The Wrong Logos

2021 ◽  
pp. 282-296
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Reasons For Action ◽  
The Core ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Practical Reality

Reasons of beneficence are at the core of ethics, and also of many of its most intractable theoretical problems, indeed paradoxes. What is needed for the resolution of these problems is an appreciation of the distinctive nature of the logos of ethics. In brief that logos is seen as an openness to a practical reality of notably reasons, for the understanding of which a familiarity with the thick ethical concepts is required. Such reasons provide direct intentional access to ethical reality. But if we attempt to gain intentional access to ethical facts through the wrong logos where the thick concepts are invisible or not central paradoxes ensue. This chapter discusses three: the paradox of supererogation, the ‘It Makes no Difference’ Paradox (e.g., that of ‘pooled beneficence’), and that of the underdetermination by reasons for action (e.g., of what charity to support).

Virtue Ethics, Thick Concepts, and Paradoxes of Beneficence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
The Core ◽  
Theoretical Position ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Practical Reality ◽  
Stark Contrast ◽  
Mode Of Being

Reasons of beneficence are at the core of ethics and also of many of its paradoxes. What is needed for their resolution is an appreciation of the distinctive nature of what has been called the logos of ethics; an openness to a practical reality of notably reasons. That openness constitutes the mode of being of that reality and thereby its ontology. I propose a virtue ethical understanding of the logos of ethics. Here the thick virtue and vice concepts are central. This conception of the ethical provides a stark contrast to the narrowness and thinness of the “moral” as traditionally conceived. After outlining the basic theoretical position—the chapter deploys the view to resolve paradoxes of beneficence. These are the paradox of supererogation, the “It Makes No Difference” Paradox (e.g., that of pooled beneficence), and that of the underdetermination by reasons for action (e.g., of what charity to support).

scholarly journals El artículo 53 de la Constitución Española de 1978: esquema de la evolución y del estado de situación de sus instrumentos de reconocimiento y garantía de las libertades y derechos fundamentales (1978-2017) // Article 53 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978: outline of the evolution and the situation of their instruments for the guarantee of the Fundamental Rights (1978-2017)

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 1099
Author(s):  
Alberto Oehling de los Reyes
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Practical Realization ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
The Public ◽  
Constitutional Protection ◽  
The Core ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
Core Content ◽  
The Social ◽  
Practical Reality

Resumen:El artículo 53 de la Constitución española recoge tres cuestiones básicas: en primer lugar, determina que los derechos y libertades vinculan a todo el poder público; en segundo lugar, determina la protección constitucional y judicial de los derechos y libertades y de los derechos fundamentales; en tercer lugar, reconoce los principios rectores de la política social y económica. En este artículo se analizan estos preceptos y conceptos constitucionales, pero también se estudia su desarrollo legislativo desde 1978 y la realidad práctica hasta el día de hoy. En el artículo también se hace análisis de algunas incoherencias de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional en materias fundamentales del artículo 53 de la Constitución española de 1978. La intención es dar una visión de conjunto del artículo 53 de la Constitución desde 1978 hasta hoy.Summary:1. Introduction. 2. The structure of the practical realization of the article 53. 3. Preconditions of the legislation of the rights and freedoms and fundamental rights: 3.1 The principle of subjection and legally binding of all public authorities. 3.2 The principle of legal reserve. 3.3 The core content of the rights and freedoms. 4. The preferred procedure and ordinary summary of the article 53: 4.1 Outline of evolution and situation of the preferred procedure and summary inthe jurisdictional divisions. 4.2 About the protection of fundamental rights with procedural nature. 5. The remedy of amparo in the context of the article 53.2. 6. Approximation to the practical sense of the principles recognized in Chapter III Title I.Abstract:The article 53 of the Spanish Constitution specifies three basic issues: First, determines that the rights and liberties link all the public authorities; Secondly, determines the judicial and constitutional protection of the rights and freedoms and fundamental rights in Spain; Thirdly, recognizes the guiding principles of the social and economic policy. In this article are analysed these constitutional provisions and concepts, but also is studied their legislative development since 1978 and the practical reality until the present day. In the article are also analysed some inconsistencies in the jurisprudence of the SpanishConstitutional Court on fundamental issues about the article 53 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978. The intention is to give an overview of the article 53 of the Constitution from 1978 until today.

scholarly journals The Three Levels of Law’s Goodness and then One More: Exploring John Finnis’s Account of Good Juridical Reasons for Action

2020 ◽  
pp. 521-552
Author(s):  
Petar Popović
Keyword(s):  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Discrete Level ◽  
The Core

The article revisits, in the first section, the core arguments of John Finnis’s account of law’s «goodness». Having established that the premises of these arguments are situated in Finnis’s theses on what constitutes good juridical reasons for action, and on law’s «double life», the three levels of law’s goodness are explored in detail. In the second section, the author argues that Aquinas’s juridical philosophy contains another discrete level of juridical goodness relevant to law. This level is then presented along with a critical assessment of its harmony with Finnis’s theory.

A Particularist but Codifiable Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 262-281
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Jonathan Dancy ◽  
The Core ◽  
Ethical View

Moral particularism of the kind developed by Jonathan Dancy is treated as a topic in meta-ethics. Until it is applied to a suitable type of normative theory criticisms which have assailed it are difficult to rebut. This chapter aims to apply Dancy’s particularism to target centred virtue ethics, showing how many of these criticisms are off the mark. At the core of these criticisms is that of uncodifiability. Virtue ethics is held to be codifiable through the virtue rules which encode virtue-reasons for action, reasons which are argued to be particularist in Dancy’s sense. That is it is possible even for reasons expressed through the thick virtue concepts to switch valence. In the course of the argument a virtue ethical view of right action (the target-centred view) is further developed.

At the Core of Our Capacity to Act for a Reason: The Affective System and Evaluative Model-Based Learning and Control

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Railton
Keyword(s):  
Relevant Information ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Rational Deliberation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Human Thought ◽  
New Approaches ◽  
Capacity To Act ◽  
And Control ◽  
Affective System

Recent decades have witnessed a sea change in thinking about emotion, which has gone from being seen as a disruptive force in human thought and action to being seen as an important source of situation- and goal-relevant information and evaluation, continuous with perception and cognition. Here I argue on philosophical and empirical grounds that the role of emotion in contributing to our ability to respond to reasons for action runs deeper still: The affective system is at the core of the process of evaluatively modeling situations, actions, and outcomes, which is the foundation upon which rational deliberation and action can be built. Taking up this perspective affords new approaches to long-standing problems in the theory of reason-based action.

Needs, Facts, Goodness, and Truth

2005 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
pp. 161-174
Author(s):  
Jonathan Lowe
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Logic Of Action ◽  
Practical Reality ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Ontological Dimension ◽  
Moral Philosophers

In this paper I want to explore certain parallels between the logic of action and the logic of belief or, as it might otherwise be put, between practical and theoretical reasoning and rationality. The parallels will be seen to involve an ontological dimension as well as psychological and linguistic dimensions. It may help to begin by mentioning how I was drawn into an examination of these parallels. This was through becoming convinced of the correctness of an externalist account of reasons for action, having been persuaded of this by, amongst other things, arguments found in Jonathan Dancy’s recent book on the subject, Practical Reality. Externalism about reasons for action appeared to me to be, on reflection, the only view that one could plausibly adopt in conjunction with a libertarian account of free will—the latter being a position which I am now convinced is not only coherent but entirely defensible and indeed correct. Oddly enough, however, recent debates concerning internalist versus externalist accounts of reasons for action tend to have been dominated by moral philosophers, whereas those concerning compatibilist versus libertarian accounts of free will tend to have been dominated by philosophers of action. As a consequence of this, the two debates have been carried on relatively independently of each other—in my view, to the detriment of both. The present paper is part of a larger exercise of trying to bring them together.

Freedom and the Origins of Reasons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Webber
Keyword(s):  
Social Situation ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Initial Form ◽  
The Core ◽  
The World ◽  
Radical Freedom ◽  
Do So

This chapter clarifies the core descriptive claim of existentialism that the reasons for action encountered in experience depend on the values at the heart of the agent’s projects. It argues that Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Sartre’s initial form of existentialism fails because it mistakes this for a claim about the meanings encountered in experience. Sartre’s initial form of existentialism agrees with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology that experienced meanings are determined by the agent’s physical capabilities and social situation. Sartre adds that the world is experienced as a field of reasons that encourage and discourage specific courses of action and that these reasons reflect the agent’s projects. Sartre’s theory of radical freedom is that projects have no inertia of their own, so one can revise or replace a project without needing any reason to do so or meeting any resistance from that project.

Needs, Facts, Goodness, and Truth

2005 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
pp. 161-173
Author(s):  
Jonathan Lowe
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Logic Of Action ◽  
Practical Reality ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Ontological Dimension ◽  
Moral Philosophers

In this paper I want to explore certain parallels between the logic of action and the logic of belief or, as it might otherwise be put, between practical and theoretical reasoning and rationality. The parallels will be seen to involve an ontological dimension as well as psychological and linguistic dimensions. It may help to begin by mentioning how I was drawn into an examination of these parallels. This was through becoming convinced of the correctness of an externalist account of reasons for action, having been persuaded of this by, amongst other things, arguments found in Jonathan Dancy's recent book on the subject, Practical Reality. Externalism about reasons for action appeared to me to be, on reflection, the only view that one could plausibly adopt in conjunction with a libertarian account of free will—the latter being a position which I am now convinced is not only coherent but entirely defensible and indeed correct. Oddly enough, however, recent debates concerning internalist versus externalist accounts of reasons for action tend to have been dominated by moral philosophers, whereas those concerning compatibilist versus libertarian accounts of free will tend to have been dominated by philosophers of action. As a consequence of this, the two debates have been carried on relatively independently of each other—in my view, to the detriment of both. The present paper is part of a larger exercise of trying to bring them together.

What face familiarity feelings say about the lateralization of specific entities within the core system

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Gainotti
Keyword(s):  
Temporal Lobe ◽  
Memory System ◽  
Core System ◽  
The Core ◽  
Memory Traces ◽  
Specific Memory ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Temporal Structures ◽  
The Right

Abstract The target article carefully describes the memory system, centered on the temporal lobe that builds specific memory traces. It does not, however, mention the laterality effects that exist within this system. This commentary briefly surveys evidence showing that clear asymmetries exist within the temporal lobe structures subserving the core system and that the right temporal structures mainly underpin face familiarity feelings.

A scanning electron microscopic study on dissolving process of cholesterol gallstones by chenodeoxycholic acid (CDCA)

1978 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 522-523
Author(s):  
T. Kanetaka ◽  
M. Cho ◽  
S. Kawamura ◽  
T. Sado ◽  
K. Hara
Keyword(s):  
Electron Microscope ◽  
Chenodeoxycholic Acid ◽  
Outer Surface ◽  
Electron Microscopic ◽  
Cholesterol Gallstones ◽  
The Core ◽  
Scanning Electron Microscopic Study ◽  
Scanning Electron Microscopic ◽  
Acceleration Voltage ◽  
Scanning Electron

The authors have investigated the dissolution process of human cholesterol gallstones using a scanning electron microscope(SEM). This study was carried out by comparing control gallstones incubated in beagle bile with gallstones obtained from patients who were treated with chenodeoxycholic acid(CDCA).The cholesterol gallstones for this study were obtained from 14 patients. Three control patients were treated without CDCA and eleven patients were treated with CDCA 300-600 mg/day for periods ranging from four to twenty five months. It was confirmed through chemical analysis that these gallstones contained more than 80% cholesterol in both the outer surface and the core.The specimen were obtained from the outer surface and the core of the gallstones. Each specimen was attached to alminum sheet and coated with carbon to 100Å thickness. The SEM observation was made by Hitachi S-550 with 20 kV acceleration voltage and with 60-20, 000X magnification.

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