Coalitional Clash, Export Mobilization, and Executive Agency
This chapter analyzes over-compliance in Brazil’s introduction of pharmaceutical patents in the 1990s. Extensive legislative deliberation and societal mobilization delayed and diluted this outcome, but could not prevent it. Brazil’s national pharmaceutical sector was able to tap into a network of social movements around the environmental and ethical dimensions of patenting to resist over-compliance. Yet, ultimately, the Executive secured over-compliance by using the country’s vulnerability to trade sanctions to mobilize exporters in support of this campaign. Comparative perspective reveals the conditional importance of external pressures and Executive preferences. Like Argentina, Brazil was subject to threats of trade sanctions and considerable intervention by the United States, and by mid-1990s both countries had Presidents that were committed to satisfying these external demands. What sets Brazil apart, however, was a different social structure that allowed the Executive and its societal allies to use these external pressures to build a broad coalition for over-compliance.