The Problem of the Prior in Criminal Trials

2021 ◽  
pp. 287-300
Author(s):  
Christian Dahlman ◽  
Eivind Kolflaath

This chapter addresses a classical challenge to the Bayesian approach. It examines different ways of setting the prior probability of the prosecutor’s hypothesis in a criminal trial, in particular, the classical Bayesian solution of setting the prior at 1/N, where N is the number of possible perpetrators in the geographical area where the crime was committed. The authors argue that this solution is at odds with the presumption of innocence, and that other proposals are also problematic, either theoretically or in practice. According to the authors, a presumed prior determined ex lege is less problematic than other solutions, and the problem of the prior can be avoided by a reconceptualization of the standard of proof.

Author(s):  
Maureen Spencer ◽  
John Spencer

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each book includes typical questions, bullet-pointed answer plans and suggested answers, author commentary and illustrative diagrams and flow charts. This chapter discusses the allocation of the burden of proof in civil and criminal trials, depending on who should bear the risk. In criminal trials the ‘presumption of innocence’ means that the burden is on the prosecution, unless reversed by express or implied statutory provision. The law of evidence safeguards what in some jurisdictions is a civil right backed by the constitution. It is important to understand the difference between the legal and evidential burden and the occasions where they are separately allocated. Tricky areas are where there is a divorce of the legal and evidential burden, primarily in situations where the prosecution cannot expect to put up evidence to anticipate every specific defence the accused may present.


Author(s):  
Maureen Spencer ◽  
John Spencer

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each book includes typical questions, bullet-pointed answer plans and suggested answers, author commentary and illustrative diagrams and flow charts. This chapter discusses the allocation of the burden of proof in civil and criminal trials, depending on who should bear the risk. In criminal trials the ‘presumption of innocence’ means that the burden is on the prosecution, unless reversed by express or implied statutory provision. The law of evidence safeguards what in some jurisdictions is a civil right backed by the constitution. It is important to understand the difference between the legal and evidential burden and the occasions where they are separately allocated. Tricky areas are where there is a divorce of the legal and evidential burden, primarily in situations where the prosecution cannot expect to put up evidence to anticipate every specific defence the accused may present.


2019 ◽  
Vol specjalny (XIX) ◽  
pp. 123-137
Author(s):  
Jerzy Konieczny

The aim of the article is to present the role of justification and belief in the course of proving guilt in a criminal trial. The starting point is the indication of the inductive character of evidentiary reasoning and the acceptance of its conclusions on the basis of the decision making by trial authority. These decisions appear after the process in which this authority reaches the level of aspirations to make them; the second basis may be their expected usefulness. The requirements for proof are contrasted with the concept of knowledge. If one assumes that the attribution of knowledge to a particular subject consists in the possession of a justified, accurate belief by that subject, then one can assume that the possession of such knowledge is tantamount to proving in a trial sense. The tools supporting the pursuit of correctness of command are the Shafer-Dempster belief function and the Bayesian approach in making decisions about factual findings.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Duff

On 1 April 1996, a rather odd provision was introduced into the Scottish criminal justice process, namely a duty on both prosecution and defence to try to agree uncontroversial evidence in advance of criminal trial.1 As far as the writer is aware, such a provision is unique, although the philosophy underlying its introduction is not totally alien to inquisitorial systems of criminal justice.2 What is particularly peculiar about this duty is that there is no sanction for a failure, however unreasonable, to agree uncontroversial evidence.3 The lack of a sanction resulted from a concern that the creation of any penalty would impinge unjustifiably upon the rights of the accused. The intention in this article is to explore in detail the relationship between the duty to agree uncontroversial evidence and the position of the accused, and to suggest that the imposition of a sanction for a breach of this duty is not as problematic as was thought by those responsible for the legislation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-232
Author(s):  
Adnan Kastrati ◽  
Alexander Hapfelmeier

Author(s):  
Daiane Aparecida Zuanetti ◽  
Luis Aparecido Milan

In this paper, we propose a new Bayesian approach for QTL mapping of family data. The main purpose is to model a phenotype as a function of QTLs’ effects. The model considers the detailed familiar dependence and it does not rely on random effects. It combines the probability for Mendelian inheritance of parents’ genotype and the correlation between flanking markers and QTLs. This is an advance when compared with models which use only Mendelian segregation or only the correlation between markers and QTLs to estimate transmission probabilities. We use the Bayesian approach to estimate the number of QTLs, their location and the additive and dominance effects. We compare the performance of the proposed method with variance component and LASSO models using simulated and GAW17 data sets. Under tested conditions, the proposed method outperforms other methods in aspects such as estimating the number of QTLs, the accuracy of the QTLs’ position and the estimate of their effects. The results of the application of the proposed method to data sets exceeded all of our expectations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-75
Author(s):  
Adebola Olaborede ◽  
Lirieka Meintjes-van der Walt

This article, referring to South Africa as well as to selected other common law jurisdictions, proceeds from the premise that it is a well-accepted practice for judges to consider demeanour in assessing the credibility of a witness and in assessing whether the accused shows remorse when decisions regarding sentences are taken. However, the article also takes cognisance of the fact that there is a lack of generally agreed-upon objective methods for the identification of remorse. The article was prompted by recent health precautions regarding the mandatory use of face masks, in order to protect people and to contain the spread of the coronavirus, which provides an opportunity to review demeanour in general and perceptions concerning facial demeanour or facial expressions in the courtroom, in particular. The article explores the validity and reliability of findings on remorse and of making credibility assessments based on demeanour evidence. Part 1 of the article is an introduction. Part 2 of the article provides a brief overview of credibility and demeanour evidence in the courtroom. Part 3 of the article examines remorse and demeanour evidence in criminal trials. Part 4 of the article considers demeanour evidence as a ‘tricky horse to ride’. Part 5 of the article provides a discussion of empirical research studies in the field of social psychology relevant to the reliability of finding credibility and remorse on the basis of demeanour evidence. Part 6 briefly discusses COVID-19 face-covering regulations and demeanour evidence in the criminal trial. The article emphasises that although non-verbal cues could be valuable to judges, such evidence may be unreliable and that courts have cautioned against demeanour evidence being afforded undue importance. The article concludes that even when facial expressions are available to the court, it would be in the interests of justice to exercise great care concerning demeanour in general and facial expressions in particular as a guide to assessing credibility and the existence of remorse.


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