The Critique of Moral Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 15-44
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Influential Points ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Classic Papers

This chapter surveys criticisms raised against moral theory from positions such as virtue ethics, particularism, anti-theory, and Wittgensteinian moral philosophy in order to identify the most central and damaging objections. It locates the origin of theory critique in two classic papers by Iris Murdoch and Elizabeth Anscombe and proceeds to give an overview of the most influential points of criticism from the second half of the twentieth century. This overview is contrasted with an explication of the dominant understanding of moral theory presented in the work of Martha Nussbaum, which allows for an identification of the crucial objections to moral theory, here presented in the form they take in the work of Bernard Williams. The objections are that theories cannot provide a foundation for moral practice, and that they do not possess the authority necessary to serve as action-guiding in any substantial sense. The conclusion of the chapter is that proponents of the dominant understanding of moral theory cannot offer convincing answers to these objections, and that this points to a need to re-evaluate our understanding of both the role and the form of moral theories.

Needs, Moral Demands and Moral Theory

Utilitas ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
SORAN READER ◽  
GILLIAN BROCK
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Demandingness ◽  
Moral Demands

In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if they cannot describe simple needs-meeting cases. We argue that the elimination or reduction of need to other concepts such as value, duty, virtue or care is unsatisfactory, in which case moral theories that make those concepts fundamental will have to be revised. In conclusion, we suggest that if moral theories cannot be revised to accommodate needs, they may have to be replaced with a fully needs-based theory.

Descriptive Moral Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-72
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Moral Philosophers

This chapter develops an alternative, descriptive understanding of moral theory in order to reconcile two apparently conflicting insights; the insight of the critics of moral theory into the problems of the dominant conception of moral theory and the insight into the relevance that we still attribute to the positions traditionally conceived as theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism. Building on the work of theory-critics, but without giving up the notion of moral theory, the chapter presents a view according to which theories are descriptive rather than prescriptive and serve heuristic and elucidatory purposes. Inspired by the notion of grammar found in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it is furthermore claimed that theories are descriptions which provide overviews of various normative structures of concerns—or moral grammars—and which may serve two different purposes, providing either general descriptions of the logic of our moral language or descriptions that elucidate a specific moral problem. According to this view, moral philosophers must accept the co-existence of a plurality of moral theories that describe a plurality of moral grammars, and they must give up the idea that moral theories are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the development of the second purpose reveals that theories cannot be the sole tool of moral philosophy, they need to be supplemented with grammatical investigations of the particularities involved in moral problems. Moral theories can be helpful, but they are never sufficient when addressing a problem in moral philosophy.

scholarly journals How do moral theories stand to each other?

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-299
Author(s):  
Svantje Guinebert
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Deontological Ethics ◽  
Basic Orientation ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
In Virtue Of

AbstractMoral theories, such as the variations on virtue ethics, deontological ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism, are expected – inter alia – to explain the basic orientation of morality, give us principles and directives, justify those, and thereby (if all goes well) guide our actions. I examine some functions and characteristics of the extant moral theories from a moral metatheoretical point of view, in order to clarify the generally assumed rivalry between them. By thinking of moral theories in analogy to languages it is argued that different moral theories are neither simply competing nor simply complementary; their respective orientations justify using them, in virtue of the problems they help to solve. But even if considerations about the functionality of a theory and the context in which it is created play an important role, they can neither be sufficient to determine these theories’ relations to one other nor for choosing between them. The challenge is to set criteria for the quality of a moral theory on a moral metatheoretical level and, in particular, to make room for future views on morality.

How Bernard Williams Constructed his Critique of Kant's Moral Theory

1999 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 106-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger J. Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Moral Theories

One of the more striking developments in contemporary philosophic discussions about morality has been the rise of anti-theory — the rejection of moral theories as ‘unnecessary, undesirable, and/or impossible’. Among those associated with this view have been Bernard Williams, John McDowell, Edmund Pincoffs and James Wallace.

Moral Philosophy and Moral Life

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Subject ◽  
Moral Position ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Alternative Understanding

This is a work in moral philosophy and its ambition is to contribute to a renewed understanding of moral philosophy, the role of moral theory, and the relation between moral philosophy and moral life. It is motivated by the belief that the lack of a coherent answer to the question of the role and status of moral philosophy and the theories it develops, is one of the most important obstacles for doing work in moral philosophy today. The first part of the book untangles various criticisms of the dominant view of moral theories that challenges the explanatory, foundational, authoritative, and action-guiding role of these theories. It also offers an alternative understanding of moral theory as descriptions of moral grammar. The second part investigates the nature of the particularities relevant for an understanding of moral life, both particularities tied to the moral subject, her character, commitments, and moral position, and particularities tied to the context of the subject, her moral community and language. The final part marks a return to moral philosophy and addresses the wider question of what the revised conception of moral theories and the affirmation of the value of the particular mean for moral philosophy by developing a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. The scope of the book is wide, but its pretensions are more moderate, to present an understanding of descriptive moral philosophy which may spur a debate about the status and role of moral philosophy in relation to our moral lives.

Buddhist Moral Thought and Western Moral Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Gowans
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Moral Particularism ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Phenomenology

This essay discusses interpretations of Indian Buddhist moral thought in terms of common categories of Western moral philosophy. Problems are raised for interpretations of Buddhism as being committed to a theory of what makes an action morally right (specifically deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics). Following the lead of the poison arrow simile, a nontheoretical understanding of Buddhist moral thought is proposed: it was implicitly supposed that we do not need to act on the basis of universal moral principles but simply need to overcome the roots of unwholesome actions (greed, hatred, and delusion) and act skillfully. This interpretation is compared with other nontheoretical interpretations of Buddhist moral thought by reference to moral particularism, moral phenomenology, moral pluralism, and a nontheoretical conception of virtue ethics. It is also suggested that we should not be perplexed by the absence of explicit moral theory in Buddhism. Featured figures include Aristotle and Śāntideva.

The Question of Moral Philosophy

2020 ◽  
pp. 3-14
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Philosophical Approach ◽  
Short Summary ◽  
Moral Importance

This chapter provides the motivation for the book by arguing for a need to address the question of the role and status of moral philosophy in light of the criticisms directed against the theory-based understanding of moral philosophy of the twentieth century. The chapter also presents the three main aims of the book, to discuss what form of moral theory—if any—can be a fruitful part of moral philosophy; to investigate the moral importance of the particular; and to offer an alternative descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. In addition, it identifies the context of the discussion which is that of contemporary analytical moral philosophy, broadly conceived, and it determines the central categories of the book, moral philosophy, moral theory, and moral life; all chosen to avoid the ambiguity of ‘ethics’ which covers both moral philosophy and what is investigated in moral philosophy, the moral. Finally, the chapter clarifies the philosophical approach adopted in the book which is modelled on an understanding of the dialogical structure and the conception of philosophy found in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later writings. The final section of the chapter offers a short summary of the remaining chapters and an overview of the overall argument of the book.

scholarly journals Why helping the victims of disasters makes me a better person: Towards an anthropological theory of humanitarian action

Human Affairs ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleni M Kalokairinou
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Developmental Process ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Humanitarian Action ◽  
Anthropological Theory ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
The Right ◽  
Difficult Situations

AbstractIn this paper I examine which is the most appropriate moral theory for dealing with disaster bioethics contexts. It is pointed out that, contrary to what is usually believed, moral theories of right action cannot actually guide us in such difficult situations. Instead, it is claimed that a virtue ethics theory of an Aristotelian version, which gives emphasis not only on the virtuous person but also on the relevant developmental process of becoming virtuous, can provide us with the right theoretical framework for coping with the problems which the victims of such disastrous situations face.

Hume and Virtue Ethics

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter shows how Hume’s “sentimentalist” moral theory can be a version of virtue ethics and elaborates the kind of virtue ethics that best describes Hume’s moral philosophy. To accomplish this task, we need a definition of virtue ethics, an account of types of virtue ethical theory, and to place Hume’s ethics within this taxonomy. Three types of virtue ethics, are outlined. Hume is located within a pluralistic virtue ethics where virtue notions are central and a variety of features make traits “naturally fitted” to be approved as virtues. Hume’s virtue ethics is understood as response-dependent, being grounded in an emotional kind of “moral sense” as suitably objective and as conforming to his basic empiricism.

Integration and authority: rescuing the ‘one thought too many’ problem

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (6) ◽  
pp. 812-830
Author(s):  
Nicholas Smyth
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
General Consensus ◽  
Emergency Situations ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Integration Problem ◽  
The One ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

AbstractFour decades ago, Bernard Williams accused Kantian moral theory of providing agents with ‘one thought too many’. The general consensus among contemporary Kantians is that this objection has been decisively answered. In this paper, I reconstruct the problem, showing that Williams was not principally concerned with how agents are to think in emergency situations, but rather with how moral theories are to be integrated into recognizably human lives. I show that various Kantian responses to Williams provide inadequate materials for solving this ‘integration problem’, and that they are correspondingly ill-positioned to account for the authority of morality, as Williams suspected all along.

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