Epilogue

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Eizenstat
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Unilateral Action ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Military

A president is called to shape a foreign policy that both reflects America’s deepest values and serves its geopolitical interests. In doing so, a president has a range of options that can be used. However, these tools are not ends in themselves, but are undertaken to achieve certain goals. In this regard, there are five lessons that can serve as useful guideposts for those who are called to assist the president in this task. These include understanding that the tools of power are most effective when simultaneously employed; that multilateral action is usually more effective than unilateral action. In addition, while the executive branch has the lead on foreign policy, Congress and the states are also actors. When either of these groups lead they should grant the president flexibility in order to ensure that the policy continues to accomplish U.S. goals. The military tool of power while powerful frequently has serious constraint imposed upon it. It may also be more effective when used flexibly—e.g., the creation of NATO to deter the Soviet Union. Finally, policymaking is messy. Actions do not always result in the hoped-for outcome.

scholarly journals Russia’s Exogenous Factor in the Donbass Conflict

2020 ◽  
pp. 97-110
Author(s):  
Yevgeny Ryabinin
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
The Political ◽  
Direct Impact ◽  
Clash Of Civilizations ◽  
Exogenous Factor ◽  
Bilateral Relations ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Military

The hypothesis of this research is that Russia has been imposing its influence on Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Before the political and military crisis in 2013, it was an indirect influence, whereas since 2014 it has been a direct impact in many spheres. It is necessary to underline that Ukraine has always been split into two parts in terms of foreign policy priorities, language, religion, and culture. This fact was mentioned by Samuel Huntington, who predicted an intense crisis in bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine in his work Clash of Civilizations. There were two parties in Ukraine that were widely supported in South-Eastern Ukraine, namely the Party of Regions and the Communist Party. The former never spoke about the integration of Ukraine as part of Russian integrational projects because its politicians were afraid of aggressive Russian capital. So they only used pro-Russian rhetoric to win elections. The Communist Party openly backed integration with Russia, but didn’t get enough support as for this idea. It is also demonstrated that there were no parties that were backed financially by Russia, because the parties that offered a kind of a union with Russia never got any seats in the parliament. Since 2014, Russia has been imposing its influence on Ukraine in various spheres, such as economics, politics, diplomacy, the military sphere, etc. Having signed two cease-fire agreements, Russia and Ukraine have failed to apply them and the crisis continues to this day.

The President’s Foreign Affairs Power

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 750-757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phillip R. Trimble
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Trade Restrictions ◽  
War Powers ◽  
Arms Sales ◽  
Imperial Presidency ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Legislative Veto

In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, Congress set out to attack the imperial Presidency and to recapture its “historic constitutional role” in foreign policy. The tools of congressional activism included the National Commitments Resolution, the War Powers Resolution, the Case Act, the legislative veto over arms sales and nuclear exports, trade restrictions aimed at the Soviet Union and regulation of intelligence activities. In response, Presidents Carter and Reagan charged that Congress was invading presidential prerogatives. Joined by former executive branch officials and academic commentators, they saw an imperial Congress and believed the solution was a strengthened Presidency.

scholarly journals Russia’s Foreign Policy Evolution in the New Balkan Landscape

2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 179-199
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Entina ◽  
Alexander Pivovarenko
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Regional Security ◽  
Southeast Europe ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
Current Trends ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
The Difference

The article reflects on the issue of the foreign policy strategy of modern Russia in the Balkans region. One of the most significant aspects of this problem is the difference in views between Russia and the West. Authors show how different interpretations of the events in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s predetermined the sense of mutual suspicion and mistrust which spread to other regions such as the post-Soviet space. Exploring differences between the Russian and the Western (Euro-Atlantic) views on the current matters, authors draw attention to fundamental differences in terminology: while the Western narrative promotes more narrow geographical and political definitions (such as the Western Balkan Six), traditional Russian experts are more inclined to wider or integral definitions such as “the Balkans” and “Central and Southeast Europe”. Meanwhile none of these terms are applicable for analysis of the current trends such as the growing transit role of the Balkans region and its embedding in the European regional security architecture. Therefore, a new definition is needed to overcome the differences in vision and better understand significant recent developments in the region. Conceptualizing major foreign policy events in Central and Southeast Europe during the last three decades (the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s), authors demonstrate the significance of differences in tools and methods between the Soviet Union and the modern Russia. Permanent need for adaptation to changing political and security context led to inconsistence in Russian Balkan policy in the 1990s. Nevertheless, Russia was able to preserve an integral vision of the region and even to elaborate new transregional constructive projects, which in right political circumstances may promote stability and become beneficial for both Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.

Military Technology Races

1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vally Koubi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Technology ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
International Distribution ◽  
Strategic Defense ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
The Military

Because of the nature of modern weapons, significant innovations in arms technology have the potential to induce dramatic changes in the international distribution of power. Consider, for example, the “strategic defense initiative” (SDI), a program initiated by the United States in the early 1980s. Had the program been successfully completed, it might have led to a substantial devaluation of Soviet nuclear capabilities and put the United States in a very dominant position. It should not then come as a surprise that interstate rivalry, especially among super powers, often takes the form of a race for technological superiority. Mary Acland-Hood claims that although the United States and the Soviet Union together accounted for roughly half of the world's military expenditures in the early 1980s, their share of world military research and development (R&D) expenditures was about 80 percent. As further proof of the perceived importance of R&D, note that whereas the overall U.S. defense budget increased by 38 percent (from $225.1 billion to $311.6 billion in real terms) from 1981 to 1987, military R&D spending increased by 100 percent (from $20.97 billion to $41.96 billion). Moreover, before World War II military R&D absorbed on average less than 1 percent of the military expenditure of major powers, but since then it has grown to 11–13 percent. The emphasis on military technology is bound to become more pronounced in the future as R&D becomes the main arena for interstate competition.

Afghanistan: Martial Society Without Military Rule

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amin Tarzi
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Central Government ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Military Campaigns ◽  
The 19Th Century ◽  
The Military

Since its inception as a separate political entity in 1747, Afghanistan has been embroiled in almost perpetual warfare, but it has never been ruled directly by the military. From initial expansionist military campaigns to involvement in defensive, civil, and internal consolidation campaigns, the Afghan military until the mid-19th century remained mainly a combination of tribal forces and smaller organized units. The central government, however, could only gain tenuous monopoly over the use of violence throughout the country by the end of the 19th century. The military as well as Afghan society remained largely illiterate and generally isolated from the prevailing global political and ideological trends until the middle of the 20th century. Politicization of Afghanistan’s military began in very small numbers after World War II with Soviet-inspired communism gaining the largest foothold. Officers associated with the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan were instrumental in two successful coup d’états in the country. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, ending the country’s sovereignty and ushering a period of conflict that continues to the second decade of the 21st century in varying degrees. In 2001, the United States led an international invasion of the country, catalyzing efforts at reorganization of the smaller professional Afghan national defense forces that have remained largely apolitical and also the country’s most effective and trusted governmental institution.

Soviet Foreign Policy Factionalism Under Stalin?: A Case Study of the Inevitability of War Controversy

1976 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-107
Author(s):  
Paul Marantz
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Harsh Discipline ◽  
Capitalist System ◽  
Strict Adherence ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Soviet Foreign Policy ◽  
Important Evidence

AbstractThere has been a great deal of controversy among Western scholars concerning the direction of Soviet foreign policy in the final years and months of Stalin's rule.1 One of the crucial questions at issue is whether or not there were significant divisions of opinion within the Politburo over foreign policy matters. This article attempts to explore this particular question through an examination of a doctrinal controversy that surfaced during Stalin's last years. In one of his most famous works, Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism, Lenin argued that war was an inevitable concomitant of the capitalist system. He contended that the unending struggle for markets meant that periodic wars among the capitalist powers were unavoidable and inevitable.2 Stalin adhered to this view throughout his long reign, and it was not until three years after Stalin's death, in Khruschchev's speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, that it was finally revised. Yet despite Stalin's strict adherence to the Leninist analysis of imperialism, and despite the harsh discipline that characterized his rule, there is evidence that the official interpretation was being publicly questioned even while Stalin was still alive. Given the nature of esoteric communication in the Soviet Union,and the close connection between doctrinal and policy debates, an examination of the controversy concerning the inevitability of war can provide important evidence having a direct bearing upon our understanding of this period.3

scholarly journals Military and Political Integration of the Scandinavian Countries in the European Security Architecture after the Second World War

2017 ◽  
pp. 39-52
Author(s):  
Valerii Pavlenko
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Political Integration ◽  
Security Architecture ◽  
European Security ◽  
Close Link ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The North ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Military

The Article examines the military and political integration of Scandinavia in the European security architecture after 1945 and analyzes the historical experience of the countries of the North Europe in the late 1940s-1960s in the security space issues. Particular attention is paid to the close link between the military and political rapprochement with the processes of the economic, technological and political integration in the Western European region. It is emphasized that the economic basis of common interests encourages the EU member states all the time to seek peaceful means to resolve possible disputes. Considerable attention is paid to the analysis of alternative approaches to the European security that the North European countries have used in their foreign policy. The role and place of these countries in the sphere of the European security during the late 1940s-1960s was determined. The influence of the USA and the USSR on the formation of the foreign policy of the Scandinavian countries, especially the pressure of the Soviet Union on Finland in its attempts to get a neutral state status, has been shown. The reasons for the failure to implement the military and political cooperation projects in the form of the Scandinavian Defense Alliance have been revealed.

scholarly journals Do History Lessons Ever Pay off? A Diplomat’s Memoir

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodric Braithwaite
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Russian Language ◽  
University Of Cambridge ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Underlying Causes ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Russian Language ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Moscow River

Sir Rodric Braithwaite was educated at Christ’s College, University of Cambridge, from where he went to serve in HM Diplomatic Service, having worked in Jakarta, Moscow, Washington, Warsaw, Rome, and Brussels, where he was a member of the British delegation to the European Community. From 1988 to 1992, Sir Rodric served as HM Ambassador in the Soviet Union during the decisive years of the Perestroika and the first British ambassador in Russia. Subsequently, he was appointed foreign policy adviser to the Prime Minister in the second John Major ministry and chaired the UK Joint Intelligence Committee between 1992 and 1993. He was appointed Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George (GCMG) in 1994. As a career diplomat, Sir Rodric gained decades of insight into the troubled relations between Russia and West, having taken part in numerous negotiations on arms control. His affinity with the decision-making circles in both Russia and Britain alongside with the mastery of the Russian language allow him to skillfully dissect the underlying causes of ups-and-downs in Moscow’s relationship with the West, employing the works of both English- and Russian-speaking analysts. Among his recent books are Across the Moscow River (2002), Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War (2006), Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 (2012), Armageddon and Paranoia: The Nuclear Confrontation (2017). In this essay, Sir Rodric reminisces of the years spent as a diplomat and provides his view on the usefulness and applicability of historical lessons while devising a foreign policy course.

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