Japan and Nuclear Nonproliferation

Author(s):  
Mike Mochizuki

This chapter analyzes the evolution of Japanese policies toward nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear disarmament. It traces the development of Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles and examines how these principles relate to Japan’s security alliance with the United States. By examining the interaction of domestic politics and changes in the international environment, the chapter shows how Japan has reaffirmed its status as a non-nuclear-weapons state. Japan’s promotion of nuclear power to meet its energy needs has rested on an explicit policy to forgo nuclear weapons and a commitment to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the same time, Japan’s reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence and its concerns about regional security threats have tempered its support for nuclear disarmament initiatives.

2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Fuhrmann

Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. In particular, countries that receive peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to initiate weapons programs and successfully develop the bomb, especially when they are also faced with security threats. Statistical analysis based on a new data set of more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements signed from 1950 to 2000 lends strong support for this argument. Brief case studies of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs provide further evidence of the links between peaceful nuclear assistance and proliferation. The finding that supplier countries inadvertently raise the risks of nuclear proliferation poses challenges to the conventional wisdom. Indeed, the relationship between civilian nuclear cooperation and proliferation is surprisingly broad. Even assistance that is often viewed as innocuous, such as training nuclear scientists or providing research or power reactors, increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will spread. “Proliferation-proof” nuclear assistance does not exist. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs.


2021 ◽  
pp. 217-248
Author(s):  
Jacob Darwin Hamblin

By the mid-1980s, the state-sponsored positive framing of the peaceful atom served a range of government interests. It enabled the United States and European states to use nuclear power as leverage against developing countries in a time when petroleum seemed to swing the pendulum of global resource dominance toward several so-called backward countries. It was useful to countries trying to prop up the legitimacy of their nuclear weapons programs, while secretly working on bombs, and it provided environmental arguments to those whose priority was actually energy security. The peaceful atom’s promise of plenty helped to maintain a veneer of credibility for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at a time when the IAEA seemed to have become the treaty’s policing instrument. The more the United States relied on the IAEA, the more it recommitted to making promises of peaceful nuclear technology, especially to the developing world.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oriana Skylar Mastro

Is China likely to intervene if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, and if so, does Beijing have the willingness and capabilities to deal safely with North Korea's nuclear program? Securing and destroying Pyongyang's nuclear weapons would be the United States’ top priority in a Korean contingency, but scholars and policymakers have not adequately accounted for the Chinese military's role in this mission. China's concerns about nuclear security and refugee flows, its expanding military capabilities to intervene, and its geopolitical competition with the United States all suggest that China is likely to intervene militarily and extensively on the Korean Peninsula if conflict erupted. In this scenario, Chinese forces would seek to gain control of North Korea's nuclear facilities and matériel. For the most part, China has the capabilities to secure, identify, and characterize North Korean nuclear facilities, though it exhibits weaknesses in weapons dismantlement and nonproliferation practices. On aggregate, however, Chinese troops on the peninsula would be beneficial for U.S. interests and regional security. Nevertheless, to mitigate the risks, the United States should work with China to coordinate their movements in potential areas of operation, share intelligence, and conduct combined nuclear security training.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 300-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jong Hee Park ◽  
Kentaro Hirose

The argument that reputational concerns promote compliance is at the center of the literature of international cooperation. In this paper, we study how reputational sanctions affect compliance when domestic parties carry their own reputations in international negotiations. We showed that the prospect of international cooperation varies a lot depending on who sits at the negotiation table, how partisan preferences for compliance are different, and how much international audiences discriminate between different types of noncompliance. We illustrate implications of our model using episodes from the negotiations between the United States and North Korea over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.


1982 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Simpson

The 1980 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference will chiefly be remembered for the inability of the delegates to agree on a final document. There were several visible reasons for this, some related to the immediate political concerns of the participants, some linked to the nature of the treaty itself. The statements of the participating states indicated that they held differing conceptions of the purposes of the treaty, and possessed very diverse views on the action that should be taken to achieve them. Four sets of assertions dominated the discussions: that the nuclear states had not fulfilled their obligation to negotiate measures of nuclear disarmament as specified in Article VI of the treaty; that the advanced industrial states had not fulfilled their obligations to assist and encourage the global development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy contained in both Articles IV and V of the treaty; that the attempts by the United States government to discharge its obligations under the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act by threatening to terminate fuel supply contracts to both treaty parties and non-parties, unless they accepted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their nuclear installations, was inequitable and improper (the same accusation was also directed at Canada); and that the major danger of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and Africa originated in the threats posed to the states in these regions by the regimes in Israel and South Africa. One issue on which there did appear to be agreement, however, was that the safeguards regime foreshadowed by Article III of the treaty had functioned satisfactorily, in that no Feaches of it had been reported to the Review Conference by the IAEA. Yet the differing interpretations of the balance of rights and obligations contained in the treaty masks a much deeper set of issues: what precisely is the problem of nuclear proliferation, to what extent is the predominant diplomatic rhetoric of nuclear non-proliferation discussions unrepresentative of the real concerns and interests of the participants, what was and is the relationship between nuclear weapons and nuclear power, and does the NPT itself address (or was it ever intended to address) the problem of nuclear proliferation in the form in which it seems likely to be encountered in the 1980s?


Author(s):  
Royce M. Reinecke

The national energy policy debate in the 107th US Congress may mark a significant milestone in the development of energy use and conversion technologies in the United States. It has been said that the result of this congressional energy policy debate was an expensive statements that, despite proposed tax breaks and subsidies for everything from solar power and hybrid cars to coal and nuclear power, may accomplish little — with not much either on the supply or the demand side that’s going to make any difference to the American public. This paper provides an insider assessment of how the debate developed, what energy policy decisions were or were not made, and what the implications are for the development of energy use and conversion technologies going forward. This debate may represent the final exhaustive struggle of long-held, but misguided, ineffectual and limited-vision policies that date to the 1970s. In combination with the September 11 events, this stalemate may open the door to new, fresh, global perspectives on meeting the energy needs of people throughout the world, including in lesser developed countries such as Afghanistan. Engineers and entrepreneurs are advised to understand the seminal implications of the 107th congressional energy policy debate on future energy use and conversion technologies.


Author(s):  
Nick Jelley

Energy is vital for a good standard of living, and affordable and adequate sources of power that do not cause climate change or pollution are crucial. Renewables can meet the world’s energy needs without compromising human health and the environment, and this VSI gives a history of their deployment and the principles of their technologies. Wind and solar farms can now provide the cheapest electricity in many parts of the world. Decarbonizing heat is just as important as clean electricity, and can be achieved using renewably generated electricity to power heat pumps and to produce combustible fuels such as hydrogen and ammonia. Several other clean alternatives, notably hydropower, biofuels, nuclear power, and carbon capture, are also becoming important. Lithium-ion batteries are enabling the electrification of transport and providing grid storage. But while market forces are helping the transition from fossil fuels to renewables, there are opposing pressures, such as the United States’ proposed withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, and vested commercial interests in fossil fuels. Net-zero emissions must be reached by 2050 for a sustainable future, and governments must act quickly to accelerate the transition.


2018 ◽  
pp. 79-109
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka

Many scholars would hold that a robust military alliance as well as strong anti-nuclear norms in domestic society would make any nuclear proliferation-related behaviour unlikely on the part of Japan. This chapter challenges such arguments, showing that the alliance with the United States did not fully inhibit Japan’s nuclear ambitions since Japan ratcheted up its interest in enrichment and reprocessing technologies in the late 1960. Indeed, Japan’s nuclear interest piqued amid concerns that the military alliance was weakening. Moreover, although the alliance did discourage some level of interest in nuclear weapons, the United States was reluctant to coerce Japan directly on this issue. Domestic politics and—to a lesser extent—prestige considerations were arguably a greater influence on Japan’s nuclear decision-making in the 1970s than alliance-related ones.


2018 ◽  
pp. 48-78
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka

Several leading international scholars argue that West Germany enjoyed limited autonomy in the Cold War and was thus susceptible to American coercion, especially on issues relating to nuclear weapons. This chapter challenges such arguments. It shows that the alliance with the United States was less useful for curbing West German nuclear ambitions than commonly presumed. It also demonstrates that in-theater conventional forces mattered for bolstering American extended nuclear guarantees to West Germany. American coercion of West Germany was important, but it played a much less direct role than what many scholars claim. Other factors—especially domestic politics—drove West Germany’s final choices pertaining to whether it should get nuclear weapons.


Author(s):  
Wissal Werfelli

The article analyzes the issue of the Middle East security. The Arab countries are facing a lot of regional threats and a fundamental shift in the regional security system, which has become one of the basic variables for the Middle East through the transition to a new form of regional and international interactions. The existence of mutual influences between the nature of the international system and the regional order of the Middle East and the Gulf region is already considered as an incubator for all intractable conflicts and crises.  We cannot study the concept of regional security in separate from the global effects and repercussions. After the end of the Cold War and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the structural transformations and global changes led to the emergence of profound changes in the international system, which resulted in the restructuring of the general features of the international environment.  The international transformation is marked by the fact that the new world order increased the chances of emergence of new international powers in both Europe and Asia, whether countries or major economic or political blocs trying to establish a multi-polar international order, which prompted the United States to pursue a policy of cooperation with competing powers.  And in light of this international environment, it was natural for the regions of strategic importance, particularly the Middle East, to be affected because they were linked to relations of mutual influence with the international system, as international balances affect regional balances.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document