The neural reuse hypothesis

Author(s):  
Vicente Raja ◽  
Marcie Penner ◽  
Lucina Q. Uddin ◽  
Michael L. Anderson

In this chapter, the authors propose neural reuse as a promising unifying framework for the advance of developmental cognitive neuroscience. In order to do so, first, the authors describe the hypothesis of neural reuse and some of the evidence for its importance to and impact on the development of the brain. Then, the authors compare neural reuse with the three prominent frameworks in contemporary developmental cognitive neuroscience—maturational viewpoint, interactive specialization, and skill learning—and show how neural reuse can accommodate their virtues while avoiding their shortcomings. After that, the authors explore some of the implications of neural reuse for the developmental study of math cognition, brain dynamics, and neurodevelopmental disorders. Finally, the authors sketch some future directions of research and some specific research suggestions.

Author(s):  
Klaus Libertus

Motor development has been relatively neglected in Developmental Psychology over the past 30 years. A recent renaissance of interest in this domain provides new insights into the dynamic nature of motor development with large individual differences, the myriad of factors influencing motor skill learning, and the long-lasting and important implications of motor activity for cognition, language, and even academic achievement. These behavioral and observational findings raise new questions that need to be addressed by future research. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience is uniquely positioned to answer open questions about motor development and to contribute to our understanding of the processes underlying the variability, malleability, and generality of motor development. This chapter summarizes select current findings and hopes to stimulate future research using Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience methods.


1997 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 562-563
Author(s):  
David Estes ◽  
Karen Bartsch

Developmental psychology should play an essential constraining role in developmental cognitive neuroscience. Theories of neural development must account explicitly for the early emergence of knowledge and abilities in infants and young children documented in developmental research. Especially in need of explanation at the neural level is the early emergence of meta-representation.


Author(s):  
Jas Sahota ◽  
Nicole Kim

Dr. Daniel Ansari is an Associate Professor at the Brain and Mind Institute at Western University where he holds a Canada Research Chair in Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience. Dr. Ansari has won many awards for his work, including the Schloessmann Award, the Society for Research in Child Development Early Contribution Award, and the APA Division 7 (Developmental Psychology) Boyd McCandless Award. His research focuses on discerning which regions of the brain are involved in our ability to calculate, such as how activation of the brain is affected during calculation by the particular arithmetic operation being performed. Jas Sahota and Nicole Kim spoke with Dr. Ansari about his work and research.


NeuroSci ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-192
Author(s):  
Oscar Vilarroya

Evolutionary theory should be a fundamental guide for neuroscientists. This would seem a trivial statement, but I believe that taking it seriously is more complicated than it appears to be, as I argue in this article. Elsewhere, I proposed the notion of “bounded functionality” As a way to describe the constraints that should be considered when trying to understand the evolution of the brain. There are two bounded-functionality constraints that are essential to any evolution-minded approach to cognitive neuroscience. The first constraint, the bricoleur constraint, describes the evolutionary pressure for any adaptive solution to re-use any relevant resources available to the system before the selection situation appeared. The second constraint, the satisficing constraint, describes the fact that a trait only needs to behave more advantageously than its competitors in order to be selected. In this paper I describe how bounded-functionality can inform an evolutionary-minded approach to cognitive neuroscience. In order to do so, I resort to Nikolaas Tinbergen’s four questions about how to understand behavior, namely: function, causation, development and evolution. The bottom line of assuming Tinbergen’s questions is that any approach to cognitive neuroscience is intrinsically tentative, slow, and messy.


Author(s):  
Pirita Seitamaa-Hakkarainen ◽  
Minna Huotilainen ◽  
Maarit Mäkelä ◽  
Camilla Groth ◽  
Kai Hakkarainen

 Designing and making crafts is a complex, multifaceted process that requires sophisticated, professional thinking and competence, described as reflection in action and as an embodied process in which the hand, eye and mind collaborate. This article discusses these cognitive and embodied aspects central to designing and making crafts in light of cognitive neuroscience. Understanding the specific cognitive processes and forms of knowledge used in creative practices is essential. In this article, we propose that cognitive neuroscience provides valuable tools for analysing thinking and acting processes relevant to designing and making. We discuss the challenges and opportunities that the use of brain imaging methods, in particular, provides for understanding design activities, skills and cognition. Additionally, we present two neuroscientific experimental settings from our empirical studies in which the methods of cognitive neuroscience are applied to study and detect the interrelations between drawing, forming, skill learning and the functional activities of the brain and its subareas. We argue that cognitive neuroscience provides valuable instruments and methods which complement traditional design research.


Author(s):  
Igor Ponomarev

Alcohol use disorder (AUD) is characterized by clinically significant impairments in health and social function. Epigenetic mechanisms of gene regulation may provide an attractive explanation for how early life exposures to alcohol contribute to the development of AUD and exert lifelong effects on the brain. This chapter provides a critical discussion of the role of epigenetic mechanisms in AUD etiology and the potential of epigenetic research to improve diagnosis, evaluate risks for alcohol-induced pathologies, and promote development of novel therapies for the prevention and treatment of AUD. Challenges of the current epigenetic approaches and future directions are also discussed.


Author(s):  
Thomas Douglas

Interventions that modify a person’s motivations through chemically or physically influencing the brain seem morally objectionable, at least when they are performed nonconsensually. This chapter raises a puzzle for attempts to explain their objectionability. It first seeks to show that the objectionability of such interventions must be explained at least in part by reference to the sort of mental interference that they involve. It then argues that it is difficult to furnish an explanation of this sort. The difficulty is that these interventions seem no more objectionable, in terms of the kind of mental interference that they involve, than certain forms of environmental influence that many would regard as morally innocuous. The argument proceeds by comparing a particular neurointervention with a comparable environmental intervention. The author argues, first, that the two dominant explanations for the objectionability of the neurointervention apply equally to the environmental intervention, and second, that the descriptive difference between the environmental intervention and the neurointervention that most plausibly grounds the putative moral difference in fact fails to do so. The author concludes by presenting a trilemma that falls out of the argument.


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