which enable us to form stable patterns of thought that co-vary with our experiences of the world. It will thus challenge the importance of the Copy Principle by claiming that it is the regularity with which certain kinds of sensory inputs motivate certain sets of complex ideas that matters for the discrimination of ideas. This reading is conducive to Hume’s account of perception, because it avoids the impoverishment of conceptual resources so typical for empiricist theories of meaning and explains why ideas should be based on impressions, although impressions cannot be known to mirror matters of fact. Dieser Aufsatz argumentiert dafür, dass humesche Eindrücke („impressions“) Auslöser von assoziativen Prozessen sind, welche es uns ermöglichen, stabile Denkmuster zu bilden, die mit unseren Erfahrungen der Welt kovariant sind. Der Aufsatz stellt somit die Wichtigkeit des Kopien-Prinzips in Frage, nämlich dadurch, dass behauptet wird, für die Unterscheidung der Ideen sei die Regelmäßigkeit maßgeblich, mit der gewisse Arten von sensorischen Eingaben gewisse Mengen von komplexen Ideen motivieren. Diese Lesart trägt zu einem Verständnis von Humes Auffassung der Wahrnehmung bei, da sie die Verarmung der begrifflichen Mittel, die für empiristische Theorien der Bedeutung so typisch ist, vermeidet und erklärt, warum Ideen auf Eindrücken basieren sollten, obwohl Eindrücke nicht als Abbildungen von Tatsachen erkannt werden können.

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy Tzohar
Keyword(s):  
Figurative Language ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Theory Of Meaning

This, the conclusion of this book, draws out those features and themes that are common to the various accounts of metaphor presented in the preceding chapters and examines their possible applications. The text also briefly examines further ways in which these features may be applied to deepen and enrich our understanding of the Buddhist and more generally Indian philosophical engagement with figurative language. As a quick case study, the final part of the discussion explores how the Yogācāra theory of meaning sheds light on the concrete use of distinct figures, focusing on a list of similes prevalent in the school’s literature.

A Yogācāra Buddhist Theory of Metaphor

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy Tzohar
Keyword(s):  
Figurative Language ◽  
Language Use ◽  
Potential Contribution ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Philosophical School ◽  
Intellectual Context ◽  
Philosophical Texts

This book is about what metaphors mean and do within Buddhist texts. More specifically, it is about the fundamental Buddhist ambivalence toward language, which is seen as obstructive and yet necessary for liberation, as well as the ingenious response to this tension that one Buddhist philosophical school—the early Indian Yogācāra (3rd–6th century CE)—proposed by arguing that all language use is in fact metaphorical (upacāra). Exploring the profound implications of this claim, the book presents the full-fledged Yogācāra theory of meaning—one that is not merely linguistic, but also perceptual.Despite the overwhelming visibility of figurative language in Buddhist philosophical texts, its role and use have received relatively little attention in scholarship to date. This book is the first sustained and systematic attempt to present an indigenous Buddhist philosophical theory of metaphor. By grounding the Yogācāra’s pan-metaphorical claim in its broader intellectual context, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, the discussion reveals an intense Indian philosophical conversation about metaphor and language that reached across sectarian lines, and it also demonstrates its potential contribution to contemporary philosophical discussions of related topics. The analysis of this theory of metaphor radically reframes the Yogācāra controversy with the Madhyamaka; sheds light on the school’s application of particular metaphors, as well as its unique understanding of experience; and establishes the place of Sthiramati as an original Buddhist thinker of note in his own right, alongside Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

Reprise

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul M. Pietroski
Keyword(s):  
Modern Logic ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Theories Of Meaning

This chapter summarizes the main themes. Humans naturally acquire generative procedures that connect meanings with pronunciations. These meanings are neither concepts nor extensions. Meanings are composable instructions for how to access and assemble concepts of a special sort. In particular, phrasal meanings are instructions for how to build monadic (i.e., predicative) concepts that are massively conjunctive. Theories of meaning should not be confused with theories of truth. Lexicalization is a process of introducing concepts that can be combined via simple operations whose inputs must be monadic or dyadic. In theorizing about meanings, we can and should eschew much of the powerful typology and combinatorial operations that the founders of modern logic introduced for very different purposes.

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