Defenses of Pornography

2018 ◽  
pp. 239-295
Author(s):  
Andrew Altman

This chapter addresses criticisms of the sex equality approach from those who argue that pornography is a right flowing from a right to freedom of expression—the free speech defense of pornography, by self-styled feminists, who claim that pornography (its making and its use) is a part of sexual liberation for women, and by gays and lesbians insofar as they allege it plays an important role in the communities of sexual minorities. Finally, I examine the arguments to those, like Altman, who locate a “right to pornography” in the right to sexual autonomy. I argue that none of these arguments sufficiently establishes their conclusions.

Author(s):  
Stephen Gardbaum

This chapter describes the structural elements or components of a free speech right. The nature and extent of a free speech right depends upon a number of legal components. The first is the legal source of the right (in common law, statute, or a constitution) and the force of the right having regard to how it is enforced, and whether and how it can be superseded. The second component is the ‘subject’ of free speech rights, or who are the rights-holders: citizens, natural or legal persons. The third is the ‘scope’ of a free speech right, while the fourth is the kind of obligation it imposes on others: a negative prohibition or a positive obligation. The fifth component is the ‘object’ of a free speech right: who is bound to respect a right of freedom of expression and against whom the right may be asserted. Finally, there is the ‘limitation’ of a free speech right.


Author(s):  
Ashutosh Bhagwat ◽  
James Weinstein

This chapter focuses on the relationship between freedom of expression and democracy from both a historical and a theoretical perspective. The term ‘freedom of expression’ includes free speech, freedom of the press, the right to petition government, and freedom of political association. Eighteenth-century proponents of popular government had long offered democratic justifications for freedom of expression. The chapter then demonstrates that freedom of political expression is a necessary component of democracy. It describes two core functions of such expression: an informing and a legitimating one. Finally, the chapter examines the concept of ‘democracy’, noting various ways in which democracies vary among themselves, as well as the implications of those variations for freedom of expression. Even before democratic forms of government took root in the modern world.


Author(s):  
Anushka Singh

On 1 February 2017 at the University of California, Berkeley, USA, mob violence erupted on campus with 1,500 protesters demanding the cancellation of a public lecture by Milo Yiannopoulos, a British author notorious for his alleged racist and anti-Islamic views.1 Consequently, the event was cancelled triggering a chain of reactions on the desirability and limits of freedom of expression within American democracy. The Left-leaning intellectuals and politicians were accused of allowing the mob violence to become a riot on campus defending it in the name of protest against racism, fascism, and social injustice. In defending the rights of the protesters to not allow ‘illiberal’ or hate speech on campus, however, many claimed that the message conveyed was that only liberals had the right to free speech....


Author(s):  
Michael Longo ◽  
Pavel Molek

This article explores the legal frameworks supporting the right to freedom of expression in Europe and Australia. Whereas in Europe there are overlapping protections of this right embedded within highly visible, legally binding instruments, the Australian protection rests on a judicial constitutional implication. Despite fundamental differences in salience, visibility and scope, it appears that neither jurisdiction is averse to limiting the right to free speech in certain circumstances, for instance when expressions are deemed gratuitously offensive. It is evident that the limits imposed on the freedom of expression both in Europe and in Australia determine the nature of the right. Whether or not the multiple layers of legal protection in Europe provide a bulwark against the erosion of the right to speech in Europe, this article reveals the comparative fragility of the constitutional implication in Australia.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi Sakr

AbstractThere is more to the denial of freedom of expression than outright censorship. The right to freedom of expression is interdependent with, and indivisible from, other rights guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To discuss freedom of expression narrowly as if it were self-contained, and to conceal the issues, processes, and conflicts implicit in its achievement, can be seen as a hegemonic strategy that serves relations of domination. Three sets of public exchanges analyzed here, conducted on and about Arab television against a background of growing international intolerance for free speech, arguably contributed to a narrow, reified understanding of freedom of expression. The first centered on a television drama serial, the second on cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, and the third on the ambitions of a privately owned television station in Egypt. Since freedom of expression was repeatedly referred to in all three cases, it might be said that Arab television increased awareness on this topic. Evidence shows, however, that instead of illuminating ways in which the rights and duties inherent in freedom of expression could benefit the viewing public, each set of exchanges helped to sustain power relations by obscuring them.


Author(s):  
Sanja Perovic

Freedom of expression and censorship are frequently cast in opposing but symmetrical terms. According to the conventional narrative, the right to free speech was acquired when first the American and then the French Revolution overthrew the repressive censorship apparatus of the ancien régime. However this account of increasing emancipation overlooks the important role played by the French Revolution in establishing a new definition of censorship that was both tolerant of free speech and repressive of political difference. This paper contends that precisely when political representation in the widest possible sense is at stake, freedom of speech cannot be reduced solely to a question of rights. It begins by revisiting the Directory period when the enlightened ideal of an unmediated public sphere openly clashed for the first time with the opposing ideal of an ‘unmediated’ or ‘popular’ sovereignty promoted by the radical press. It then focuses on the Conspiracy of Equals to show how the presumed neutrality of the liberal press was forged by repressing competing understandings of the right to free speech. Rather than assume that revolutionary propaganda is the ‘other’ of liberalism, this paper demonstrates the joint origins of both liberal and revolutionary understandings of free speech in the new censorship laws that attempted to separate the message from the medium of revolution.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Vanessa Haggie

<p>Hate speech legislation involves a fundamental conflict with the right to freedom of expression. However, it is a conflict that can be justified in a constitutional framework in which free speech is not paramount and can be balanced against other rights and freedoms. This paper discusses the concept of “hate speech” legislation, the conflict between freedom of expression and hate speech censorship, and ways in which these seemingly-incompatible concepts might be harmonised. It considers, drawing on legislation and case law from other jurisdictions, and in light of the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, the possibility of extending such legislation to protect gender and sexual minorities in New Zealand, and suggests a potential framework for such legislative change. Any provision concerning hate speech must avoid overreaching into the realm of free expression. As a result, ‘hate speech’ should be clearly defined and narrowly focussed in scope, as words or matter which “exposes or tends to expose to hatred or contempt” the minority group at which the protection is aimed. In New Zealand’s constitutional/rights framework, this limitation on freedom of expression can be justified as reasonable and appropriate. While hate speech legislation does create a conflict with freedom of expression, to protect hate speech at the risk of perpetuating harm, discrimination, marginalisation and silencing is not appropriate. It sends the message that the voice of hate speakers is worth more than that of minorities, and undervalues the dignity and social assurance of those minority groups as valued members of society.</p>


2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sue Curry Jansen ◽  
Brian Martin

Censorship can backfire because it is usually viewed as a violation of the right to free expression, which is widely valued as an ideal; under the Charter of the United Nations, freedom of expression is a universal human right. Backfire occurs, for example, when censorious attacks on a film or book cultivate increased demand for the forbidden work rather than restrict access to it. Censors can inhibit this backfire effect in various ways, including covering up the censorship, devaluing the target, reinterpreting the action, using official channels, and using intimidation and bribery. These five methods to inhibit backfire from attacks on free speech are illustrated by a variety of cases, including attacks that backfired and ones that did not. This analysis provides guidance for effectively opposing attacks on free expression.


2018 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 69-98
Author(s):  
Amy Lai

This paper argues that the right to expressing oneself through parodies should constitute part of the core freedom of expression of a normative copyright regime. By drawing upon natural law legal theories, the paper proposes a legal definition of parody that would help to bring the copyright jurisprudence of a jurisdiction more in line with its free speech tradition. It argues that a broad parody definition, one that encompasses a great variety of expressive works but would not compete with the original and its derivatives in the market, is preferable to a narrow one. The paper then explains why the parody defence in American law and the parody exception in the Canadian copyright statute should follow the proposed parody definition, which would properly balance the rights of copyright owners with those of users.


2018 ◽  
pp. 11-50
Author(s):  
Andrew Altman

Disagreements about pornography have revolved around questions of freedom of speech and expression. This chapter proposes to rethink those disagreements so that the right of sexual autonomy becomes a decisive consideration. The re-thinking is motivated by two ideas. First, much of the pornography that circulates in today’s society, especially on the Internet, is not plausibly regarded as protected by freedom of expression. Second, that very same pornography is used entirely for purposes of sexual arousal and release and so directly involves an individual’s authority to control his own sex life. Setting the stage for the subsequent argument that a right to pornography should be understood as an element of the right of sexual autonomy, this chapter examines the nature of rights and the reasons why the right to control one’s sex life is especially weighty.


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