The Ethics Problem

Author(s):  
David M. Levy ◽  
Sandra J. Peart

The collective action problem of economic experts was diagnosed acutely by Knight and Pigou in the 1930s. The interest of economists as a group is in pursuing the public good of truth; the interest of an individual economist is in pursuing the private good of happiness. Pigou’s example is the pursuit of political influence. Deviation from truth-seeking devastates the theory of governance as objective inquiry laid out by Knight and John Rawls, as we saw in the eugenic era. We reformulate the Knight–Rawls position as truth-seeking contingent on a presupposed system. The best case for the Knight–Rawls position is transparency, where presuppositions are common knowledge. If transparency is infeasible making the nontransparency of inquiry itself transparent will serve as a second-best solution to warn third parties to make adjustments. A code of ethics can itself serve as a warning about the temptation. Pigou’s concern about nonpecuniary temptation should be added to the American Economic Association code of ethics.

Author(s):  
Grégoire Rousseau ◽  
Nora Sternfeld

AbstractAll over the world, education—which could be understood as a universal right and public good—is facing processes of economization and privatization. Technology—which could be understood as a common means of production, collaboratively developed—is taken away from the public and put into corporate hands. This article is designed as a conversation investigating the question of shared and common knowledge from the perspectives of an educator and an engineer, respectively. The dialogue explores necessary convergences in radical practices of commoning, and possible future strategies for education and Open Technology. It asks how new models can challenge the neoliberal agenda and move away from established policies, and how a collective re-appropriation of the means of production could emerge within a post-digital society.


2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

AbstractLiberalism generally holds that legitimate political power is limited and is to be impartially exercised, only for the public good. Liberals accordingly assign political priority to maintaining certain basic liberties and equality of opportunities; they advocate an essential role for markets in economic activity, and they recognize government's crucial role in correcting market breakdowns and providing public goods. Classical liberalism and what I call “the high liberal tradition” are two main branches of liberalism. Classical liberalism evolved from the works of Adam Smith and the classical utilitarian economists; its major 20th century representatives include Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. The high liberal tradition developed from John Stuart Mill's works, and its major philosophical representatives in the 20th century are John Dewey and, later, John Rawls. This paper discusses the main distinguishing features of the classical and the high liberal traditions and their respective positions regarding capitalism as an economic and social system. Classical liberals, unlike high liberals, regard economic liberties and rights of private property in productive resources to be nearly as important as basic liberties. They conceive of equality of opportunity in more formal terms, and regard capitalist markets and the price system as essential not only to the allocation of production resources, but also as the fundamental criterion for the just distribution of income, wealth, and economic powers. High liberals, by contrast, regard the economic liberties as subordinate to the exercise of personal and civic liberties. They are prepared to regulate and restrict economic liberties to achieve greater equality of opportunities, reduce inequalities of economic powers, and promote a broader conception of the public good. And while high liberals endorse markets and the price system as essential to allocation of productive resources, they do not regard markets as the fundamental criterion for assessing just distributions of income, wealth, and economic powers and positions of responsibility. The paper concludes with some reflections upon the essential role that dissimilar conceptions of persons and society play in grounding the different positions on economic justice that classical and high liberals advocate.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Deutchman ◽  
Dorsa Amir ◽  
Katherine McAuliffe ◽  
Matthew Jordan

Recent work suggests that an important cognitive mechanism promoting coordination is common knowledge—a heuristic for representing recursive mental states. Yet, we know little about how common knowledge promotes coordination. We propose that common knowledge increases coordination by reducing uncertainty about others’ cooperative behavior. We examine how common knowledge increases cooperation in the context of a threshold public goods game, a public good game in which a minimum level of contribution—a threshold—is required. Across two preregistered studies (N = 4,111), we explored how varying (1) the information participants had regarding what their group members knew about the threshold and (2) the threshold level affected contributions. We found that participants were more likely to contribute to the public good when there was common knowledge of the threshold than private knowledge. Using structural equation modeling, we found that the predicted number of group members contributing to the public good and certainty about the predicted number of contributors mediated the effect of information condition on contributions. Our results suggest that common knowledge of the threshold increases public good contributions by reducing uncertainty around other people’s cooperative behavior. These findings point to the influential role of common knowledge in helping to solve large-scale cooperation problems.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Ofosu ◽  
Daniel N Posner

The evidence-based community has championed the public registration of pre-analysis plans (PAPs) as a solution to the problem of research credibility, but without any evidence that PAPs actually bolster the credibility of research. We analyze a representative sample of 195 PAPs from the American Economic Association (AEA) and Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) registration platforms to assess whether PAPs are sufficiently clear, precise and comprehensive to be able to achieve their objectives of preventing “fishing” and reducing the scope for post-hoc adjustment of research hypotheses. We also analyze a subset of 93 PAPs from projects that have resulted in publicly available papers to ascertain how faithfully they adhere to their pre-registered specifications and hypotheses. We find significant variation in the extent to which PAPs are accomplishing the goals they were designed to achieve


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg Nöldeke ◽  
Jorge Peña

AbstractWe consider how group size affects the private provision of a public good with non-refundable binary contributions. A fixed amount of the good is provided if and only if the number of contributors reaches an exogenous threshold. The threshold, the group size, and the identical, non-refundable cost of contributing to the public good are common knowledge. Our focus is on the case in which the threshold is larger than one, so that teamwork is required to produce the public good. We show that both expected payoffs and the probability that the public good is obtained in the best symmetric equilibrium are decreasing in group size. We also characterize the limit outcome when group size converges to infinity and provide precise conditions under which the expected number of contributors is decreasing or increasing in group size for sufficiently large groups.JEL classificationC72, D71, H41.


1997 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-240
Author(s):  
G. W. Crook

The Ordre des ingénieurs forestiers du Québec has for 75 years played a key role in building the public's awareness of forests and of the practice of professional forestry, and in safeguarding the public interest in the resource. Two primary drivers are behind the organization's success : a long-standing advocacy policy and licensing. As a professional association that has been given the right to exclusive practice, it is legally bound to place as its highest priority the protection of the public good. This necessitates an inspection, discipline, and continuing education program for its members to ensure their competency. Also, the Order has the mandate of ensuring that foresters are not impeded in their professional practice. Its advocacy and communications mandate is closely linked to its role, specified in its Code of Ethics, to protect the public by speaking out on forestry-related issues. The Order has thus been able to rise above partisan issues and base its position statements and policies on the reservoir of expertise that it collectively represents. The result has been the promotion of professional forestry for the public good, and the Order taking a leadership role as the conscience of forestry in Quebec.


1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark E. Sibicky ◽  
Cortney B. Richardson ◽  
Anna M. Gruntz ◽  
Timothy J. Binegar ◽  
David A. Schroeder ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document