Debating Land

2019 ◽  
pp. 50-72
Author(s):  
Ronojoy Sen

Land is one of those rare issues that has animated Indian Parliament and been intensely debated from the 1950s to contemporary times. One of the key elements of the very first amendment to the Indian Constitution, passed by the provisional parliament in 1951, was related to land reform and the abolition of zamindari or large land holdings. In response to court rulings that declared zamindari abolition laws as unconstitutional, Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress reacted by inserting Article 31A in the Constitution which stipulated that nothing in the Fundamental Rights could be used to strike down laws for the appropriation of property. The most important component of the First Amendment was, however, Article 31B, which created the Ninth Schedule where legislation could be put and made immune from judicial review. Thirteen land reform Acts were placed in the schedule. This chapter analyses the parliamentary debates on land, beginning with the First Amendment and continuing to the contemporary period where the BJP government attempted to amend the 2013 Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act. The chapter examines three broad questions. How has the issue of land, land reform, and land acquisition been framed over time in parliament? How much have contemporary politics influenced the debate? What have been the recurrent themes as well as radical departures in the debates on land?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raghav Kohli

Abstract Unlike the US First Amendment, Article 19 of the Indian Constitution expressly enumerates eight grounds on which free speech may be restricted. Despite being a fundamental issue of constitutional interpretation, the question of whether Article 19 provides for an exhaustive list of restrictions has largely been neglected in academic literature and Indian jurisprudence. The latest site of contestations on the scope of the free speech clause has been the case of Kaushal Kishor, where the Supreme Court is currently hearing arguments on whether speech can be restricted by invoking fundamental rights beyond Article 19. This Article seeks to develop a principled answer by excavating the meaning of constitutional silences on the relationships between fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution. It argues that a strict textualist approach leads to a distinct form of rights absolutism that is both doctrinally incoherent and inconsistent with Indian jurisprudence. Examining the shift in the Supreme Court’s interpretive outlook from strict textualism to interpretive holism, it finds that the Court’s rich fundamental rights jurisprudence allows importing restrictions on speech from beyond Article 19. Such an approach also provides a meaningful framework for resolving intra-right, inter-right, and right-interest conflicts in the constitutional adjudication of free speech issues.


Author(s):  
Hena Shmeem ◽  
A. N. Sharma ◽  
Suchitra Sharma

As we know land reforms on land acquisition is directly associated with different development. It aims to improve poor people access towards mean of social welfare. In fact India and Chhattisgarh state is not an exception the above rule and policies. For land reform and acquisition in Chhattisgarh. In this research paper, an attempt has been made to cover various land displacements in Chhattisgarh. This research paper has been prepared mainly on the basis of secondary data from it. Like other places, Chhattisgarh has also seen the following effects of land displacement, such as in social life, in children, in women, in employment, the opposite effect is seen. An attempt has been made to explain the impact of land displacement in Korba, Chhattisgarh, where the common life of the displaced people has been particularly affected.


Author(s):  
Sam B. Edwards III

The United States is facing challenges in applying First Amendment principles from the eighteenth century to modern communications. Speech and assembly in the eighteenth century was extremely limited when compared to speech now. This chapter examines two cases where the government has intruded upon fundamental rights contained in the First Amendment. In the first case, a government, in an effort to stop a protest, cut off all wireless mobile and Internet communications. This amounted to a digital gag and ear plugs for the protesters. In this case, the responsible government officials did not even contemplate that this might violate the fundamental rights of the protesters. In the second case, government employees were fired for using Facebook to “like” the page of a political candidate. The trial court ruled that “liking” on Facebook was not speech and therefore did not garner constitutional protection. These two cases represent warning signs that the United States, just like other countries, is struggling to adapt eighteenth century legal principles to modern communication. The digital revolution is happening in the United States and the courts will eventually have to develop a new set of rules based on the principles in the First Amendment.


Author(s):  
Varinder Singh ◽  
Shikha Dhiman

The framers of Indian Constitution were very much cognizant about the significance of human nobility and worthiness and hence they incorporated the “right to life and personal liberty” in the Constitution of India. Right to life is considered as one of the primordial fundamental rights. There is no doubt that Indian Judiciary has lived up to the expectations of the Constitution framers, both in interpreting and implementing Article 21 initially, but there are still a few complications left as to the viability of Article 21 in modern times. Looking at the wider arena of right to life, it can be articulated that broader connotation of “right to life” aims at achieving the norms of “privacy” as well.


2019 ◽  
pp. 193-236
Author(s):  
Arvind Elangovan

Contrary to Rau’s ideas, the framers of the Indian constitution, however, were deeply influenced by the political history that preceded the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. As a result, the framers privileged not only Fundamental Rights but also the postcolonial State and the latter’s right to intervene for the cause of social justice. Interestingly, the idea that mainly underscored this act of privileging was not so much to come together to create a state by submitting individual wills (as theorized by social contract theorists, for instance) but rather there was a deep mistrust between the different political interests that were at work in the Constituent Assembly. Thus, by the time of the drafting of the Indian constitution, political history played a dominant role, with norms giving way to a history of politics.


Author(s):  
Rajagopalan Shruti

This chapter examines the patterns of amendments to the Indian Constitution, especially to the fundamental rights, throughout the country’s constitutional history. Instead of resorting to conventional doctrinal analysis, the discussion focuses on the issue of constitutional design by highlighting the costs and benefits imposed by different constitutional rules. It presents an analytical framework for constitutional amendments in order to elucidate the interaction of constitutional rules, along with the increase in the relative price of seeking formal amendments to the Constitution and how this has incentivised interest groups to seek rule changes through the judiciary. It explains how revisions in substantive and procedural rules changed the costs and benefits of amending the Indian Constitution, forcing interest groups to shift the form and forum while seeking rule change.


Author(s):  
Bhatia Gautam

This chapter examines the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs) and their controversial place in the Indian Constitution. It first reviews the origins of DPSPs and the notion that fundamental rights must be interpreted in light of the DPSPs. It then considers the role played by the DPSPs in judicial inquiries by focusing on the Indian Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the aftermath of the Re Kerala Education Bill case. After discussing the DPSPs as markers of reasonableness, the chapter explores whether it is possible to ground the DPSPs within a coherent intellectual vision, one that is justified both constitutionally and philosophically. It also analyses the Supreme Court’s evolving understanding of the place of Part IV within the constitutional scheme, and concludes by outlining the distinct roles played by DPSPs in judicial interpretation.


Author(s):  
Andreas Grimmel

Solidarity is one of most contentious and contested concepts in European Union (EU) politics. At the same time, it was, and remains, a central value of European integration that has been more and more institutionalized over time. The numerous codifications in the EU treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, along with the increasingly frequent references to the value in political declarations and decisions, prove the value’s growing significance. Yet, there also exists a fundamental divide between rhetorical commitments to solidarity and the practice of the EU and its member states. The most recent crises of the EU have shown the instrumentality and strategic use of the concept in order to promote particular political positions rather than work toward a more common understanding of European solidarity. This makes the application of solidarity in the EU a question not just of arriving at definitional clarity, but also of developing practices that reflect solidarity in concrete cases. Such practices are inextricably linked with three grounds for action: voluntariness, selflessness, and identification. Despite, or precisely because of, these difficulties in defining, concertizing, and implementing solidarity as a European value, there is a rising interest in solidarity in various fields of studies, such as political science, sociology, philosophy, law, and history, making it an interdisciplinary and multidimensional subject matter.


2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.S. Mlambo

This study seeks to trace the role of race in the evolution of the land question in Zimbabwe from Occupation to the ‘fast-track land reform programme’ of 2000 and beyond to explore the extent to which the era of colonial domination made the racialization of the land issue in the post-colonial period almost unavoidable. It contends that Mugabe’s use of race to justify the campaign to drive whites from the land from 2000 onwards was facilitated (in part) by the fact that race had always been used by the colonial authorities as a decisive factor in land acquisition and allocation throughout the colonial period and that using the alleged superiority of the white race, colonial authorities alienated African land for themselves without either negotiating with the indigenous authorities or paying for the land. Consequently, Mugabe’s charge that the land had been stolen and needed to be retaken clearly resonated with some segments of the Zimbabwean population enough to get them to actively participate in the land invasions of the time.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document