scholarly journals Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 261-299
Author(s):  
Florian Engl ◽  
Arno Riedl ◽  
Roberto Weber
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Direct Influence ◽  
Control Groups ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Positive Spillover ◽  
Public Good Games

Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others’ cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects. (JEL C92, D02, D83, D91, H41)

scholarly journals Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 191567
Author(s):  
Balaraju Battu ◽  
Narayanan Srinivasan
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Role Models ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Previous Round ◽  
Good Behaviour ◽  
Public Good Games

Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because individuals behave as conditional cooperators. This is because individuals imitate the social behaviour of successful individuals when their payoff information is available. However, in human societies, individuals cooperate in many situations involving social dilemmas. We hypothesize that humans are sensitive to both success (payoffs) and how that success was obtained, by cheating (not socially sanctioned) or good behaviour (socially sanctioned and adds to prestige or reputation), when information is available about payoffs and prestige. We propose and model a repeated public good game with heterogeneous conditional cooperators where an agent's donation in a public goods game depends on comparing the number of donations in the population in the previous round and with the agent's arbitrary chosen conditional cooperative criterion. Such individuals imitate the social behaviour of role models based on their payoffs and prestige. The dependence is modelled by two population-level parameters: affinity towards payoff and affinity towards prestige . These affinities influence the degree to which agents value the payoff and prestige of role models. Agents update their conditional strategies by considering both parameters. The simulations in this study show that high levels of cooperation are established in a population consisting of heterogeneous conditional cooperators for a certain range of affinity parameters in repeated public good games. The results show that social value (prestige) is important in establishing cooperation.

scholarly journals Conditional cooperation and confusion in public-goods experiments

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (5) ◽  
pp. 1291-1296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew ◽  
Claire El Mouden ◽  
Stuart A. West
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Experimental Methods ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Common Assumption ◽  
Economics Experiments ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Public Good Games

Economic experiments are often used to study if humans altruistically value the welfare of others. A canonical result from public-good games is that humans vary in how they value the welfare of others, dividing into fair-minded conditional cooperators, who match the cooperation of others, and selfish noncooperators. However, an alternative explanation for the data are that individuals vary in their understanding of how to maximize income, with misunderstanding leading to the appearance of cooperation. We show that (i) individuals divide into the same behavioral types when playing with computers, whom they cannot be concerned with the welfare of; (ii) behavior across games with computers and humans is correlated and can be explained by variation in understanding of how to maximize income; (iii) misunderstanding correlates with higher levels of cooperation; and (iv) standard control questions do not guarantee understanding. These results cast doubt on certain experimental methods and demonstrate that a common assumption in behavioral economics experiments, that choices reveal motivations, will not necessarily hold.

scholarly journals The Role of the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Public Good and Public Bad Games: Evidence From a tDCS Study

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuyou Chen ◽  
Xinbo Lu ◽  
Yuzhen Li ◽  
Lulu Zeng ◽  
Ping Yu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
The Public ◽  
Gains And Losses ◽  
Public Good Games

Although humans constitute an exceptionally cooperative species that is able to collaborate on large scales for common benefits, cooperation remains a longstanding puzzle in biological and social science. Moreover, cooperation is not always related to resource allocation and gains but is often related to losses. Revealing the neurological mechanisms and brain regions related to cooperation is important for reinforcing cooperation-related gains and losses. Recent neuroscience studies have found that the decision-making process of cooperation is involved in the function of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). In the present study, we aimed to investigate the causal role of the VMPFC in cooperative behavior concerning gains and losses through the application of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). We integrated cooperation-related gains and losses into a unified paradigm. Based on the paradigm, we researched cooperation behaviors regarding gains in standard public good games and introduced public bad games to investigate cooperative behavior regarding losses. Our study revealed that the VMPFC plays different roles concerning gains and losses in situations requiring cooperation. Anodal stimulation over the VMPFC decreased cooperative behavior in public bad games, whereas stimulation over the VMPFC did not change cooperative behavior in public good games. Moreover, participants’ beliefs about others’ cooperation were changed in public bad games but not in public good games. Finally, participants’ cooperative attitudes were not influenced in the public good or public bad games under the three stimulation conditions.

scholarly journals Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games

Games ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 234-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Cartwright ◽  
Denise Lovett
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Public Good Games

scholarly journals Sharing the gains in forest management: Insights from the application of principles of collective action

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. e011
Author(s):  
Maria Alló ◽  
Maria L. Loureiro
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Forest Management ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Local Communities ◽  
Social Aspects ◽  
Forest Owners ◽  
Important Amount ◽  
Public Good Games

Aim of study: To analyze the factors that motivate the sharing of a contribution to a common pool resource (CPR).Area of study: We obtained data from Galicia communal forests during 2013-2014. Material and methods: A survey among forest owners in which questions about decisions, mimicking those in public good games, were included. In addition, the compliance with the principles of collective action (PCA), and their implications in the management of CPR were tested.Main results: PCA are not functioning perfectly in our sample of communal forest owners. In line with previous literature, results suggest that individuals are willing to share an important amount of endowment in a CPR. Examining the role that PCA play in individuals’ decisions, it was observable that when owners face the sharing of an endowment, the monitoring, conflict resolution mechanism and minimal recognition of rights imply more cooperative results. Current communal forests should promote a better application of these PCA in order to obtain a more cooperative behavior from their members.Research highlights: Communal forest owners are quite generous according to the results obtained. In addition, it has also been found that the endowment is an important factor to consider, while social aspects represented through the PCA also matter when explaining sharing decisions. The present study may be useful in order to promote stronger cooperation in local communities.

Efficiency and Stability of Sampling Equilibrium in Public Good Games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cesar Mantilla ◽  
Rajiv Sethi ◽  
Juan-Camilo CCrdenas
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Public Good Games

scholarly journals Beaten ballots: political participation dynamics amidst police interventions

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Toni Rodon ◽  
Marc Guinjoan
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Spatial Dynamics ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Political Mobilization ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Positive Spillover ◽  
Police Crackdown ◽  
Surrounding Areas ◽  
Empirical Approaches

Abstract What is the effect of violence on political mobilization? Taking the repression-mobilization nexus debate as a starting point, we study the effects of police interventions on political participation, focusing on the Spanish police crackdown on Catalonia's independence referendum on 1 October 2017. We analyze the effect of police actions on turnout using detailed aggregate data, as well as a survey conducted a few days after the referendum. The two empirical approaches show that police interventions had both deterrent and inverse spatial spillover effects. Although police raids had a local negative impact on turnout, they induced positive spillover effects in the surrounding areas. Our findings also indicate heterogeneity in the spatial dynamics, with police actions encouraging people to go to vote in nearby areas, but also mobilizing residents in neighboring areas to participate, especially those individuals with fewer incentives to turn out to vote.

scholarly journals Fractional Punishment of Free Riders to Improve Cooperation in Optional Public Good Games

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Rocio Botta ◽  
Gerardo Blanco ◽  
Christian E. Schaerer
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Phase Portrait ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Group Project ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
State Evolution ◽  
Public Good Games ◽  
Full Cooperation

Improving and maintaining cooperation are fundamental issues for any project to be time-persistent, and sanctioning free riders may be the most applied method to achieve it. However, the application of sanctions differs from one group (project or institution) to another. We propose an optional, public good game model where a randomly selected set of the free riders is punished. To this end, we introduce a parameter that establishes the portion of free riders sanctioned with the purpose to control the population state evolution in the game. This parameter modifies the phase portrait of the system, and we show that, when the parameter surpasses a threshold, the full cooperation equilibrium point becomes a stable global attractor. Hence, we demonstrate that the fractional approach improves cooperation while reducing the sanctioning cost.

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