Incoherent Corporate Speech

Author(s):  
Lisa Siraganian

F. Scott Fitzgerald imagines corporate marriage proposals as a promising thought experiment to think through the fundamental incoherence of what was eventually to be known as corporate speech after the U.S. Supreme Court case Citizens United (2010). His autobiographical and underappreciated meditations on the film industry, The Love of the Last Tycoon (1940) and The Pat Hobby Stories (1940–1), tease out corporate expression’s difficulties and possibilities—complications that are typically overlooked in contemporary discussions of corporate speech. In Tycoon, Fitzgerald’s Hollywood executive producer imagines that he can “buy” what is in his screenwriter’s “mind.” His understanding of speech articulates Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s theory of contractual meaning and economist Ronald Coase’s literalization of “the marketplace of ideas,” anticipating the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Citizens United. But when that tycoon’s lover treats her multiple Dear John letters to him in the same literal manner—as automatic, repetitive, and commodified—the tycoon senses the flaws in his account of language. After examining Citizens United and related precedents struggling to conceptualize corporate speech, this chapter argues that Fitzgerald’s focus on the problem of repeated action reveals a basic incoherence in theories of corporate speech. Conceiving of ideas as brain content that can be bought and sold, Tycoon’s corporate executive unwittingly stumbles on the essentially impoverished nature of corporate speech as repetitive but not meaningful. Decades before corporate speech had First Amendment protections, Fitzgerald’s late fiction imagined and represented its potential problems.

Author(s):  
Lisa Siraganian

The Introduction contextualizes the book’s broader legal and philosophical debates about corporate personhood, collective agency, and modernism. The book’s methodology and structure are explained using accessible modernist poems, political cartoons, and legal case studies to present to non-experts the key ideas and historical background of corporate personhood in the U.S., with its first life not after the U.S. Supreme Court case Citizens United (2010), but after Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad (1886). Beginning with an extended example from Muriel Rukeyser’s long poem, The Book of the Dead, the Introduction canvasses American literature from the nineteenth through the twentieth century to show how the book renders the field of modernist studies radically different, as modernism’s formal speculations emerge as deeply entangled with a range of social and political developments. Asking the question “Has a corporation a soul?” becomes a means to explore the aims of collective social agents, and to think through how collective forms produce meaning by their acts. Not until the postwar era did philosophy synthesize these ideas (on the possibility of corporate intention) being teased out in mostly prewar novels, poetry, and short stories. The third section situates this analysis within modernist literary studies as a field, culminating with a reading of an Archibald MacLeish poem in light of this focus on collective action and literary form and descriptions of each subsequent chapter.


Author(s):  
Randall P. Bezanson

This chapter examines the justices' views and the reasoning behind Supreme Court's 5–4 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It does so through a review of the second oral argument before the Court and an analysis of the Court's opinion. After the Court had first heard oral argument in 2009, it scheduled a second argument and instructed the parties to brief and argue the general question of the constitutional status of corporate speech. The Court had ruled in prior cases that much corporate speech was protected by the First Amendment, but as a general rule the protection afforded such speech was weak and limited. After taking full stock of the Court's decision, and in light of the virtual absence of serious constitutional analysis of the core question of the First Amendment's meaning, the chapter then steps back and considers from a fresh and broader perspective whether corporations should be fully protected speakers under the First Amendment, drawing on the Constitution's text, its history, and the structural, philosophical, and practical considerations that bear on this central question.


2021 ◽  
pp. 241-288
Author(s):  
Phoebe S.K. Young

Chapter 6 uses Occupy Wall Street as a window to examine episodes of politically inflected camping, particularly a series of encampments in the nation’s capital since the late 1960s. While for many Occupy seemed unprecedented, earlier protests that used camping to protest poverty, the Vietnam War, and homelessness reveal new perspectives on public nature. Many of them wound through the courts, culminating in a Supreme Court case from 1984 that examined whether the Constitution protected camping and sleeping outside as a First Amendment expression. The rise of the homeless crisis in the 1980s, which this last case concerned, was a significant development. Camping as function of poverty or as a platform for politics remained available as means of last resort—to find shelter or assert voice. Occupy, and protests that preceded it, attempted to use camping to reinvigorate political participation, to reestablish community and connection, and to renew the social contract.


Black Market ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 17-48
Author(s):  
Aaron Carico

This chapter reassembles the immediate and concrete history of abolition after 1865, from the counter of the Southern country store to the international trade in cotton, as it sorts out the mechanisms of law and arrangements of political economy that chaperoned the tremendous value incarnated in slaves across the gulf of the Civil War. It explains how citizenship for the formerly enslaved was tethered to the racialization of debt and how the legal relations of formal abolition were actually economic relations of credit. This chapter analyzes the legal history of the Fourteenth Amendment and the interlocking forms of theft it enabled, from Southern sharecropping to New York corporations, from the Freedman’s Bank to the U.S. national debt, showing how liberalism is enmeshed with colonialism. Through a landmark Supreme Court case in 1897, this chapter describes how the personhood of the freed enabled the white accumulation of finance capital through global cotton markets, engaging with the theories of Giovanni Arrighi and world-systems analysis.


2019 ◽  
Vol 100 (5) ◽  
pp. 14-18
Author(s):  
Jeremy Anderson ◽  
Erica Frankenberg

Sixty-five years after the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education, the federal and judicial role in school desegregation has declined. In a more difficult political and legal environment, it has fallen on school districts to develop and implement voluntary integration plans through diversity-minded student assignment policies. In this article, Jeremy Anderson and Erika Frankenberg discuss how many and what types of voluntary integration policies currently exist in the U.S. and assess how effective they are at reducing racial and socioeconomic segregation.


1981 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 967-1021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori B. Andrews

A current Supreme Court case concerning lawyer advertising, In re R.M.J., is analyzed in the context of a discussion of the diverse state regulations governing lawyer advertising and solicitation. The article considers the regulations in terms of their constitutionality, their tendency to impede effective advertising, and the effect they have on the legal profession's provision of information to potential clients about the nature, availability, and cost of legal services. Analysis of the major commercial speech cases, from Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to Central Hudson, indicates that many state rules infringe on attorneys' First Amendment rights.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-203
Author(s):  
Jared Schroeder

Abstract Truth as a fundamental ingredient within the flow of discourse and the application of freedom of expression in democratic society has historically received considerable attention from the U.S. Supreme Court. Many of the Court’s central precedents regarding First Amendment concerns have been determined by how justices have understood truth and how they have conceptualized the complex relationship truth and falsity share. Despite the attention truth has received, however, the Court has not provided a consistent understanding of its meaning. For these reasons, this article examines how the Supreme Court has conceptualized truth in freedom-of-expression cases, ultimately drawing upon the results of that analysis, as well as pragmatic approaches to philosophy, the so called “pragmatic method” put forth by American philosopher William James, to propose a unifying conceptualization of truth that could be employed to help the Court provide consistency within its precedents regarding the meaning of a concept that has been central to the Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment since, in many ways, another pragmatist and friend of James’s, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, substantially addressed truth in his dissent in Abrams v. United States. The article concludes by proposing that the courts conceptualize the nature of truth via three substantially related understandings: that truth is a process, that it is experience-funded, and that it is not absolute and is best approached without prejudice. Each of the three ingredients relates, at least to some extent, with thematic understandings put forth by the Court in previous freedom-of-expression cases, and therefore does not represent a significant departure from justices’ traditional approaches to truth. The model, most ideally, does seek, with the help of pragmatic thought and ideas put forth by Justice Holmes, to encourage consistent recognition of certain principles regarding truth as justices go about considering its nature in First Amendment cases.


2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-14
Author(s):  
Jenna Tomasello

Sexual harassment is often understood as a subjective notion that asks the woman if she has been victimized. This paper argues that we need not ask women if they are victims by conceptualizing sexual harassment as an objective notion that holds the perpetrator accountable for his actions. In making my case, I will apply an objective conception of sexual harassment to the U.S. Supreme Court case Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson by drawing on the feminist view of sexual harassment given by Anita Superson and the role of equality and autonomy as motivated by Ronald Dworkin and James Griffin, respectively.


1996 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Wat Hopkins

The marketplace of ideas metaphor is the model most called upon by the U.S. Supreme Court in the resolution of free-expression cases. Justices have used the theory in the adjudication of virtually every area of First Amendment law, despite increasing attacks on the theory. For the most part, however, the Court does not recognize a single, universal marketplace of ideas, but numerous mini-marketplaces, each with its own dynamics, parameters, regulatory scheme, and audience.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document