scholarly journals Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 191567
Author(s):  
Balaraju Battu ◽  
Narayanan Srinivasan
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Role Models ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Previous Round ◽  
Good Behaviour ◽  
Public Good Games

Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because individuals behave as conditional cooperators. This is because individuals imitate the social behaviour of successful individuals when their payoff information is available. However, in human societies, individuals cooperate in many situations involving social dilemmas. We hypothesize that humans are sensitive to both success (payoffs) and how that success was obtained, by cheating (not socially sanctioned) or good behaviour (socially sanctioned and adds to prestige or reputation), when information is available about payoffs and prestige. We propose and model a repeated public good game with heterogeneous conditional cooperators where an agent's donation in a public goods game depends on comparing the number of donations in the population in the previous round and with the agent's arbitrary chosen conditional cooperative criterion. Such individuals imitate the social behaviour of role models based on their payoffs and prestige. The dependence is modelled by two population-level parameters: affinity towards payoff and affinity towards prestige . These affinities influence the degree to which agents value the payoff and prestige of role models. Agents update their conditional strategies by considering both parameters. The simulations in this study show that high levels of cooperation are established in a population consisting of heterogeneous conditional cooperators for a certain range of affinity parameters in repeated public good games. The results show that social value (prestige) is important in establishing cooperation.

scholarly journals Conditional cooperation and confusion in public-goods experiments

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (5) ◽  
pp. 1291-1296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew ◽  
Claire El Mouden ◽  
Stuart A. West
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Experimental Methods ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Common Assumption ◽  
Economics Experiments ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Public Good Games

Economic experiments are often used to study if humans altruistically value the welfare of others. A canonical result from public-good games is that humans vary in how they value the welfare of others, dividing into fair-minded conditional cooperators, who match the cooperation of others, and selfish noncooperators. However, an alternative explanation for the data are that individuals vary in their understanding of how to maximize income, with misunderstanding leading to the appearance of cooperation. We show that (i) individuals divide into the same behavioral types when playing with computers, whom they cannot be concerned with the welfare of; (ii) behavior across games with computers and humans is correlated and can be explained by variation in understanding of how to maximize income; (iii) misunderstanding correlates with higher levels of cooperation; and (iv) standard control questions do not guarantee understanding. These results cast doubt on certain experimental methods and demonstrate that a common assumption in behavioral economics experiments, that choices reveal motivations, will not necessarily hold.

scholarly journals Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 261-299
Author(s):  
Florian Engl ◽  
Arno Riedl ◽  
Roberto Weber
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Direct Influence ◽  
Control Groups ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Positive Spillover ◽  
Public Good Games

Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others’ cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects. (JEL C92, D02, D83, D91, H41)

scholarly journals Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games

Games ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 234-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Cartwright ◽  
Denise Lovett
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Public Good Games

scholarly journals Endogenous rewards promote cooperation

2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (40) ◽  
pp. 9968-9973 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chun-Lei Yang ◽  
Boyu Zhang ◽  
Gary Charness ◽  
Cong Li ◽  
Jaimie W. Lien
Keyword(s):  
Biological Sciences ◽  
Practical Implementation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Community Members ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
Cooperation Model ◽  
High Level ◽  
Reward Mechanism

Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas is a fundamental objective in the social and biological sciences. Although providing a punishment option to community members in the public goods game (PGG) has been shown to effectively promote cooperation, this has some serious disadvantages; these include destruction of a society’s physical resources as well as its overall social capital. A more efficient approach may be to instead employ a reward mechanism. We propose an endogenous reward mechanism that taxes the gross income of each round’s PGG play and assigns the amount to a fund; each player then decides how to distribute his or her share of the fund as rewards to other members of the community. Our mechanism successfully reverses the decay trend and achieves a high level of contribution with budget-balanced rewards that require no external funding, an important condition for practical implementation. Simulations based on type-specific estimations indicate that the payoff-based conditional cooperation model explains the observed treatment effects well.

'Expressive' Obligations in Public Good Games: Crowding-In and Crowding-Out Effects

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Corazzini ◽  
Anna Marenzi ◽  
Michele Bernasconi
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
Public Good Games

Efficiency and Stability of Sampling Equilibrium in Public Good Games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cesar Mantilla ◽  
Rajiv Sethi ◽  
Juan-Camilo CCrdenas
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Public Good Games

Social ethology of the wolverine

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey P. Copeland ◽  
Arild Landa ◽  
Kimberly Heinemeyer ◽  
Keith B. Aubry ◽  
Jiska van Dijk ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Organization ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Resource Availability ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Social System ◽  
Group Living ◽  
Field Studies ◽  
Ecological Framework ◽  
The Social ◽  
Living Species

Social behaviour in solitary carnivores has long been an active area of investigation but for many species remains largely founded in conjecture compared to our understanding of sociality in group-living species. The social organization of the wolverine has, until now, received little attention beyond its portrayal as a typical mustelid social system. In this chapter the authors compile observations of social interactions from multiple wolverine field studies, which are integrated into an ecological framework. An ethological model for the wolverine is proposed that reveals an intricate social organization, which is driven by variable resource availability within extremely large territories and supports social behaviour that underpins offspring development.

‘Everything Belongs to God’

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Rech
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Economic Inequality ◽  
Private Ownership ◽  
Social Conflicts ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
Wealth Redistribution ◽  
Social Teachings

This chapter examines and contextualizes Sayyid Qutb’s doctrine of property and social justice, which he articulated at a time of deep social conflicts in Egypt. The chapter describes how Qutb, along with other writers concerned with economic inequality in the 1920s–40s such as Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri (1895–1971), conceptualised private ownership as a form of power that must be limited by religious obligations and subordinated to the public good. The chapter further shows that Qutb made this notion of restrained property central to a broader theory of social justice and wealth redistribution by combining the social teachings of the Qur’an with the modern ideal of the centralized interventionist state. Arguably this endeavour to revitalise the Quranic roots of Islamic charity and simultaneously appropriate the discourse of modern statehood made Qutb’s position oscillate between legalism and anti-legalism.

Social Evolution, Hamilton’s Rule, and Inclusive Fitness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Okasha
Keyword(s):  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Social Evolution ◽  
Inclusive Fitness ◽  
Popular Approach ◽  
Hamilton’S Rule ◽  
Inclusive Fitness Theory ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Encounters ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Hamilton's Rule

Inclusive fitness theory, originally due to W. D. Hamilton, is a popular approach to the study of social evolution, but shrouded in controversy. The theory contains two distinct aspects: Hamilton’s rule (rB > C); and the idea that individuals will behave as if trying to maximize their inclusive fitness in social encounters. These two aspects of the theory are logically separable but often run together. A generalized version of Hamilton’s rule can be formulated that is always true, though whether it is causally meaningful is debatable. However, the individual maximization claim only holds true if the payoffs from the social encounter are additive. The notion that inclusive fitness is the ‘goal’ of individuals’ social behaviour is less robust than some of its advocates acknowledge.

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