A Plague on Both Your Houses

2018 ◽  
pp. 56-70
Author(s):  
Pratap Bhanu Mehta
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The Political ◽  
Judicial Appointments ◽  
Political Events ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government

This essay proceeds with the view that the process of judicial appointments is as much political as it is legal, even though the arguments before the Supreme Court in the NJAC Case constantly treated it as a matter of only constitutional law. This essay argues that it is critical to be cognizant of the political events involving successive governments and Chief Justices wresting the power to appoint judges. It asks why and how the process of deciding upon an acceptable procedure for judicial appointments has become the source of an ongoing confrontation between the executive and the judiciary. It is argued in this essay that while the government and the judiciary might individually be justified in their stance, as a result of this conflict, public credibility of both these institutions has been adversely affected.

Japan

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Political ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Rubber Stamp ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government

This chapter looks at the Japanese experience with judicial review. The Supreme Court of Japan does not enforce those parts of the Japanese Constitution, like Article 9, which prohibits war making; Article 21, which protects freedom of speech; or Article 89, which forbids taxpayer money from being used to hire Shinto priests. The Supreme Court of Japan thus refuses to enforce important articles in the Constitution of Japan. It does rubber stamp and thus legitimize actions taken by the political branches of the government. Why has judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation failed to take root in Japan? Japan does not need either a federal or a separation of powers umpire, since Japan is, firstly, a unitary nation-state with no need for a federalism umpire; and, secondly, a parliamentary democracy with a weak upper house of the legislature. Moreover, Japan has never atoned for the wrongs it committed during World War II nor has it truly admitted to even having done the horrible things that Japan did. A nation cannot get rights from wrongs judicial review and a Bill of Rights unless it admits it has done something wrong. Finally, the Japanese Constitution contains an inadequate system of checks and balances. As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan may not have the political space within which it can assert power.

Appointments to the Supreme Court of Nepal

2018 ◽  
pp. 267-280
Author(s):  
Semanta Dahal
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Special Committee ◽  
Judicial Appointments ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government

This essay analyses how Nepal has consciously made attempts to depoliticize judicial appointments—while appointments to the Supreme Court were originally made at the behest of the executive (the monarch), the fifth Constitution onwards (in 1990), appointments became the prerogative of the ‘Judicial Council’, a body chaired by the Chief Justice of Nepal. This essay describes how by the time Nepal enacted its Interim Constitution of 2006, judicial appointments involved all three branches of the government. This essay observes that the 2015 Constitution retains the Judicial Council and the Parliamentary Hearing Special Committee, and by necessary implication, the model of power-sharing between the three branches of government. Though still largely untested, this essay parts with the belief that the appointment procedures under this Constitution may lead to appropriate selections being made, though its complicated power-sharing devices might quite easily descend into gridlock.

From an unconstitutional constitutional amendment to an unconstitutional constitution? Lessons from Honduras

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID E LANDAU ◽  
ROSALIND DIXON ◽  
YANIV ROZNAI
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
The Political ◽  
Potential Utility ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Comparative Constitutional Law ◽  
Global Constitutionalism

Abstract:The unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine has emerged as a highly successful, albeit still controversial, export in comparative constitutional law. The doctrine has often been defended as protecting a delegation from the people to the political institutions that they created. Other work has noted the doctrine’s potential utility in guarding against abusive constitutionalism. In this article, we consider how these justifications fare when expanded to encompass claims against the original constitution itself, rather than a later amendment to the text. That is, beyond the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine, can or should there be a doctrine of an unconstitutional constitution? Our question is spurred by a puzzling 2015 case from Honduras where the Supreme Court held an unamendable one-term limit on presidential terms, as well as protective provisions punishing attempts to alter that limit, to be unconstitutional. What is particularly striking about the case is that these provisions were not later amendments to the constitution, but rather parts of the original 1982 constitution itself. Thus, this article examines the possibility of ‘an unconstitutional constitution’, what we predict to be the next trend in global constitutionalism.

The Obvious Foundation Test

2018 ◽  
pp. 109-121
Author(s):  
Raju Ramachandran ◽  
Mythili Vijay Kumar Thallam
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
Judicial Appointments ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future

This essay deals with the ramifications of the judgment in the National Judicial Appointments Commission Case for the basic structure doctrine. The doctrine of basic structure places limits on the legislative power to amend the Constitution, and owes its origins to the judgment of the thirteen-judge bench of the Supreme Court in the Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala ((1973) 4 SCC 225). According to the authors, the judges in the NJAC Case, by striking down the 99th Amendment to the Constitution of India for violating the basic structure, appear to have conceptually expanded the remit of the basic structure doctrine significantly. They conclude that the contents of what was held to be part of basic structure in the NJAC Case are largely incapable of being defended normatively. Against this background, they chart the significance of the judgment on constitutional law and separation of powers questions in the future.

Constitutional Law in 1926-1927: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1926

1928 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-107
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
First Time ◽  
Preceding Term

The most conspicuous constitutional decision rendered by the Supreme Court during its 1926 term, or for many a preceding term, was in the case of Myers v. United States. It is here held that the power of the President to remove executive officers appointed by him with the consent of the Senate cannot be restricted by Congress. On the question of the removal of such officers the Constitution is entirely silent. It is an interesting commentary on the process by which we make constitutional law that a problem as important as this, a problem which was debated at length in 1789, upon which presidents have acted and congresses have passed statutes, should now, after 137 years, be definitely settled for the first time, and be settled now only because the late Mr. Myers saw fit to sue the government in the Court of Claims for his salary.The facts in the case are simple. In 1917 President Wilson appointed Myers to a first-class postmastership at Portland, Oregon, for a term of four years. In 1920, by direction of the President, he was removed from office. A statute passed in 1876 and still in force provides that “postmasters of the first, second, and third classes shall be appointed and may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended according to law.” The removal of Myers was never referred to the Senate for its consent.

scholarly journals Judicial Review And Judicial Supremacy: A Paradigm of Constitutionalism in Nigeria

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-75
Author(s):  
Ajepe Taiwo Shehu
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
The United States ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
The Political ◽  
Natural Consequence ◽  
The People ◽  
Judicial Supremacy ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government

Abstract This paper examines judicial review and judicial power in Nigeria under the 1999 Constitution in relation to the constitution itself and in relation to the political branches of government. Th is is essentially to locate where lays supremacy between the branches and the judiciary particularly the Supreme Court with its final appellate jurisdiction. Judicial review and supremacy of the judiciary had been of recurring academic discuss in some jurisdictions with written Constitutions, particularly the United States from where Nigeria largely borrowed its presidential constitutionalism. This thus suggests that there is a need to examine the controversy within the context of Nigeria’s experience; is it really in the Constitution that creates branches of the government and that is proclaimed to be supreme over all authorities including the judiciary? Is it in the judiciary whose oversight function cuts across the political branches and whose interpretative decisions are binding on the constitution itself and the other branches? Is it in the executive that appoints and removes Justices of the court subject to confirmation by the Senate, or is it in the legislature? The paper argues that the overriding effect of the judicial power of the Supreme Court over all persons and authorities including the Constitution puts the judiciary in supreme position, that being the natural consequence of the power so vested in the judiciary by the “People Themselves.”

DEKADENSI PEMILIHAN HAKIM AGUNG OLEH DPR RI

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Institutional Status ◽  
The Government

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.

Summary of Results

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Trademark Law ◽  
Intellectual Property Law ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Networked Economy

The persuasive force of the accepted account’s property logic has driven antitrust and intellectual property law jurisprudence for at least the past three decades. It has been through the theory of trademark ownership and the commercial strategy of branding that these laws led the courts to comprehend markets as fundamentally bifurcated—as operating according to discrete types of interbrand and intrabrand competition—a division that had an effect far beyond the confines of trademark law and resonates today in the way government agencies and courts evaluate the emerging challenges of the networked economy along the previously introduced distinction between intertype and intratype competition. While the government in its appeal to the Supreme Court in ...

The tenure of English judges

1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. McIlwain
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
General Object ◽  
William Iii ◽  
Science Association

At the meeting of the Political Science Association last year, in the general discussion, on the subject of the recall, I was surprised and I must admit, a little shocked to hear our recall of judges compared to the English removal of judges on address of the houses of parliament.If we must compare unlike things, rather than place the recall beside the theory or the practice of the joint address, I should even prefer to compare it to a bill of attainder.In history, theory and practice the recall as we have it and the English removal by joint address have hardly anything in common, save the same general object.Though I may not (as I do not) believe in the recall of judges, this paper concerns itself not at all with that opinion, but only with the history and nature of the tenure of English judges, particularly as affected by the possibility of removal on address. I believe a study of that history will show that any attempt to force the address into a close resemblance to the recall, whether for the purpose of furthering or of discrediting the latter, is utterly misleading.In the history of the tenure of English judges the act of 12 and 13 William III, subsequently known as the Act of Settlement, is the greatest landmark. The history of the tenure naturally divides into two parts at the year 1711. In dealing with both parts, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself strictly to the judges who compose what since 1873 has been known as the supreme court of judicature.

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