Global and Regional Security Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy

Author(s):  
Paul Midford

This chapter analyzes Japan’s experience with, and motivations for participating in, security multilateralism. It considers the historical legacies of a lack of multilateral interaction when international relations in East Asia were governed by the Sinocentric tributary system, the security multilateralism of the Washington system of the 1920s, Japan’s failed multilateral Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere during the Pacific War, as well as Tokyo’s security isolationism during the Cold War, before turning to Japan’s pivot from 1991 toward embracing regional security multilateralism. It argues that Japan’s promotion of security multilateralism since 1991 is part of a broader shift away from security isolationism and toward global and regional security engagement on bilateral and multilateral levels. Japan’s 1992 decision to begin participating in UN peacekeeping and its promotion of the ASEAN Regional Forum’s creation through the 1991 Nakayama proposal are examples of Japan’s post–Cold War security multilateralism. The chapter argues that Japan’s embrace of security multilateralism after the Cold War, like its embrace of security isolationism during the Cold War, has been driven by its reassurance strategy of convincing other East Asian nations that Japan can be trusted as a military power that will not repeat its pre-1945 expansionism. Moderating its alliance security dilemma vis-à-vis the US is another motivation for Japan’s promotion of security multilateralism. Since 2000 Japan has promoted the creation of other regional security multilateral forums, including the counter-piracy ReCAAP organization, the East Asian Summit, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus Dialogue Partners, and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum.

2020 ◽  
pp. 002234332090562
Author(s):  
Jamie Levin ◽  
Joseph MacKay ◽  
Anne Spencer Jamison ◽  
Abouzar Nasirzadeh ◽  
Anthony Sealey

While peacekeeping’s effects on receiving states have been studied at length, its effects on sending states have only begun to be explored. This article examines the effects of contributing peacekeepers abroad on democracy at home. Recent qualitative research has divergent findings: some find peacekeeping contributes to democratization among sending states, while others find peacekeeping entrenches illiberal or autocratic rule. To adjudicate, we build on recent quantitative work focused specifically on the incidence of coups. We ask whether sending peacekeepers abroad increases the risk of military intervention in politics at home. Drawing on selectorate theory, we expect the effect of peacekeeping on coup risk to vary by regime type. Peacekeeping brings with it new resources which can be distributed as private goods. In autocracies, often developing states where UN peacekeeping remuneration exceeds per-soldier costs, deployment produces a windfall for militaries. Emboldened by new resources, which can be distributed as private goods among the selectorate, and fearing the loss of them in the future, they may act to depose the incumbent regime. In contrast, peacekeeping will have little effect in developed democracies, which have high per-troop costs, comparatively large selectorates, and low ex-ante coup risk. Anocracies, which typically have growing selectorates, and may face distinctive international pressures to democratize, will likely experience reduced coup risk. We test these claims with data covering peacekeeping deployments, regime type, and coup risk since the end of the Cold War. Our findings confirm our theoretical expectations. These findings have implications both for how we understand the impact of participation in peacekeeping – particularly among those countries that contribute troops disproportionately in the post-Cold War era – and for the potential international determinants of domestic autocracy.


Author(s):  
Enyu Zhang ◽  
Qingmin Zhang

The study of East Asian foreign policies has progressed in sync with mainstream international relations (IR) theories: (1) from perhaps an inadvertent or unconscious coincidence with realism during the Cold War to consciously using different theoretical tools to study the various aspects of East Asian foreign policies; and (2) from the dominance of realism to a diversity of theories in studying East Asian foreign policies. Nonetheless, the old issues from the Cold War have not been resolved; the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait remain two flashpoints in the region, with new twists that can derail regional stability and prosperity. New issues also have emerged and made East Asia most volatile. One issue is concerned with restructuring the balance of power in East Asia, particularly the dynamics among the major players, i.e. Japan, China, and the United States. Regionalism is another new topic in the study of East Asian foreign policies. A review of the current state of the field suggests that two complementary issues be given priority in the future. First, the foreign policy interests and strategies of individual small states vis-à-vis great powers in the region, particularly those in Southeast Asia and the Korean peninsula. Second, what could really elevate the study of East Asian foreign policies in the general field of IR and foreign policy analysis is to continue exploring innovative analytical frameworks that can expand the boundaries of existing metatheories and paradigms.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong-Kong T. Nguyen

The end of the Cold War in 1991 brought about structural changes to the global geostrategic landscape but did not usher in a completely new era in East Asia. Unresolved issues remain, such as the division lines on the Korean peninsula and across the Taiwan Straits, simmering Sino-Japanese hostility, and continuing United States predominance in regional security. Against this background of the early 1990s, in “Building a Neighborly Community: Post-Cold War China, Japan, and Southeast Asia,” Diaojiong Zha and Weixing Hu examine the collective efforts of East Asian countries in forging a regional environment conducive to their security and development.


2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-129
Author(s):  
Lee Seung Joo

While aggressively embracing free trade agreements (FTAs) in general, East Asian countries have incorporated security and political factors in promoting FTAs under the swiftly shifting regional economic and security environments, epitomized by the end of the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis, and the intensifying Sino-Japanese rivalry. Therefore, a sole focus on economic factors would fail to shed light on East Asian strategies for linking FTAs and security. While FTAs have mushroomed in East Asia since 2000, East Asian countries have pursued FTAs not merely to increase their economic interests. In many cases, they have attempted to link FTAs to broader security considerations. However, they have demonstrated markedly diverse ways of linking FTAs and security, depending on their primary economic and security imperatives as well as their domestic political situations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-100
Author(s):  
Clint Work

After the Cold War, conditions appeared ripe for the formation of new multilateral institutions that would have more accurately reflected the altered distribution of power in East Asia. However, no new or robust institutions were established. Despite the value of certain historical and structural arguments, this study emphasizes the role of the United States in contributing to this outcome. Building upon critical historiography, this article sketches three frames of U.S. foreign policy held by U.S. elites (including: expansion, preponderance, and exceptionalism), traces their operation in the discourse and rationales behind U.S. policy during the post-Cold War interregnum, and argues that these frames worked against any attempt by the United States to establish new multilateral institutions.


Author(s):  
A. A. Baykov

The paper analyzes the impact of geography and security threats on the dynamics and forms of integration cooperation in the area of East Asia. In particular, it is concluded that both the institutional features of the integration in Asia Pacific, and approaches in the field of cooperation between local states have been largely predetermined by the system of military cooperation and military-political agreements, which were formed during the "cold war".


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 659-675
Author(s):  
Kozue Akibayashi

Japan occupies a unique position in the history of East Asia as the sole non-Western colonial power. Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War that ended its colonial expansion did not bring justice to its former colonies. The Japanese leadership and people were spared from being held accountable for its invasion and colonial rule by the United States in its Cold War strategy to make post–World War II Japan a military outpost and bulwark in the region against communism. How then did the Cold War shape feminisms in Japan, a former colonizing force that never came to terms with its colonial violence? What was the impact of the Cold War on Japanese women’s movements for their own liberation? What are the implications for today? This article discusses the effects of Japan’s imperial legacies during the Cold War and the current aftermath with examples taken from the history of the women’s movement in Japan.


Author(s):  
Yosuke Nagai

The security-development nexus has become one of the most important agendas especially in the field of peacebuilding in response to urgent needs in complex humanitarian assistance in war-torn areas. With the changing dynamics of conflict since the end of the Cold War, recent peacebuilding efforts have employed a combination of security and development paradigm to ameliorate severe human rights situations in different contexts. In particular, the functionality of security-development nexus has been well observed in post-conflict scenarios where broader state-building, institutional, security, and governance-related reforms were implemented to ensure sustainable peace processes. In addition, it has been criticized in terms of the imposed liberal values. This article critically analyzes the security-development nexus and attempts to examine how and why the nexus has become essential to the post-Cold War peacebuilding framework. It further elucidates the role of the United Nations (UN) as the leading actor in peacebuilding operations, especially in the form of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) which have played a significant role in establishing and consolidating peace in various conflict-ridden societies.


Author(s):  
Yu. Skorokhod

Since the accession of the People’s Republic of China to the UN in 1971, its approach to UN peacekeeping operations underwent significant alterations at least three times: after 1981, 1989/1990 and after 2003. This article examines the peculiarities of China’s approach to UN peacekeeping operations in 1971–1980 as to the tool of interference in the internal affairs of small states exercised by superpowers. The article claims that although Beijing’s approach to participation in UN peacekeeping efforts changed when in 1981 China began to vote on the UN Security Council for extending the mandates of UN current operations and began to pay contributions to the budget for peacekeeping, the evolution of China’s stance towards UN peacekeeping activities in fact became apparent only following the end of the Cold War, when China was able to take part in launching and implementation of the new peacekeeping operations. Beijing’s vision of the settlement of conflicts in the Persian Gulf (1990–1991) and Somalia, which had a significant impact on China’s position on the new trends in the development of UN peacekeeping practices, was also explored in the article. The author provides a thorough analysis of the main features of Chinaʼs stance on the development of theory and practice of UN peacekeeping in 1981–2003 and points out that in contrast to the previous period of 1971–1980 the countryʼs opposition to it was limited but not overwhelming, since China had elaborated its attitude towards peacekeeping in terms of its own national interests but not ideological reasons, in particular because of the need to create favorable external conditions for implementation of domestic reforms. The article also pays much attention to the study of changes which Chinaʼs peacekeeping policy has undergone since 2003 and which were marked by a significant increase in Chinaʼs participation in UN peacekeeping. The author explains the reasons behind reconsideration by the Chinese leadership of the role which UN peacekeeping played in Beijingʼs strategy of foreign policy; the article also defined political and reputational benefits which China derived from participating in UN peacekeeping operations. The conclusion is that Beijingʼs position on UN peacekeeping evolved from vivid obstructionism to active participation because of significant changes in Chinaʼs foreign and security policy and the development of theory and practice of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period. The article proves that the core traits of Chinaʼs policy towards UN peacekeeping are flexibility and pragmatism.


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