Needs, Facts, Goodness, and Truth

2005 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
pp. 161-173
Author(s):  
Jonathan Lowe

In this paper I want to explore certain parallels between the logic of action and the logic of belief or, as it might otherwise be put, between practical and theoretical reasoning and rationality. The parallels will be seen to involve an ontological dimension as well as psychological and linguistic dimensions. It may help to begin by mentioning how I was drawn into an examination of these parallels. This was through becoming convinced of the correctness of an externalist account of reasons for action, having been persuaded of this by, amongst other things, arguments found in Jonathan Dancy's recent book on the subject, Practical Reality. Externalism about reasons for action appeared to me to be, on reflection, the only view that one could plausibly adopt in conjunction with a libertarian account of free will—the latter being a position which I am now convinced is not only coherent but entirely defensible and indeed correct. Oddly enough, however, recent debates concerning internalist versus externalist accounts of reasons for action tend to have been dominated by moral philosophers, whereas those concerning compatibilist versus libertarian accounts of free will tend to have been dominated by philosophers of action. As a consequence of this, the two debates have been carried on relatively independently of each other—in my view, to the detriment of both. The present paper is part of a larger exercise of trying to bring them together.

2005 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
pp. 161-174
Author(s):  
Jonathan Lowe

In this paper I want to explore certain parallels between the logic of action and the logic of belief or, as it might otherwise be put, between practical and theoretical reasoning and rationality. The parallels will be seen to involve an ontological dimension as well as psychological and linguistic dimensions. It may help to begin by mentioning how I was drawn into an examination of these parallels. This was through becoming convinced of the correctness of an externalist account of reasons for action, having been persuaded of this by, amongst other things, arguments found in Jonathan Dancy’s recent book on the subject, Practical Reality. Externalism about reasons for action appeared to me to be, on reflection, the only view that one could plausibly adopt in conjunction with a libertarian account of free will—the latter being a position which I am now convinced is not only coherent but entirely defensible and indeed correct. Oddly enough, however, recent debates concerning internalist versus externalist accounts of reasons for action tend to have been dominated by moral philosophers, whereas those concerning compatibilist versus libertarian accounts of free will tend to have been dominated by philosophers of action. As a consequence of this, the two debates have been carried on relatively independently of each other—in my view, to the detriment of both. The present paper is part of a larger exercise of trying to bring them together.


2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-525
Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor

Abstract One of the most fascinating developments in the domain of international law in the last few decades is the astonishing proliferation of non-binding legal instruments or soft law, namely, norms or directives explicitly avoiding the imposition of legal obligations on the relevant parties. From a philosophical perspective, this is rather puzzling: how can we explain the idea of a non-binding directive or a non-binding contract? In this article I aim to provide an account of the rationale of soft law from the perspective of the practical reasons in play. First, I analyse the idea of authoritative advice, suggesting that when authorities advise their putative subjects, they purport to give the subject presumptive reasons for action. I explain what presumptive reasons are. Secondly, I suggest the possibility that something very similar is at work in cases of non-binding agreements, coupled with special accountability relations that such agreements invariably constitute.


1992 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 979-991 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Farley Hurlbert ◽  
Carol Apt

The identification of any new psychopathology or syndrome has been based on numerous clinical enquiries and theoretical discussions and has assumed an important place in the literature of psychology and psychiatry. Using two case descriptions and the subject described in a recent book, this report presents a theoretical discussion of an unusual personality organization, referred to as the malevolent personality disorder. Differential diagnosis, theorizing about pathogenesis, clarification of salient psychodynamics, and treatment considerations are explored.


1957 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 19-46
Author(s):  
M. Roberts

The motives which impelled Gustav Adolf to invade Pomerania in June 1630, and the political objectives at which he aimed in the following two-and-a-half years, were once among the classic battlegrounds of German—and, to a less conspicuous extent, of Swedish—historiography. Since about 1920 the debate has noticeably flagged. Historians have in general been content to take their stand upon positions established by the researches of Bertil Boëthius and Nils Ahnlund. No recent book on the subject has served to keep controversy alive, as the parallel controversy about Wallenstein was reanimated during the inter-war years by the works of Srbik and Pekař; and little new material of any consequence has latterly been made available.


Dialogue ◽  
1963 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 390-399
Author(s):  
Stanley G. French

The subject of this paper is the relationship between factual beliefs and moral beliefs, between is-statements and ought-statements. Hume recognizes that a problem exists concerning this relationship. He states the problem in an oft-quoted passage from his Treatise. In their writings, moral philosophers pass imperceptibly from is-statements to ought-statements; and this change is “of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it”.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 645-659
Author(s):  
Hanno Sauer

In his most recent book, Daniel Batson develops a psychological theory of moral motivation by looking at moral failure. Even under favorable conditions, Batson argues, people frequently behave immorally. In addition to defects of character or judgment and situational pressures, a lack of moral integrity plays an important role in explaining moral failure. Batson’s book sheds light on the most common sources of immoral behavior, providing moral philosophers with the resources to properly target their reasons to be moral.


1993 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. R. A. Morray-Jones

The theory that the background of Paul's rapture into paradise (2 Corinthians 12) is indicated by the rabbinic story of four men who entered a garden, park, or orchard (pardes), which is found in collections of traditions associated with “merkabah mysticism,” is by no means new. First proposed by Wilhelm Bousset, the theory was developed by Hans Windisch and Hans Bietenhard, but has come to be associated with Gershom G. Scholem. Although a few scholars have subsequently referred to Jewish mysticism in their interpretations of Paul, the subject on the whole has figured only at the periphery of the map of Pauline studies as a puzzling and little exploredterra incognitaof marginal or, at best, uncertain relevance to the whole. Growing recognition of the importance of apocalyptic for our understanding of Paul now makes it imperative that this unknown territory be explored. Following the publication of Alan F. Segal's recent book, it is clear that Jewish mysticism must occupy a more central place than has previously been the case in any reconstruction of the matrices of Paul's experience and thought.


1967 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. D. Loan

Abstract As is now well known, the use of an organic peroxide as a crosslinking agent for an elastomer was first reported by Ostromislensky in 1915. In this work benzoyl peroxide was used to cure natural rubber; similar acyl peroxides together with more recently discovered, less active, and more convenient dialkyl peroxides have since this time been used to crosslink a very large number of polymers. With the common unsaturated polymers the vulcanizates produced have mechanical properties rather inferior to those obtained with accelerated sulfur cures. They do, however, have the good aging and low compression set properties which are, in general, associated with sulfurless cures. The commercial use of peroxides in unsaturated elastomers is nevertheless small, being employed only where the presence of sulfur would be deleterious. In spite of its technological disadvantages peroxide crosslinking has been extensively studied since it forms a chemically simple means of introducing crosslinks into a wide variety of rubbers and leads to vulcanizates of simple structure with physically and chemically stable, carbon-to-carbon crosslinks. Interest in the industrial use of peroxides as curing agents has increased recently with the introduction of a number of fully saturated rubbers for which the usual accelerated sulfur systems are unsuitable. Such saturated rubbers are, in general, more resistant to aging, are more thermally stable, and will probably be used to increasingly greater extents as operational conditions become more and more severe. The study of curing systems available for use with such rubbers is therefore of considerable importance and organic peroxides, forming one such system, are worthy of detailed examination. Much work has been done on the technological evaluation of peroxide vulcanizates and much of this is summarized in a recent book edited by Alliger and Sjothun which is recommended as a source of references for a more detailed study of this aspect of the subject. The basic mechanism of the peroxide crosslinking of a wide variety of rubbers has, however, been neglected until relatively recently. For this reason, and for reasons of length, it is proposed to limit the present review to this latter aspect of the subject.


1960 ◽  
Vol 92 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 32-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. K. Bassett

Much has been written about British activities in the Far East, particularly in China, in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, especially by American historians. Dr. H. B. Morse's monumental Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China was first in the field and Professor E. H. Pritchard and J. K. Fairbank have been worthy successors. English scholarship on the subject is naturally somewhat older but, possibly for that reason, the work done has not usually been as detailed or thorough: an exception is Michael Greenberg's recent book, British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800–42. To find general surveys of Anglo-Chinese relations by British writers which extend back into the seventeenth century, it is necessary to turn to the books of A. J. Sargent and J. Bromley Eames. But as far as the seventeenth century is concerned historical research has been scanty. That Greenberg should have regarded a summary of events before the period with which he was immediately concerned as sufficient for his purpose was only natural. Fairbank's introductory chapters are more comprehensive but show greater interest in the attitude of the Chinese to external intruders than in the efforts of the East India Company to intrude. Sargent, as he himself acknowledged, was mainly concerned with the nineteenth century and his attempt to provide a historical background was very superficial. Eames paid considerable attention to early British contacts with China but was prone to errors of fact which make him unreliable.


Disputatio ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (45) ◽  
pp. 167-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos J. Moya

Abstract In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom (and moral responsibility) are motivated by a reflection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen, threaten actual-sequence accounts, including Sartorio’s. On the basis of her (rather complex) view of causation, Sartorio contends, however, that the two members of each pair have different causal histories, so that her view is not undermined by those cases after all. I discuss these test cases further and defend my alternative-possibilities account of freedom.


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