Veiled Deliberation

2020 ◽  
pp. 178-212
Author(s):  
Albert Weale
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Economic Resources ◽  
The Political ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Practical Syllogism ◽  
Individualism And Collectivism ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Rawls’s theory of justice has been the centre-point of modern social contract theory over decades. Given the breadth and extent of Rawls’s work, there are many problems in treating the arguments in limited space. However, points of comparison with other contract theorists are interesting and his theory is treated as being a continuous, if evolving, whole. Rawls seeks to achieve deductive rigour—a moral geometry—in the presentation of his principles of justice, which cover both the political liberties and the distribution of economic resources. Rawls hold that a maximin form or reasoning underlies his two principles of justice. That form of reasoning is reconstructed and it is shown that it is not as decisive in giving the deductive rigour to his conclusions as he requires. The basic liberties and their priority can be defended in broadly Rawlsian terms, assuming that the contracting parties use the practical syllogism of deliberative rationality. However, that form of reasoning cannot deal with cases where the liberties conflict, despite Rawls’s attempt to avoid a balancing test. Rawls’s argument for the difference principle fails outside of a simply two-group economy, and its failure reflects a deeper tension in his thinking between individualism and collectivism. There is a way of reconstructing his account of rational choice so as to be consistent with his collectivism, but it involves abandoning the claim that the rationality of the contracting parties should be consistent with the axioms of utility theory.

Justice in a Market Economy

2006 ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.

Morality, Rational Choice, and Semantic Representation

1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gauthier
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Semantic Representation ◽  
New Venture ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Historical Antecedents

(1) In his recent paper, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” John Rawls makes use of a footnote to disown what to many readers must have seemed one of the most striking and original underlying ideas of his theory of justice, that it “is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of rational choice.” That Rawls should issue this disclaimer indicates, at least in my view, that he has a much clearer understanding of his theory, and its relationship to rational choice than he did at the time that he wrote A Theory of Justice. As I note in Morals by Agreement (pp.4–5), Rawls does not show that principles of justice are principles of rational choice. Hence, in appropriating the idea, I can claim diat I am undertaking a pioneering enterprise. No doubt Thomas Hobbes would have undertaken it had the resources of the theory of rational choice been at his disposal, but I do not intend to pursue counterfactuals in a search for historical antecedents. Moral theory as rational choice theory is, I claim, a new venture.

Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points

1980 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls defines a hypothetical contract situation and argues rational people will agree on reflection it is fair to contractors. He solves the rational choice problem it poses by deriving two lexically-ordered principles of justice and suggests the derivation justifies the principles. Its soundness aside, just what justificatory force does such a derivation have?On one view, there is no justificatory force because the contract is rigged specifically to yield principles which match our pre-contract moral judgments. Rawls provides ammunition for this claim: “By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments [about what is just] and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.”

scholarly journals Rescuing Rawlsian Justice: Are Fraternity and Difference Principle Compatible?

2021 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-74
Author(s):  
R.Yu. Belkovich ◽  
S.V. Vinogradov
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Order ◽  
The Political ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Distribution Of Resources ◽  
Internal Contradiction ◽  
The Difference

The revival of the academic interest in the problem of fair distribution of resources in the society, which is one of the key issues for the political thought today, is largely associated with the name of John Rawls and his Theory of Justice. The article is devoted to the analysis of Rawls’s arguments in support of the difference principle as one of the principles of social justice. According to Rawls (whose arguments later formed the foundation for a separate direction in the political-philosophical thought known as luck egalitarianism), due to the random nature of the original distribution of talents, inequality in human wellbeing cannot be justified by an appeal to a merit. However, because strict equality in distribution might reduce productivity of the owners of talent, achieving the best outcome for all requires such inequalities that incentivize the more talented to work as efficiently as possible for the benefit of the less talented. This compromise drew criticism from ardent egalitarians, among which Gerald Cohen articulated objections to the difference principle most clearly and compared the claims of the most talented for material rewards with extortion. Having considered possible justifications for the need for incentives, based on Rawls’s argument in the Theory of Justice, the authors conclude that these justifications do not solve the problem that Cohen revealed. Appealing to human nature merely translates the dispute into the methodological realm: should the theory of justice proceed from reality, or should it be guided by the ideal? In turn, the inevitability of a conflict of private interests does not fit well with Rawls’s ideal of fraternity as an integral part of a just social order. According to their conclusion, in order to resolve the internal contradiction in Rawls’s theory, it is necessary to abandon either the postulates of luck egalitarianism or difference principle. However, both of these options directly contradict Rawls’s intellectual constructs and undermine the basic foundations of his concept.

Los sentimientos morales, un elemento articulador de la justicia como imparcialidad

2018 ◽  
pp. 133
Author(s):  
Yasmin Díaz Saldes
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
The Political ◽  
Life Project ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Sense Of Justice

Los sentimientos morales, un elemento articulador de la justicia como imparcialidadMoral feelings, an articulating element of justice as impartialityOs sentimentos morais, um elemento articulador da Justiça como imparcialidade ResumenLa noción de sujeto que subyace en la teoría de la justicia de John Rawls, es un elemento fundamental para la propuesta de justicia como imparcialidad, pues se trata de un sujeto concebido a partir de la noción kantiana de persona moral. Esto significa que el sujeto es capaz de autodeterminarse y, en función de esta autodeterminación, la comunidad política debe garantizar las condiciones para que pueda desarrollar su proyecto de vida. En tanto, la propuesta de la justicia como imparcialidad es una propuesta de sociedad liberal, que busca garantizar las libertades básicas del individuo y establecer las condiciones de posibilidad de una comunidad política pluralista, por medio de la articulación de principios de la justicia reconocidos y valorados por todos los integrantes de la sociedad, de manera que la estabilidad de la comunidad política radica en la fidelidad a los principios articuladores del orden social. Esta fidelidad se consigue por medio de lo que Rawls denomina el “sentido de la justicia”. AbstractThe notion of subject that underlies the theory of justice by John Rawls is a fundamental element for proposing justice as impartiality, since it is a subject conceived from the Kantian notion of a moral person. This means that the subject is capable of self-determination and, in function of this self-determination, the political community must guarantee conditions so he or she can develop a life project. Meanwhile, the proposal of justice as impartiality is a proposal of a liberal society, seeking to guarantee individual basic freedoms and establish conditions of possibility for a pluralist political community through the articulation of principles of justice recognized and valued by all members of society, so that the stability of the political community lies in the fidelity to the articulating principles of social order. This fidelity is achieved through, what Rawls calls, a “sense of justice.”ResumoA noção de sujeito que subjaz na teoria da justiça de John Rawls, é um elemento fundamental para a proposta de justiça como imparcialidade, pois se trata de um sujeito concebido a partir da noção kantiana de pessoa moral. Isto significa que o sujeito é capaz de autodeterminar-se e, em função desta autodeterminação, a comunidade política deve garantir as condições para que possa desenvolver seu projeto de vida. Assim, a proposta da justiça como imparcialidade é uma proposta de sociedade liberal, que busca garantir as liberdades básicas do indivíduo e estabelecer as condições de possibilidade de uma comunidade política pluralista, por meio da articulação de princípios da justiça reconhecidos e valorados por todos os integrantes da sociedade, de maneira que a estabilidade da comunidade política radica na fidelidade aos princípios articuladores da ordem social. Esta fidelidade alcança-se por meio do que Rawls denomina o “sentido da justiça”.

The Original Position in José Saramago's Blindness

2007 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Keren
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Modern Age ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Following the tradition of social contract theories of the early modern age, John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, renewed the notion of the “original position,” that is, a set of behavioral assumptions from which general principles of justice are deduced. José Saramago's novel Blindness enriches Rawls's normative theory by adding behavioral assumptions that help clarify some of the problems raised by the theory's critics and enhance its application to social and political settings.

Universalization or Threat Advantage? The Difficult Dialogue between Discourse Ethics and the Theory of Rational Choice

Dialogue ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 373-382
Author(s):  
Cristina Lafont
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Mutual Advantage ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Difficult Dialogue

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls claims that “to each according to his threat advantage is not a conception of justice.” Although it may indeed seem intuitively plausible that a principle based on “threat advantage” cannot count as a principle of justice, it is an altogether different matter to explain why this is so. The question is especially pressing if one bears in mind that such a principle of bargaining in fact underlies many institutionally regulated interactions. Moreover, to the extent that morality is thought of as a mechanism for guaranteeing mutual advantage in the resolution of conflicts, it may indeed seem necessary that it reflect the bargaining power of the parties (in order to make sure that it is indeed advantageous for all of them). In fact, there is a prominent tradition of social-contract theories (from Hobbes to Gauthier) that work under this assumption and claim to provide an answer to what justice requires as much as Rawls's theory does. So seen, the burden of proof seems to fall rather on the shoulders of those committed to claim both that morality is a mechanism that works to the advantage of all and that it nevertheless requires neutralizing all differences in bargaining power.

Toward a New Feminist Liberalism: Okin, Rawls, and Habermas

Hypatia ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy R. Baehr
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Jürgen Habermas ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Recent Proposal ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Jurgen Habermas ◽  
The Family ◽  
Critical Edge ◽  
Principles Of Justice

While Okin's feminist appropriation of Rawls's theory of justice requires that principles of justice be applied directly to the family, Rawls seems to require only that the family be minimally just. Rawls's recent proposal dulls the critical edge of liberalism by capitulating too much to those holding sexist doctrines. Okin's proposal, however, is insufficiently flexible. An alternative account of the relation of the political and the nonpolitical is offered by Jürgen Habermas.

Rational Choice Fundierungen von Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien

1995 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Moral Dimensions ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Rational Choice Theories ◽  
Choice Approach

AbstractThe paper draws on a conceptual analysis of justice in discussing the power of rational choice justifications of conceptions of justice. It is argued that the concept of justice can be reduced to two independent moral dimensions. From this conceptual thesis a simple conceptional criterion is derived which any powerful theory of justice must satisfy. An attempt is made to use this fundamental criterion in evaluating a wide variety of rational choice theories of justice. It is shown that there is but one variant of the rational choice approach which in substantiating principles of justice does not violate this criterion.

Rawls’ Theory of Justice: Domestic and International Perspectives

1977 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 438-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Amdur
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Distribution Of Wealth ◽  
International Perspectives ◽  
Principles Of Justice

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls seeks to derive principles of justice from the agreement of rational, hypothetical individuals, each concerned to further his own interests. From a carefully defined initial situation of choice, Rawls derives two basic principles: one demanding equal liberties for all, the other permitting inequalities in wealth and authority only when they serve to maximize the expectations of those who are left worst off. This article explores the political and social implications of Rawls' theory. It is argued (1) that the theory requires a constitutional democracy, offering very strong protection to political and intellectual liberties; and (2) that it also requires a highly egalitarian distribution of wealth and income. Although Rawls does not discuss international distributive justice, there are good reasons for concluding that his distributive principles ought to apply globally.

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