Introduction

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Anushka Singh
Keyword(s):  
Free Speech ◽  
Hate Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
University Of California ◽  
American Democracy ◽  
Mob Violence ◽  
A Chain ◽  
The Right ◽  
The University ◽  
Public Lecture

On 1 February 2017 at the University of California, Berkeley, USA, mob violence erupted on campus with 1,500 protesters demanding the cancellation of a public lecture by Milo Yiannopoulos, a British author notorious for his alleged racist and anti-Islamic views.1 Consequently, the event was cancelled triggering a chain of reactions on the desirability and limits of freedom of expression within American democracy. The Left-leaning intellectuals and politicians were accused of allowing the mob violence to become a riot on campus defending it in the name of protest against racism, fascism, and social injustice. In defending the rights of the protesters to not allow ‘illiberal’ or hate speech on campus, however, many claimed that the message conveyed was that only liberals had the right to free speech....

scholarly journals Giving Oral Expression “Free Rein”: Implications for Diversity of University Hate Speech Code

1997 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Tim A. Pilgrim
Keyword(s):  
Free Speech ◽  
Political Correctness ◽  
Minority Groups ◽  
Hate Speech ◽  
Alexis De Tocqueville ◽  
Speech Code ◽  
University Campus ◽  
Oral Expression ◽  
The Right ◽  
The University

This paper uses history, law, and First Amendment theory to examine the concepts of political correctness, free speech, and hate speech in a search for a solution of how best to deal with hate speech incidents that occur in the university campus community. The paper notes the American tendency toward tyranny of the majority as noted by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1830s and then proceeds to examine the double-edged sword of free speech. By guaranteeing freedom of speech we promote the right to shout down ethnic and other minority groups; by providing penalties against those who use it to shout others down we make society less free. This paper suggests a different answer: promote more speech expressed in community meetings conducted in an atmosphere that is safe and encouraging for all to express their views.

Freedom of Speech

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Riley
Keyword(s):  
Free Speech ◽  
Hate Speech ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Type A ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
Type B ◽  
Public Expression ◽  
Laissez Faire ◽  
The Right

John Stuart Mill is a liberal icon, widely praised in particular for his stirring defense of freedom of speech. A neo-Millian theory of free speech is outlined and contrasted in important respects with what Frederick Schauer calls “the free speech ideology” that surrounds the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and with Schauer’s own “pre-legal” theory of free speech. Mill cannot reasonably be interpreted to defend free speech absolutism if speech is understood broadly to include all expressive conduct. Rather, he is best interpreted as defending an expedient policy of laissez-faire with exceptions, where four types of expression are distinguished, three of which (labeled Types B, C, and D) are public or other-regarding, whereas the fourth (labeled Type A) is private or self-regarding. Types C and D expression are unjust and ought to be suppressed by law and public stigma. They deserve no protection from coercive interference: they are justified exceptions to the policy of letting speakers alone. Consistently with this, a moral right to freedom of speech gives absolute protection to Type B public expression, which is “almost” self-regarding. Type A private expression also receives absolute protection, but it is truly self-regarding conduct and therefore covered by the moral right of absolute self-regarding liberty identified by Mill in On Liberty. There is no need for a distinct right of freedom of expression with respect to self-regarding speech. Strictly speaking, then, an expedient laissez-faire policy for public expression leaves the full protection of freedom of private expression to the right of self-regarding liberty.An important application of the neo-Millian theory relates to an unjust form of hate speech that may be described as group libel. By creating, or threatening to create, a social atmosphere in which a targeted group is forced to live with a maliciously false public identity of criminality or subhumanity, such a group libel creates, or significantly risks creating, social conditions in which all individuals associated with the group must give up their liberties of self-regarding conduct and of Type B expression to avoid conflict with prejudiced and belligerent members of society, even though the libel itself does not directly threaten any assignable individual with harm or accuse him or her of any wrongdoing of his or her own. This Millian perspective bolsters arguments such as those offered by Jeremy Waldron for suppressing group libels. America is an outlier among advanced civil societies with respect to the regulation of such unjust hate speech, and its “free speech ideology” ought to be suitably reformed so that group libels are prevented or punished as immoral and unconstitutional.

scholarly journals Un-Chartered Waters: Ontario’s Campus Speech Directive and the Intersections of Academic Freedom, Expressive Freedom, and Institutional Autonomy

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-78
Author(s):  
Alison Braley-Rattai and Kate Bezanson*
Keyword(s):  
Free Speech ◽  
Hate Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Assistant Professor ◽  
Criminal Code ◽  
Colleges And Universities ◽  
Associate Professor ◽  
College Campuses ◽  
University Of Chicago ◽  
The University

In August 2018, the Ford Government in Ontario introduced a ‘Directive’ entitled “Upholding Free Speech on Ontario’s University and College Campuses” (the Directive).1 The Directive required all publicly supported universities and colleges2 in Ontario to create a free speech policy by January 1st 2019 that applies to “faculty, students, staff, management and guests,” and includes a) a definition of free speech, and b) reference to various “principles” of free speech similar to those elucidated by the University of Chicago (Chicago Principles).3 According to the Directive, speech that is otherwise illegal is not permitted. Illegal speech includes hate speech and uttering threats that are proscribed by Canada’s Criminal Code,4 defamatory speech which can give rise to both criminal5 and civil6 actions, as well as workplace harassment.7   * Dr. Alison Braley-Rattai is Assistant Professor of Labour Studies at Brock University. Dr. Kate Bezanson is Associate Professor of Sociology and Associate Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Brock University. 1 Ministry of Training, Colleges, and Universities, “Upholding Free Speech on Ontario’s University and College Campuses” (30 August 2018) online: Government of Ontario Newsroom <https://news.ontario.ca/ opo/en/2018/08/ontario-protects-free-speech-on-campuses.html> [perma.cc/7VXR-K4RB] [Directive].2 This piece is only concerned about the university sector. There are noteworthy differences between colleges and universities with regard to topics discussed in this piece that are unexplored here.3 The Committee on Freedom of Expression, “Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression” (2014) online (pdf): University of Chicago <provost.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/documents/reports/FOECommitteeReport.pdf> [perma.cc/LAA4-RW43].4 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 319(1).5 Ibid, ss 297-304.6 Libel and Slander Act, RSO 1990, c L.12.7 Occupational Health and Safety Act, RSO 1990, c O.1; Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19.

scholarly journals Academic Freedom: a Choice Between Conservative or Liberal Perceptions – the Case of the United States

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-218
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Teresa Maćkowska
Keyword(s):  
Academic Freedom ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Hate Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Method ◽  
Legal Provisions ◽  
The One ◽  
The University ◽  
The U.S

It is only the minimum extent to which the law becomes the instrument of coping with social tautness regarding the academic freedom. On the one hand, legal provisions significantly limit the number of cases related to hate crimes but on the other, they sometimes narrow a discussion due to difficulties in harmonizing individual’s rights and campuses’ perception - a phenomenon, which in the U.S. had been called as “chilling” the freedom. Undoubtedly, the enactment of free speech or academic freedom regulations at universities is necessary as it helps to prevent from a “hate speech” but the legal shape of this process has been strictly connected to a determination for either liberal or conservative description of the academic freedom. Regarding the newest Niche’s rankings, ten universities have been selected, five out of the most liberal and five the most conservative public ones. Furthermore, two catholic universities have been added to describe differences in defining the academic freedom. Moreover, some references have been made to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and the very fundamental documents, namely the 1940 Statement and Harvard Free Speech Guidelines. In the separate article a problem of legislative acts that had been enacted for the past two years in a response to Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression by the University of Chicago of 2014 will be covered. A few remarks upon this matter have been hereby made, though. The article is based on a dogmatic legal method, including quotations of legal sources and their subsequent analysis.

Confessions of a Free Speech Lawyer

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodney A. Smolla
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Hate Speech ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Law Schools ◽  
History Of ◽  
Gang Rape ◽  
The Right ◽  
The City

This personal and frank book offers an insider's view on the violent confrontations in Charlottesville during the “summer of hate.” Blending memoir, courtroom drama, and a consideration of the unhealed wound of racism in our society, the book shines a light on the conflict between the value of free speech and the protection of civil rights. The author has spent his career in the thick of these tempestuous and fraught issues, from acting as lead counsel in a famous Supreme Court decision challenging Virginia's law against burning crosses, to serving as co-counsel in a libel suit brought by a fraternity against Rolling Stone magazine for publishing an article alleging that one of the fraternity's initiation rituals included gang rape. The author has also been active as a university leader, serving as dean of three law schools and president of one and railing against hate speech and sexual assault on US campuses. Well before the tiki torches cast their ominous shadows across the nation, the city of Charlottesville sought to relocate the Unite the Right rally; the author was approached to represent the alt-right groups. Though the author declined, he came to wonder what his history of advocacy had wrought. Feeling unsettlingly complicit, the author joined the Charlottesville Task Force, and realized that the events that transpired there had meaning and resonance far beyond a singular time and place. Why, he wonders, has one of our foundational rights created a land in which such tragic clashes happen all too frequently?

The Structure of a Free Speech Right

2021 ◽  
pp. 212-230
Author(s):  
Stephen Gardbaum
Keyword(s):  
Free Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Structural Elements ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
Free Speech Rights

This chapter describes the structural elements or components of a free speech right. The nature and extent of a free speech right depends upon a number of legal components. The first is the legal source of the right (in common law, statute, or a constitution) and the force of the right having regard to how it is enforced, and whether and how it can be superseded. The second component is the ‘subject’ of free speech rights, or who are the rights-holders: citizens, natural or legal persons. The third is the ‘scope’ of a free speech right, while the fourth is the kind of obligation it imposes on others: a negative prohibition or a positive obligation. The fifth component is the ‘object’ of a free speech right: who is bound to respect a right of freedom of expression and against whom the right may be asserted. Finally, there is the ‘limitation’ of a free speech right.

Freedom of Expression and Democracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 81-105
Author(s):  
Ashutosh Bhagwat ◽  
James Weinstein
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Popular Government ◽  
The Press ◽  
Political Association ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter focuses on the relationship between freedom of expression and democracy from both a historical and a theoretical perspective. The term ‘freedom of expression’ includes free speech, freedom of the press, the right to petition government, and freedom of political association. Eighteenth-century proponents of popular government had long offered democratic justifications for freedom of expression. The chapter then demonstrates that freedom of political expression is a necessary component of democracy. It describes two core functions of such expression: an informing and a legitimating one. Finally, the chapter examines the concept of ‘democracy’, noting various ways in which democracies vary among themselves, as well as the implications of those variations for freedom of expression. Even before democratic forms of government took root in the modern world.

The Nature of Offence

2021 ◽  
pp. 7-34
Author(s):  
Nicholas Hatzis
Keyword(s):  
Free Speech ◽  
Hate Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Special Problem ◽  
Free Expression ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Narrow Definition ◽  
State Coercion ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Offensive Speech

The experience of suffering offence relates to a constellation of unpleasant feelings stirred up when one’s expectations of being treated in a certain way are frustrated. This chapter explores how the nature of offence matters for the way the law responds to offensive conduct. Prohibiting speech which offends poses a special problem because it clashes with the free speech principle, i.e. the idea that there is something particularly important in being allowed to speak our minds, which sets free expression apart from a general liberty claim to choose a way of life. It is suggested that when deciding what should count as properly offensive for the purpose of exercising state coercion, only a very narrow definition of offensive speech is compatible with the values underlying freedom of expression. Then, offensive speech is distinguished from hate speech. As the two are morally different, it is inappropriate to borrow arguments from the hate speech debate to justify restrictions on offensive speech.

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