The United Nations and the Responsibility to Rebuild
Peacebuilding and statebuilding were integral parts of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) when the principle was first articulated in 2001. But since 2005 they have developed quite separately, creating a gap between the theories and practices of protection and peacebuilding. The effects of this gap are not just theoretical but practical too. The UN’s failure to properly follow through with rebuilding support in Libya contributed to that country’s descent into chaos and civil war, especially after 2013. Likewise a failure to incorporate atrocity-prevention concerns into ongoing peacebuilding efforts in places like Sri Lanka and the Central African Republic meant that the UN’s field presences did not do all they could to prevent atrocities or protect vulnerable populations. This chapter examines the relationship between peacebuilding and R2P in the UN context. It shows how the two were conceived as being mutually supporting activities but were separated during the UN’s wider deliberations on reform. It describes the effects of this gap between peacebuilding and protection before arguing that the two agendas are closely aligned and should be integrated. And it points to practical work to ensure that atrocity prevention is mainstreamed into peacebuilding efforts, and vice versa.