Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta on the Freedom of Consciousness

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabelle Ratié
Keyword(s):  
Indian Philosophy ◽  
Recognition System ◽  
The Self ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
The Absolute

The Pratyabhijñā (“Recognition”) system, designed by the Śaiva nondualist Utpaladeva (c.925–975 ce) and expounded by Abhinavagupta (c.975–1025 ce) stands out as one of the greatest accomplishments of Indian philosophy. Engaging in a dialogue with all the rival currents of thought of his time, and claiming that the realization of our identity with God (understood as a single, all-encompassing, and all-powerful consciousness) can be achieved through the mere recourse to experience and reason, Utpaladeva transforms the Śaiva scriptural dogmas into philosophical concepts. His “new path” is aimed at demonstrating that the essence of any individual’s consciousness is none other than the absolute freedom characterizing God’s creativity. While examining Utpaladeva’s use of the concept of freedom in several major Indian controversies (such as the debates over the existence of the self or the ontological status of perceived objects), this article explores his phenomenological attempts to uncover the freedom of consciousness in our most ordinary experiences.

Barth and Buddhism in the theology of Katsume Takizawa

2011 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-210
Author(s):  
John Parratt
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Identity ◽  
Basic Relationship ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractKatsume Takizawa (1909–1984) was one of the most innovative of twentieth-century Japanese philosophical theologians. His study with Barth (1935) led him to attempt to bring together aspects of Barth's theology with concepts derived from Jodo-shin and Zen. He found in both religions a basic relationship between God and man which transcended both identity and distinction, which he expressed in Nishida's concept of the self-identity of the absolute contradiction. This relationship he called ‘Emmanuel 1’. The fulfilment of the relationship is ‘Emmanuel 2’ and is reflected for Christians in Jesus.

Let the Witness Speak: From Archi-writing to the Community to come

Derrida Today ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-270
Author(s):  
Francesco Vitale
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Tradition ◽  
Metaphysics Of Presence ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
To Come ◽  
The One ◽  
The Sacrifice

The paper aims to present a reading of the question of Testimony rising in Derrida's later works (from Faith and Knowledge to Poetics and Politics of Witnessing): the experience of Testimony as the irreducible condition of the relation to the Other, of every possible link among living human singularities and, thus, of the thinking of a community to come. This thinking is able to divert the community from the economy grounding and structuring it within our political tradition governed by the metaphysics of presence, which demands the sacrifice of the Other in its multiple theoretical and practical forms. We intend to read this proposal and to point out its rich perspectives by bringing it into the articulation of an ethical-political archi-writing. So we suggest going back to Derrida's early analyses of phenomenology and to De la grammatologie in order to present a reading of archi-writing as the irreducible condition of the relation to otherness and, thus, of the experience through which a living human singularity constitutes itself, a singularity different from the one our tradition compels us to think of within the pattern of the absolute presence to the self, free from the relation to the other.

scholarly journals POZITYVIOJI IR NEGATYVIOJI TIKROVĖS TEMATIZACIJA. ŠLIOGERIS IR BAUDRILLARD’AS

Problemos ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 78 ◽  
pp. 74-82
Author(s):  
Mantautas Ruzas ◽  
Marius P. Šaulauskas
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
The Self ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Conceptual System ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
The Real ◽  
Real Functions ◽  
Metaphysical Principle

Straipsnis skirtas Arvydo Šliogerio filosofijos ontologinių nuostatų tyrimui, jame analizuojamos ir lyginamos Šliogerio ir Baudrillard’o tikrovės ontologinio statuso traktuotės. Šliogerio filosofijoje tikrovės ontologinis statusas tematizuojamas parodant ir tai, kas yra, ir tai, kas nėra tikrovė. Baudrillard’as tikrovės ontologinį statusą įvardija negatyviai tematizuodamas tik tai, kas nėra tikrovė. Šliogerio filosofija yra grindžiama paradoksalia ontologine prielaida, jog metadiskursyvinė tikrovė funkcionuoja kaip galutinis neredukuojamas referentas, kuris savo ruožtu traktuojamas kaip juslinė substancija (Esmas). Tačiau pati juslinė substancija, nors ir būdama pamatiniu principu, įgalinančiu prasmingumą, pati negali būti adekvačiai įvardyta ex definitio, nes ji iš principo esti neredukuojama į jokį prasminį darinį ir juo labiau į prasminę sistemą. Baudrillard’o filosofija grindžiama semiologiniu reduktyvizmu, t. y. prielaida, kad prasminės nuorodos į metadiskursyvinę tikrovę yra autoreferentiški simboliniai konstruktai (simuliakrai), todėl bet koks bandymas ir apčiuopti tikrovę, ir apibrėžti ją pozityviai tesukuria negatyvų efektą, t. y. spontanišką ir neišvengiamą kitų autoreferentiškų simbolinių konstruktų gamybą.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Tikrovė, simuliakras, Baudrillard’as, Šliogeris, ontologija.Positive and Negative Thematization of Reality: Šliogeris and BaudrillardMantautas Ruzas, Marius P. Šaulauskas SummaryThe article aims to elucidate the dialectical nature of the most fundamental ontological tenets of Šliogerian philosophy while contrasting them to Baudrillard’s interpretation of the ontological status of the Real. In contrast to Šliogeris who thematizes the Real both in terms of what it is an what it is not, Baudrillard proceeds in a negative way only by showing what the Real is not. Šliogeris’ philosophy is based on a paradoxical ontological argument that the metadiscursive Real functions as the final non-reductive referent conceptualised as the ultimate perceptual substance (Isness). As an ultimate metaphysical principle, it serves as a core of experience, although it cannot be adequately described ex definitio or else somehow reduced to any meaningful counterpart of the conceptual system. Baudrillard’s philosophy, on the contrary, is based on the principle of semiological reductionism, i.e. on the premise that all meaningful links to metadiscursive reality follow the self-referential logic and therefore are merely interrelated symbolic constructions (simulacra) precluding any direct access to the Real and not only to its positive (cataphatic) articulation.Keywords: the Real, simulacrum, Baudrillard, Šliogeris, ontology.

De l’image-modèle à l’image de Dieu. Le dépassement de l’individu dans la doctrine éthique de Fichte, 1798–1812

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 171-184
Author(s):  
Luc Vincenti ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Image Of God ◽  
The Self ◽  
Spiritual Life ◽  
Individual Form ◽  
Ethical Action ◽  
Ideal World ◽  
Model Image ◽  
Rational Individual ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Individual

Fichte’s ethics changed in many ways between 1794 and 1812: in the first place spiritual life replaced the transformation of nature; individual supersession was radicalized; and ethics was linked with first philosophy. In 1812 it was no longer a matter of inflecting natural necessity by means of the model image of an ideal world (Vorbild). The theme of image reappears as an externalizing of absolute life. Ethical action becomes a moment of this manifestation: a return to unity, following the process of fragmentation of the originary phenomenon (the I or the I-one), into an infinity of individual I’s. This fragmentation is fondamental: life is self-consciousness only in this individual form. The ethical act manifests the concept or image of God with the self-annihilation of individuality. Fichte had already written, in part XI of the Second Introduction, that the I, “only reasonnable”, “is no longer an individual”, and in the first Sittenlehre, § 18 : “We are all supposed to act identically”. Fichte’s final Ethics thus does not radicalize the supersession of the individual. It defines the rational individual by this supersession of himself [or herself], making ethics into a moment [stage] of the absolute life. The matter is not to merge the individual into the whole, but to partake in a living order, in the activity of the whole, which reaches out to each of its members, only to return to the first unity, by forming the whole as such.De 1794 à 1812, l’éthique de Fichte connaît plusieurs évolutions : abandon de la transformation de la nature au profit de la vie spirituelle, radicalisation du dépassement de l’individu, et rapprochement entre éthique et philosophie première. En 1812 il n’est plus question d’infléchir la nécessité naturelle par l’image modeèe (Vorbild) d’un monde idéal. La thématique de l’image apparaît comme extériorisation de la vie absolue. L’action éthique devient un moment de cette manifestation : le retour vers l’un, au terme d’un morcellement du phénomène originaire (le »Moi« ou »Moi un«) en une infinité de Moi(s) individuels. Cette diffraction est essentielle : la vie ne peut être consciente d’elle-même que dans cette forme individuelle. L’agir éthique manifeste le concept ou l’image de Dieu en anéantissant l’individualité. Mais la XIe section de la Seconde Introduction précisait déjà, que dans le monde moral, le Moi »uniquement raisonnable«, »a cessé d’être un individu« et dans la première Sittenlehre, § 18, Fichte écrivait : »Nous devons tous agir de la même manière«. L’éthique tardive ne radicalise donc pas le dépassement de l’individu. Elle définit l’individu rationnel par le dépassement de soi, en faisant de l’éthique un moment de la vie absolue. La question est donc moins de fondre l’individu dans un tout que de participer à un ordre vivant, à l’activité du tout qui va jusqu’à chacun des membres pour revenir vers l’unité première en constituant la totalité comme telle.

A Perspective on Epistemology and Ontology of Indian Psychology

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dharm P. S. Bhawuk
Keyword(s):  
Indian Philosophy ◽  
World View ◽  
The Self ◽  
Theory Method ◽  
Twin Research ◽  
Indian Psychology ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
The World ◽  
Research Criteria

The epistemology of Indian Psychology (IP) is akin to that of Indian Philosophy or in general the Indian world view of knowledge, truth and belief about making sense of the self and the world. In this article, the epistemological and ontological foundations of IP are derived from a verse from the Ishopanishad and corroborated by verses from the Bhagavad-Gita. In doing so, epistemological questions like what is knowledge in IP or what knowledge (or theories) should IP develop and how (the methodology) are answered. Similarly, ontological questions like what is the being that is the focus of IP research or are biomechanical or spiritual-social-biological beings of interest to IP are addressed. The simplicity and clarity of this derivation fulfils the twin research criteria of parsimony and aesthetics. The role of epistemology and ontology in constructing cultural meaning for theory, method and practice of IP is discussed.

scholarly journals Suveræne livsytringer og kredsende tanker og følelser – en kritisk begrebsudvikling

2014 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 178-196
Author(s):  
Bjørn Rabjerg
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Ontological Difference ◽  
Fundamental Distinction ◽  
The Absolute

The absolute ontological difference between sovereign expressionsof life and encircling thoughts and emotions in Løgstrup’s ethics andmetaphysics reflects a fundamental distinction between that which isgiven (and thus not constituted by the self) and that which we ourselvesmust accept responsibility for. This ontological difference plays a centralpart through Løgstrup’s authorship from the 1930’s and until theformation of the concepts in the 1960’s, and beyond. As a consequenceit is suggested that the term ‘encircling expressions of life’ must be abandoned, as it blurs this ontological difference and implies that man is notresponsible for his own resentment and egotism.

"Herodias," or the Self-Annihilation of the Absolute Work

MLN ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 115 (4) ◽  
pp. 761-782
Author(s):  
Victor Provenzano
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Absolute

The Self in Indian Philosophy.

1965 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 276
Author(s):  
Dale Riepe ◽  
Troy Organ
Keyword(s):  
Indian Philosophy ◽  
The Self

Gaṅgeśa (fl. c.1325)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen H. Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Indian Philosophy ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Multidimensional System ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Indian School ◽  
New School ◽  
Classical Indian Philosophy ◽  
Realist Ontology

Gaṅgeśa launched and solidified advances in logic and epistemology within the classical Indian school of Logic, Nyāya. He is traditionally taken to have inaugurated the ‘New’ school, Navya-Nyāya. Nyāya, both Old and New, is a multidimensional system that belies the stereotype of Indian philosophy as idealist and mystical in orientation. Gaṅgeśa worked with a realist ontology of objects spoken about and experienced every day. He articulated what may be called a reliabilist theory of knowledge: under specified conditions, sense-mediated and inferential cognitions (along with two other types) are reliable sources of information about reality. Gaṅgeśa was a pivotal figure in classical Indian philosophy; most later debate both within his school and outside it presupposed cognitive analyses that he standardized. These analyses focus on properties exhibited by things known, properties central to the processes whereby they are known. Properties relating the cognized to the cognizer are especially important. Though Gaṅgeśa had a lot to say about the ontological status of these properties, others in his school found them problematic. Such controversy appears to have contributed to New Logic’s success: proponents of rival views were able to utilize Gaṅgeśa’s formulas and definitions without abandoning their own positions on what is real.

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