Presidential Term Limits as a Credible-Commitment Mechanism

2019 ◽  
pp. 123-140
Author(s):  
Octavio Amorim Neto ◽  
Igor P. Acácio
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Political Order ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Chief Executives ◽  
Regime Stability ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

Contra the conventional wisdom that term limits are meaningless in dictatorships, Brazil’s military regime developed term-limits for its chief executives and managed a durable political order. This chapter argue that term limits moderated intra-elite conflicts, thus contributing to regime stability. Term limits were key to reconcile two warring factions within the armed forces. The authors see term limits as a credible-commitment mechanism. Three elements are jointly sufficient to explain the adoption of term limits: (1) the armed forces’ decision in 1964 to part ways with the decades-old pattern of episodic, short political interventions and stay in office for the long haul; (2) a legalist tradition that led the new regime to keep a façade of constitutionalism through a myriad of political institutions; and (3) the ideological and political cleavages within the armed forces. We corroborate our arguments using a new dataset of tension events between the military and the government in 1946–85.

Myanmar: Civil–Military Relations in a Tutelary Regime

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Bünte
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.

Civil–Military Relations and Russia’s Post-Soviet Military Culture: A Belief System Analysis

2021 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2110629
Author(s):  
Kirill Shamiev
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
System Analysis ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Culture ◽  
Institutional Autonomy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This article studies the role of military culture in defense policymaking. It focuses on Russia’s post-Soviet civil–military relations and military reform attempts. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s armed forces were in a state of despair. Despite having relative institutional autonomy, the military neither made itself more effective before minister Serdyukov nor tried to overthrow the government. The paper uses the advocacy coalition framework’s belief system approach to analyze data from military memoirs, parliamentary speeches, and 15 interviews. The research shows that the military’s support for institutional autonomy, combined with its elites’ self-serving bias, critically contributed to what I term an “imperfect equilibrium” in Russian civil–military relations: the military could not reform itself and fought back against radical, though necessary, changes imposed by civilian leadership.

scholarly journals “The British Soldier is no Bolshevik”: The British Army, Discipline, and the Demobilization Strikes of 1919

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Butler
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
British Army ◽  
Political Climate ◽  
Civilian Life ◽  
Daily Mail ◽  
Winston Churchill ◽  
The Press ◽  
The Government ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Military

Abstract This article considers the breakdown in discipline in the British Army which occurred in Britain and on the Western Front during the process of demobilization at the end of the First World War. Many soldiers, retained in the army immediately after the Armistice, went on strike, and some formed elected committees, demanding their swifter return to civilian life. Their perception was that the existing demobilization system was unjust, and men were soon organized by those more politically conscious members of the armed forces who had enlisted for the duration of the war. At one stage in January 1919, over 50,000 soldiers were out on strike, a fact that was of great concern to the British civilian and military authorities who miscalculated the risk posed by soldiers. Spurred on by many elements of the press, especially the Daily Mail and Daily Herald, who both fanned and dampened the flames of discontent, soldiers’ discipline broke down, demonstrating that the patriotism which had for so long kept them in line could only extend so far. Though senior members of the government, principally Winston Churchill, and the military, especially Douglas Haig and Henry Wilson, were genuinely concerned that Bolshevism had ‘infected’ the army, or, at the very least, the army had been unionized, their fears were not realized. The article examines the government’s strategy regarding demobilization, its efforts to assess the risk of politicization and manage the press, and its responses to these waves of strikes, arguing that, essentially, these soldiers were civilians first and simply wanted to return home, though, in the post-war political climate, government fears were very real.

scholarly journals The anniversary of the military coup attempt in Turkey, July 15–16, 2016. The evolution of a political system

2017 ◽  
pp. 63-68
Author(s):  
Y. S. Kudryashova
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Authoritarian Regime ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Ruling Party ◽  
Coup Attempt

During the government of AK Party army leaders underprivileged to act as an exclusive guarantor preserving a secular regime in the country. The political balance between Secular and Islamite elites was essentially removed after Erdogan was elected Turkish President. Consistently toughening authoritarian regime of a ruling party deeply accounts for a military coup attempt and earlier periodically occurred disturbance especially among the young. The methods of a coup showed the profundity of a split and the lack of cohesion in Turkish armed forces. Erdogan made the best use of a coup attempt’s opportunities to concentrate all power in his hands and to consolidate a present regime. The mass support of the population during a coup attempt ensured opportunities for a fundamental reorganization of a political system. Revamped Constitution at most increases political powers of the President.

Term Limit and Political Incumbency in Africa: Implications of Staying in Power Too Long with References to the Cases of Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia

2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Napoleon Bamfo
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Recent Trend ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Recent History ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Term Limit ◽  
Political Landscape ◽  
Almost All ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Impact

Abstract African nations never seriously addressed the issue of term limits for incumbents until newly-drafted constitutions did so in the early 1990s. Since then, however, some incumbents have initiated campaigns to circumvent that measure. Some of those initiatives have been successful; others have not. Incumbents attempting to stay in office longer than what constitutions originally allowed used to be a time-honored strategy that African leaders regularly employed throughout the post-independent period until the early 1990s. The autocratic and single-party regimes that littered Africa's political landscape epitomized the extent to which political incumbents would go to keep anybody else, including members of their own party, from winning the highest political office.The response of opposition groups and the military, which assumed a guardianship role, to this wanton aggrandizement of power was a spate of military coups, counter-coups, and sabotage or destabilize those regimes. African nations paid dearly for this wave of instability to which almost all political systems became associated. This period of uncertainty and decay reminiscent of Africa's recent history is being re-invented following unsuccessful attempts of political incumbents in Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia to seek additional terms. Even as these efforts were being resisted, incumbents elsewhere were succeeding at securing additional terms. This paper examines the impact this recent trend among incumbents for term extension will have on the building of political institutions in Africa. If history were to serve as a guide, that spells an ominous foreboding.

scholarly journals THE RISE OF THE CHINGGISID DYNASTY: PRE-MODERN EURASIAN POLITICAL ORDER AND CULTURE AT A GLANCE

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-84
Author(s):  
Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Political Order ◽  
The Political ◽  
Leaders And Followers ◽  
Asian State ◽  
Dynastic Succession ◽  
As If

Analyzing the messages and the responses that Chinggis Khan sent to and received from Ong Khan and his allies after his defeat at the hands of the latter at the battle of Qalaqaljit Elet in the spring of 1203, and explicating the terms of cimar (chimar) and törü that appear in the messages, this article looks at the political order and culture where the Chinggisid state rose. The article argues that pre-modern Mongolian and Inner Asian politics was guided by the idea of törü, which resembles the Indo-Buddhist idea of dharma, the Chinese idea of dao, and the European idea of natural law. It also argues that the hereditary divisional system that the Inner Asian state builders regularly employed to govern their nomadic populations, the institutions of dynastic succession, and the hereditary rights of princes and the nobility for inheritance fundamentally structured Inner Asian politics. Hence, it questions the conventional wisdom that depicts pre-modern Inner Asian politics not only as pragmatic, fluid, and fractious but also dependent on the personal charisma of leadership, and the personal bond and loyalty between leaders and followers, as if it were lacking enduring social, political institutions and order.

Military Government in Latin America, 1959–1990

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian E. Loveman
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Military Government ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Latin America’s armed forces have played a central role in the region’s political history. This selective annotated bibliography focuses on key sources, with varying theoretical, empirical, and normative treatments of the military governments in the region, from the Cuban Revolution (1959) until the end of the Cold War (1989–1990). The article is limited to those cases in which military governments or “civil-military” governments were in power. This excludes personalist dictatorships, party dictatorships, and civilian governments in which the armed forces exercised considerable influence but did not rule directly. No pretense is made of comprehensiveness or of treating the “causes” of military coups (a vast literature) and of civil-military relations under civilian governments. Likewise, the closely related topics of guerrilla movements during this period, human rights violations under the military governments, US policy and support for many of the military governments, and the transitions back to civilian government (including “transitional justice”) are not covered in depth, but some of the selections do treat these topics and direct the reader to a more extensive literature on these subjects. Long-term military governments, with changing leadership in most cases, controlled eleven Latin American nations for significant periods from 1964 to 1990: Ecuador, 1963–1966 and 1972–1978; Guatemala, 1963–1985 (with an interlude from 1966–1969); Brazil, 1964–1985; Bolivia, 1964–1970 and 1971–1982; Argentina, 1966–1973 and 1976–1983; Peru, 1968–1980; Panama, 1968–1989; Honduras, 1963–1966 and 1972–1982; Chile, 1973–1990; and Uruguay, 1973–1984. In El Salvador the military dominated the government from 1948 until 1984, but the last “episode” was from 1979 to 1984. Military governments, though inevitably authoritarian, implemented varying economic, social, and foreign policies. They had staunch supporters and intense opponents, and they were usually subject to internal factionalism and ideological as well as policy disagreements. The sources discussed in this article reflect that diversity.

Iran's military set for more aggressive stance in Gulf

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
General Staff ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Defence Budget ◽  
Intelligence Collection ◽  
Gulf States ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Major General

Significance Tensions between the Gulf states and Iran have escalated significantly in 2016, in the wake of Iran's signing of a landmark deal in 2015 that brought to an end the decade-long dispute over its nuclear programme. The response of Iran's military to the heightened tensions will be partly influenced by the new chairman of the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), the country's top military body, Major General Mohamad Hossein Bagheri. Impacts A more assertive and non-compromising IRGC will increase pressure on President Hassan Rouhani as he seeks re-election in 2017. Improvements in intelligence collection and dissemination are likely in Syria, aimed at reducing Iranian casualties. The military and government are likely to clash soon over the defence budget and its allocation. The government will try to keep the IRGC in check by tipping the media off about alleged financial wrongdoings. With the next US president expected to adopt a harder-line stance on Iran, the diplomatic rapprochement may be reversed partially.

Persistent insecurity will test Burkinabe government

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Burkina Faso ◽  
Local Community ◽  
Community Support ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Old Regime ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Slow Pace ◽  
Public Pressure ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

Subject Counterterrorism in Burkina Faso. Significance Despite recent gains against jihadist groups, in recent months attacks have moved beyond the more insecure north and started to occur more frequently in the east and parts of the centre. Separately, authorities are growing increasingly intolerant of public dissent and protest, while revelations of abuses by the military risk scuppering crucial local community support necessary for counterinsurgency operations. Impacts The government will face growing political and public pressure to end persistent strikes. Patriotic support for the armed forces remains widespread, but growing revelations of abuse will tarnish its image. Opposition criticisms of the government’s counterterrorism strategy will increase but avoid directly blaming the military. Public dissatisfaction may grow with the Sahel Group of Five (G5) regional force if the slow pace of its operations persists. The prosecution of alleged coup plotter Gilbert Diendere will enjoy public backing amid calls for justice for victims of the old regime.

Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 13-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holger Albrecht ◽  
Dina Bishara
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Political Order ◽  
Political Transformation ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
Revolutionary Politics ◽  
Path Dependent ◽  
The Military

Though there are many expectations regarding the interim character of the current political order, the future of Egyptian democracy remains highly uncertain. A closer look at the take-over of power by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is imperative to an understanding of a political system at a decisive crossroads, but also of the path-dependent implications of the military’s engagement in politics. We project that, irrespective of the institutional framing and the results of the current political transformation, the military will play a decisive role in the country’s political future. In addressing its role during the current revolutionary events, we account for the reason for the military’s engagement in politics, the path of the take-over of political power, and the military’s management of politics. Thus, our analysis will attempt to provide preliminary answers to three questions: When and how did the Egyptian military intervene directly in revolutionary politics? Why did it intervene? And how does it manage the transformation?

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